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ABSTRACT
THE SELF, ETHICS AND POWER:
DEPTH IN AUGUSTINE, FOUCAULT AND MERLEAU-PONTY
SEPTEMBER, 1988
ROMAND COLES, B.S., WESTERN WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
M.A., WESTERN WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by: Professor William E. Connolly
This dissertation seeks to address the problems of
nihilism, normalization and atomistic egoism through a
discussion of the self, ethics and power. It aims at
the exploration and elaboration of a dialogical artistic
ethos that accents the value of diversity. Augustine
is an important figure in this project because of his
critique of the egoism of the Roman pagan self. Equally
important is his alternative confessing-self which seeks
to divert the externally directed lust of the egoistic
self inward into the self's depths where it seeks God's
truth. Augustine's alternative is problematic, and some
of these problems come to light in Foucault's critique of
the confessing quality of modern selves even though the
latter are not to be equated with Augustine's conception.
Foucault's critique of the modern episteme and modern
practices sheds light on modernity's tendencies towards
nihilism and normalization. This essay argues that far
vii
from being nihilistic, Foucault's notion of a dialogical
artistic ethos goes a good distance towards addressing
the problems of nihilism and normalization he acutely
identifies. Merleau-Ponty
' s philosophy in many ways
enhances Foucault's position. Merleau-Ponty
' s theory of
"depth being- elucidates the intercorporeality of world
in a way that emphasizes the value of our dialogical
relations with different others. His discussions of
aesthetics and artists are important for a further
elaboration of the dialogical artistic ethos and his
political writings allow us to develop the interrelations
between this ethos and democratic politics. Yet there are
important differences between Merleau-Ponty and Foucault
and they stem in large part from Merleau-Ponty ' s effort
to salvage - albeit in a radically transformed manner -
certain theoretical dimensions we find in Augustine's
thought. In the final chapter the three theorists are
brought together to access the relative merits of their
rhetorical and philosophical similarities and differences.
Much of the discussion revolves around each philosopher's
conception of depth, since the latter is a central concern
of each, through which each develops positions on the
central problems addressed in this dissertation.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Natural ecologists know that the boundaries between
two different ecological communities - for example, that
between a forest and a meadow - often harbor a greater
variety and density of life than either of the two
distinct communities alone. These edges are "special
meeting grounds" and "the mingling of animals from
different ecosystems charges such border zones with
evolutionary potential." 1 This fertility is often
referred to as the "edge effect" and the edge itself
wears the formal nomenclature "ecotone." The etymology
of the latter word is of some significance, stemming from
the Greek "oikos" or habitation and "tonos" or tension.
"Ecotone" and "edge effect" call our attention to the
life-engendering character of the ambiguous tension-
laden dwelling which emerges at the intersection between
differently constituted regions: they speak of the
pregnancy of edges.
This dissertation is about edges, not those between
forests and grasslands, but those between self and other,
and those between differences within the self. The edges
humans are most familiar with are often not pregnant with
life, but rather zones of destruction, boundaries between
1
warring countries. Western civilization has a long and
dark history with respect to edges; it tends to view them
as indicative of an evil that lies on the other side; it
constitutes them as regions to be forever thrust back and
ultimately eliminated at the moment when we conguer the
Other. Yet it is not just specific edges which pose
problems, but edges per se - we are a civilization that
on the whole - at least since Plato - dreams of a reality
without wild edges, a world encompassed within one Reason.
In the shadow of this dream it is little wonder that our
approach to edges is obliterating and that when we are
involved, edges are localities desolate rather than
fructiferous.
Yes, our wretched edges are a hauntingly ubiquitous
phenomenon. Our history is overflowing with barren
boundaries; those between master and slave, capitalist
and worker, humans and nature, male and female, white and
black, "normal" and "abnormal." Of course, each of these
oppositions is distinguished by specificities that are
far greater than the thin breath of ink called "comma"
which separates them might indicate. Yet there is sense
in this sequence. In each case, the hegemonic category
seeks to master and determine that which it is not. The
master masters the slave by ensuring both the distinction
between the two and the former's rule over the latter.
The "normal" masters the "abnormal" sometimes through
2
categorization, condemnation and ostracization, sometimes
by "helping,
» "healing" and pressuring in ways which draw
it into the circle of the Same. in both cases however,
what is
- or is to be - eliminated is the unmastered voice
and being of the Other. Thus, even where a difference is
constituted and perpetuated as essential - for example,
master and slave - the dynamic is fundamentally edge-
denying insofar as it seeks to obliterate the other's
Otherness. [That is, here, constituting the other as
other (slave) is at the center of the obliterative
dynamic] Hence even many of our socially constituted
differences and the boundaries which emerge at the
interstice operate to a very large degree to extend
mastery, thrust back edges and eliminate others'
differences
.
In contrast to what appears to me to be the funda-
mental bent of our history, this dissertation seeks the
beginnings of an ethos that is attuned to the value of
edges and those differences whose communication makes them
fertile. I seek a reevaluation of edges and difference -
not simply a new conceptualization of edges, but a new
reality as well, in light of a different conceptual
approach to and participation in the formation of edges.
It is my sense that the project of formulating an edge-
affirming ethos, and creating differences in light of
this ethos, must be one of the most fundamental dimensions
3
of our efforts to remedy our contemporary social and
political problems. So long as edges and diversity remain
anathema, we are doomed to a politics and life of explicit
or insidious conquest, a politics that seeks to obliterate
the otherness of others and in so doing devitalizes the
human and natural world. Of course, I am not arguing that
worldly change can be accomplished by the development of a
new ethos alone. Our ideas, attitudes and practices to a
large extent germinate within and are perpetuated by the
institutions we inhabit, and change requires that careful
attention be given to reality in all its dimensions. My
argument is simply that the ethical dimension is critical
and in this dissertation it is my primary focus.
Augustine, whom I explore in the first section is a
fascinating figure in light of these issues, for he has a
heightened sense and profound analysis of one important
mode of being which transforms the edge into a war zone as
it seeks to master all that is not the self: namely, that
of the egoistic self of ontological conceit which takes
itself as the ground of being. By carefully developing
Augustine's critique of the Roman pagan self, we gain
a critical elaboration of the dynamics and consequences
of egoism which is extremely insightful and serves as
a warning beacon of that from which we must steer clear
in our efforts to formulate an ethos with a greater
appreciation of difference.
4
Augustine attempts, through his notion of the
confessing-self, to formulate an ethos which does not
collapse everything to the self. The latter turns away
from the lust to dominate the world and towards the
depths of its soul, where it seeks to fashion even its
most fleeting desires in obedience to God's truth and
morality. Augustine seeks to escape the tyranny of
others' domination and conform to God in the depths of
his soul, and this involves a profound recognition that
others too are deep, diverse signs of God's polyphonous
voice rather than beings flattened to their "being-for-
the-self." Yet if Augustine opens the space for an
appreciation of others that appears to have been lacking
in decadent Rome, his relation to that which does not
"face God" is - in a sense developed in the concluding
section - monological: that which is not obedient to
God is "nothingness" and hence we discover that the
confessing-self confronts its Other - that which is not
sanctioned by God - in a manner that is very different
but every bit as relentless and extirpating as the pagan
self. For all of Augustine's profound insights into
depth, remembering, willing and unifying the scattered
self in confession, the edge at which he faces the non-
Christian - even within himself - is still a battlefield,
not a region of fertile intermingling. Thus, in this
respect, Augustine's confessing-self inadvertently
5
provides another beacon of warning of an ethos that
still seeks to endlessly thrust back edges, one that
proceeds not from the self, but from the one true God.
in section two I begin by elaborating Foucault's
analysis of the "normalizing" tendencies that characterize
much of the concrete functioning of power in modernity.
I briefly summarize his critique of normalization as it
operates through "panoptic power" and confessing practices
which assert that we harbor "deep truths" within us which
we must carefully decipher and follow. I then explore
these themes at a meta-theoretical level in his writing
on the modern episteme in The Order of Things When
Foucault's theoretical work is read in light of his
genealogies and vice versa, his work as a whole acquires
a level of profundity missed by many of his interpreters.
In contrast to Augustine, for whom depth is the dimension
of freedom, according to Foucault, depth is the dimension
of subjugation. It is that dimension in which we rout out
the other and constitute ourselves in light of hegemonic
norms. That we cannot "get to the bottom" of depth in
modernity does not signify that we have somehow come to
accept a degree of otherness, rather it merely ensures
the endlessness of subjugative interrogations.
Yet if Foucault's critique is extremely illuminating
of modern approaches to edges, equally interesting is the
alternative "ethos" which has guided most of his work.
6
in contrast to most of Foucault's critics, who essentially
charge Foucault with nihilism, I argue that Foucault's
work
- the content of his critique, its style and the
positive directions towards which it gestures - is
constituted around a dialogical artistic ethic which
affirms the importance of difference and the desirability
of giving shape to our individual lives and social milieu
in light of a "limit attitude" that affirms edges and
enriches human relations. Indeed, far from being a
nihilist, Foucault offers us important insights into
the possibility of ethics in a post-metaphysical age.
Merleau-Ponty, to whom I devote section three, is
a philosopher and political theorist for whom depth is
a central concern. Yet depth is not a dimension which
promises total identification, but rather a dimension
of the concealed in which things always partially exceed
and resist our gaze. Through an exploration of Merleau-
Ponty 's philosophy of depth (Etre profond) I begin to
articulate an ontology which harbors a profound awareness
and reverence for the edge between the self and other as
well as that which inhabits the terrain beyond this edge.
This insight acquires a particularly social significance
in light of Merleau-Ponty ' s thoughts on the "intercor-
poreality" of depth. I attempt to gather these insights
together, and draw on his writings on art and politics
as well, in an effort to develop an ethics and politics
7
of depth and distinction which extends the dialogical
artistic ethos initially formulated in the section on
Foucault
.
In the conclusion I contemplate the virtues and
dangers of each theorist in light of the insights
offered by the others. Particular focus is given to
the significance of the ontological and rhetorical
differences between Merleau-Ponty and Foucault with
respect to their mutual gestures towards a dialogical
artistic ethos. Finally, a brief and highly provisional
effort is made to formulate a few of the concrete social
and political implications of the insights which emerge
in this dissertation.
8
CHAPTER II
AUGUSTINE
Introducti on
From unfathomable depths a question emerges whose
answer lies most profoundly in the question itself.
Augustine queries: "What then am I, o my God? What
nature am I?" 1 This is the question through which the
Confessions are created; the restless question through
which Augustine is created; and hence the mysterious
question that transforms the self - the question's answer
- as both the subject and object of the question. It is a
question whose character and limits are defined by the God
he evokes - a God who guides the most sincere questioners.
With a passion rarely equaled in the history of western
thought Augustine pursues this question in search of the
deep truths within himself. In his peculiar occupation of
this question he signifies the dawn of the hermeneutic
self. In his most revealing moment he answers the
question thus: "I have become a question to myself." 2
"What is Augustine?" Augustine is a being whose
being is defined by the restlessness and depth of his
self-examination. Augustine is a confessing-self ; a
self that continually faces itself in the endless task
of discovering and telling the deepest truths about
9
itself. Augustine is a self that is itself a "soil"
into which it continually delves; a soil "heavy with
sweat .
"
Augustine's Confessions is an exemplary manifesta-
tion of a new way of being. it is the gesture, the
expression, the act of a new form of self. Long before
Michel Foucault, Augustine himself defined the Christian
self in contrast to all previous forms of selves, in part
through the act of confession. Even the Platonists, with
so many insights which Augustine respected, inhabited a
region far on the other side of a gigantic chasm with
respect to the type of selves they were. "Their pages
show nothing of the tears of confession. 1,3
The confessing-self is distinguished from previous
selves in that it is constituted through a very peculiar
movement: the movement of the self towards deciphering
its own depths. In a most fundamental sense, the
confessing-self is this movement. In its ceaseless
journey to reveal and examine its interior, it becomes
a being of depth. The confessing-self dwells in its
depth, the dimension which is simultaneously its most
profound discovery and that which makes confession both
possible and necessary.
As we inhabit the movements of Augustine's heart
and mind in his Confessions , we can begin to sense in a
profound and not entirely expressible manner, how it was
10
to be as Augustine was. The remarkable manner in which
Augustine attempts to confront the deepest realms of
himself, offers us a valuable access to Augustine's
being-as-confessor
.
Yet continual confession is not a way of being
of which Augustine is merely an innocent and unwitting
manifestation. As a particular expression of a new way
of being, a way of being which one is not unless one
chooses to become such through conversion, Augustine
continually makes explicit the fact that he is a
confessing-self
.
Unlike modern "western man," who
inhabits a world which Michel Foucault argues has
"become a singularly confessing society," 4 a society
in which confession is a constitutive element of so many
of our practices, institutions, discourses and ideals,
one in which all confess and all are born to be confessors
- Augustine inhabits a world in which non-confessing modes
of being have been hegemonic. Augustine's world is one in
which people are for the most part born non-confessors and
the techniques for producing confessing-selves with which
the modern world is saturated are largely absent. Hence
Augustine is quite aware that deep reflexivity is a
"different" mode of being. (This is not to say that
Augustine was one of the only confessing-selves of his
day. The early monastic self-examinations and the "self-
publication" in penitential rites were both important
11
mechanisms for producing confessing-selves
.
5 Further,
as Peter Brown has noted, Augustine associated with a
group of people concerned with "the events of their inner
life." Yet the techniques of confession were not nearly
as pervasive nor as dominant as they are today - and
Augustine in any case was extreme in his confessing. 7
)
The Confessions offers us more than an experience
of an early Christian's attempt to truly become a
confessing-self
.
What makes this book - this act of
self-reflection - so fertile, is that it is largely about
deep self-reflection itself. Augustine confesses about
confession. I know of few books that are so thoroughly
about themselves. Hence, the Confessions provides us
with an opportunity to begin to apprehend confession as
a confessing-self apprehended it from within confession.
Through a close reading of the Confessions , we can start
to perceive the way in which a confessor at the dawn of
confession could affirm confession as a mode of being.
Yet if we are to begin to experience and understand
this early confessing-self, it is insufficient to look
merely at this self's sel
f
-understanding . Augustine's
conversion and subsequent life as a confessor welled out
of his perception of the late antique Roman pagan world
and the type of selves which he believed constituted that
world. If it is true that Augustine was a confessing-self
because he thought confession was synonymous with being,
12
it is equally true and equally important, that Augustine
viewed the non-confessing Roman self as the origin of non-
being. Hence it is only through a textured understanding
of Augustine's analysis of the way of being which he
rejected, that we can comprehend the mode he affirmed.
In the discussions of the Roman pagan self and the
Christian confessing self which follow, I have focused
particularly upon the specificity of and interrelation-
ships between three dimensions which consistently
characterize Augustine's analysis. One of these is the
importance Augustine places upon attempting to understand
both the implicit and explicit ontological framework
within which different selves constitute themselves.
Closely related to this dimension are Augustine's efforts
to disclose the deep psychological characteristics of
selves. Indeed, the ontological and psychological
dimensions are generally so inextricably intertwined in
Augustine's analysis that we might best describe his
studies as "psycho-ontological . " Finally, it is crucial
to realize that Augustine does not view the self as a
static entity, but rather as a being characterized by its
dynamic relations with itself and the world. It is these
relations which Augustine seeks to discern; and because
they are dynamic he is primarily concerned with the
trajectory that different types of selves assume: either
13
towards strength, unity, love, truth and God or towards
weakness, dispersion, concupiscence and illusion.
The salience of these three dimensions will become
clearer in light of the following discussion. We will
begin with Augustine 's critique of the Roman pagan self
in an effort to situate the discussion of Augustine's
confessing-self which will follow.
Augustine's Critique of fche Roman Pagan Self
Augustine recounts the history of Rome as a long dark
succession of conquests, civil wars, tyrannies, rapes - a
seemingly endless tale of subjugation. It is a history of
cruelty that was driven by the "lust for domination" 8 and
the quest for glory. Even Rome's peace was structured
around the dominion of some people over others. Yet
domination is never understood by Augustine to rise
out of particular social and political organizations.
Instead, Rome's social structures and the horrors so
often associated with them, are always perceived to
originate from the Roman pagan self's way of being.
Slavery, poverty, bloodshed and obscenities are simply
manifestations of selves in error: selves of civitas
terrena . How does Augustine understand this Roman pagan
self - this self whose pervasive causality echoes so
violently across the face of the earth?
14
Following scripture, Augustine argues that pride is
the start of the evil will [and]... of every kind of sin."*
Rome's lust for dominion originates in pride. Yet what
is pride? Simply a moral error? Pride certainly has a
moral and psychological character, but more profoundly,
the psychological "longing for a perverse kind of
exaltation" 10 is intertwined with an ontological error.
Viewed ontologically, "this then is the original evil:
man regards himself as his own light " 11 (my emphasis).
For Augustine, God is the ground and origin of all
being. He is the "light" which gives Being, Truth and
Goodness to all beings and He illuminates His creation
and thereby makes it perceptible to these beings. The
ontological error committed by the proud, is to view
themselves as self-originating light: self-originating
being. Under the sway of this profound ontological error
people view themselves as the independent source of their
own existence and as the source of the light in which the
truth about other beings is illuminated as well. For the
proud self, being and truth originate in the self alone.
Concerning the fall from the garden Augustine writes that
Adam and Eve "made themselves their own ground" instead
of adhering to the "real ground of their being." 12
Already we begin to see the way in which psychology
and ontology are inseparable in Augustine's analysis.
He argues that this perverse "exaltation derives from
15
a fault in character"" (my emphasis). The fault in
character however, is a very specific fault which refers
to the ontological dimension, namely the desire to be
self-originating being. The essence of the conceit that
is the origin of all evil is that it is ontological
conceit. As the primordial conceit, ontological conceit
is the origin and basis for all other conceit.
In taking itself to the origin of its own being, the
self of the purest form of ontological conceit renunciates
its relations of reciprocity with and its dependence upon
the world, others and God. Freed from all necessary
relationships with anything that is "other" than itself,
the self becomes conditionless and absolute. As absolute,
the self lives according to itself and grants itself
universal status. In Augustine's words, the self lives
"by the rule of itself." 14
Lest we fall prey to an oversimplification of
Augustine's understanding of pagan selves and the possi-
bility of a misleading anachronism, these lines should
be read with caution and deserve further clarification.
Augustine's description of the "origin of all evil" should
not be construed in a manner that would establish an
identity between Roman pagan selves and "modern subjects."
If pagan selves could simply be reduced to the pure form
of ontological conceit described above, such a comparison
might be inviting. Modern subjects as we find described
16
and criticized variously in many of Heidegger and Hegel's
texts (among others) seem to exemplify some of the
qualities that Augustine believed were most at the heart
of evil: the self being its own ground, living according
to its own rule. Yet - with the exception of Augustine 's
analysis of the most wicked who seek to master the earth -
his writing on the Roman pagan self reflects an awareness
of the extent to which ontological conceit manifests
itself in a highly differentiated world of beliefs and
events; a world originating in, sustained and exacerbated
by ontological conceit, yet one in which the latter
frequently did not appear on the surface of beliefs and
events in the pure form described here. Certainly it is
a world far from that of modern selves in important ways.
Once humans take themselves to be their "own light," they
lose the truths that Augustine believed only God's light
could illuminate and fall into an extended progression of
errors. Often these errors were purely self-centered, but
often as well, they were more complicated. In error, the
Romans invented "false gods" and religious worship that
connected them to a metaphysical world upon which they
were dependent. Augustine does not argue that in the
complicated world of pagan cosmology all selves explicitly
conceived of themselves as self-originating. Rather he
• • • .
i rdescribes their metaphysics as "pitiable folly":
pitiable not only for its falsity, but also because of
17
the extent to which this metaphysics harbored and nurtured
the germ cells of the ontological conceit which produced
enormous cruelty and led them beyond all bounds - even
those posed by pagan religion. According to Augustine,
the behavior and exploits - the violence, cruelty, lusts -
of the pagan gods was emblematic of and hence fostered the
very ontological conceit and lust for dominion in which
they originated. While the self was not the explicit
center of Roman paganism in the large sense, nevertheless,
on Augustine's account this paganism generated and
encouraged thoughts, desires and practices - the self's
mode of being
- that were purely self-aggrandizing. Hence
most essentially, the pagan selves were for Augustine
selves of ontological conceit. His discussion of
ontological conceit is an attempt to capture the origin,
essence of and driving force underneath and implicit in
the desires, thoughts and practices of Roman pagan selves
- not an attempt to reductively equate all of their
thoughts and practices with ontological conceit in its
purest form. I am interested in Augustine's analysis of
the qualities and dynamic of this essence and hence pitch
my discussion at this level. I do not wish to imply a
reduction of the explicit religious beliefs of this self.
It is interesting to note - as I develop in the next
chapter - that Augustine believes that he only escapes
ontological conceit when he becomes a confessing Christian
18
self. Though he endorsed Christian belief a good deal
before his conversion, he did not truly become a Christian
until he overcame his ontological conceit - implicit in
the willing of his everyday life - by turning inward
towards his depths and God. Christianity's superiority,
in Augustine's eyes, lies not only in the humble place
it accords man in the grand scheme of things, but in the
humble mode of experiencing the everyday world at the
basic level of desire, perception, judgment.
When the self dwells in the ontology of conceit, its
experience of the world - a combination of perception and
judgment - is fundamentally transformed. For Augustine,
"it is the nature of things considered in itself, without
regard to our convenience or inconvenience, that gives
glory to the creator." 16 Thus, "he lives in justice who
is an unprejudiced assessor of the intrinsic value of
17things." Just judgment is that which judges the
intrinsic, which for Augustine always refers to God as
the condition of all beings. Because we are finite beings
with an incomplete perspective on the world, the intrinsic
is always to a greater or lesser extent elusive. The
world's meaning is rarely if ever simply identical with
the meanings we discover. Hence for Augustine, the
Christian self is always aware of the incompleteness that
always points beyond to something "other" than itself and
its own experience; an incompleteness that can only be
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filled by faith. Everything is part of that deep design
which no human being can completely discover. 18
For the purely self-originating self, beings in the
world cease to have intrinsic value as creatures of God
and cease to be evaluated with respect to the ordered
whole of creation. Instead, all beings - the world
itself, all that is "other" - are reduced to being
experienced as objects that exist for this self which
takes itself as the origin of being. The being of all
that is not the self, all that is "other," is reduced
to being a "being-for-the-sel f " of ontological conceit,
because this self has only itself to refer to. The
salience of this problem is indicated in the first
paragraph of the City of God where Augustine characterizes
the city of this world as a place where justice is absent
from judgment. No one can be sure they judge justly, but
Roman pagan selves do not even attempt to judge in a just
manner in Augustine's view. They judge not the intrinsic
value of things, but the things' value for the self.
The proud self lives and experiences the world
according to the "flesh." by which Augustine does not
refer primarily to our physical flesh, but rather to the
self as a whole, soul and body. Examining St. Paul's
"Epistle to the Galatians," Augustine notes that works of
the flesh "include x faults of the mind' such as enmity,
I Q
animosity and envy as well as bodily lusts. I,J-^ To live by
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the flesh is to "live by the rule of fha selj and it ig
thus that man "becomes like the Devil"20 (my emphasis)
,
To experience the world according to the flesh is to
experience the world exclusively from the perspective of
self
-centered being, and this for Augustine is to live in
"lust" in the worst sense of the word. Again however,
"lust" is not meant in this sense to refer fundamentally
to the physical dimension, but rather to the desire of
the self of ontological conceit for an object . Lust as
conceited objectifying desire, can take a bodily form
( libido carnalis ) or a more psychological form as in the
lust for power ( libido dominandi )
.
Lust is not a possibility for the proud self - it is
a necessity imposed by the experience it has of the world.
The self which strove for absolute freedom by taking
itself to be the condition of its own being - its own
light, its own ground - culminates in the most depraved
state of slavery. The self experiences around itself a
world of beings which have been flattened out to their
value for-the-self
. However, this experience of the
object flattens and drains the subject as well as the
object. Each object, as for-the-self, demands that the
self desire and appropriate it. The self is flattened
to the single dimension of lust as it strives to conguer
a world that invites - a world that insists - that the
self subjugate it. But at the same time the subject is
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flattened, it is crushed and dispersed into as many
objects as it desires.
Hence the world as experienced through ontological
conceit leads to life lived in "lust" according to the
"flesh." The great intensity of this experience can
be gleaned from Augustine's account of his attempt to
overcome it prior to his conversion:
When I rose against you in my
pride.
. .those lower things became
greater than I and pressed me under
so that I could neither loosen their
grip nor so much as breathe. Wherever
I looked they bore in upon me, massed
thick; and when I tried to think, the
images of corporeal things barred me
from turning back towards the truth,
as though they said: "Where are you
going base and unclean?" All these
things had grown out of my wound, for
You humble the proud like one wounded;
and I was separated from You by my own
swollenness, as though my cheeks had
swelled out and closed up my eyes. 1
Augustine views this pre-conversion period as one when
he was so enslaved by his experience of the world (a world
of objects and images of objects which grew "out of his
wound") that despite his faith in holy scripture and
Christ, he was still unable to free himself from its grip
even though he longed to do so. In spite of his efforts
to think, the world he experienced - a world revealed in
ontological conceit - conscripted him into other forms of
toil. In this state, he was blinded by false experiences
which he could not escape. The desire for the self's
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absolute hegemony over objects fosters a relentless and
in some ways more profound hegemony of objects over the
self.
Let us explore two of the most important and most
"enslaving" lusts that Augustine addresses, in order to
gain a more textured understanding of his interpretation
of the Roman pagan self.
"The most pitiless domination," Augustine argues,
"is that exercised by this very lust for domination." 22
It is this lust to dominate other people which dominates
"the city of this world." 23 The selves of ontological
conceit view themselves (at least implicitly, on
Augustine's account) as absolute subjects and "live
according to their own rule." As the self ground of
being, the proud self seeks to impose its being and its
standards upon "others." For if others were to live
according to "other" standards, the self's absoluteness
and independence would be jeopardized. The only way this
self, which Augustine describes as a "perverted imitation
of God," 24 can maintain the illusion of being independent
and absolute in its involvement with others is by obliter-
ating others' otherness. Hence the self "seeks to impose
• • • • ? Sits own dominion on fellow men in place of God's rule."
"The wicked. . .desire to make all men their own people,
if they can, so that all men can be subservient to one
master." 26 Indeed, the only peace this "puffed up" self
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can accept, is one where it is absolutely hegemonic. Such
a peace would confirm the illusions which well out of
ontological conceit - all other peace mocks these false-
hoods. Augustine asks rhetorically, "when can that lust
for power come to rest until after passing from one office
to another, it arrives at sovereignty." 27
Yet in attempting to impose its dominion, the
self confronts other similar selves with antithetical
objectives. "Hence human society is generally divided
against itself." 28 m absence of fear, the libido
dominandi ran its unchecked course after the destruc-
tion of Carthage, resulting in "bloody insurrection...
disastrous quarrels ... the slaughter of civil wars...
torrents of bloodshed.
.. greed and monstrous seething
cruelty " 29 The desire to impose the self's rule
on others is the most pitiless lust, because it is the
most impossible lust to satisfy, and because it is the
most cruel.
While Augustine sees the dynamic of libido dominandi
play itself out time and time again throughout history, it
is important to note that this dynamic is a tendency of,
but not an absolute necessity for, the self of conceited
ontology. There are times when these selves constitute
situations where this tendency is largely contained. Fear
for example, such as that which existed in the rivalry
between Rome and Carthage, might produce "a period of high
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moral standards . "30 Yet tne fear . r ^.^ ^
standards were based, was itself grounded in the unstable
lusts of conceited ontology, lusts which could not rest
long in a state of relative equality with others. The
libido dominandi destroyed the unlikely preconditions of
its containment and "first established victory in a few
powerful individuals, and then crushed the rest of an
exhausted country beneath the yoke of slavery." 31
Likewise, the passion for glory, which itself stems
from and is "puffed up with empty conceit" 32 may check
the other lusts for a period of time. The object which
glory seeks is "the judgment of men when they think well
of others." 33 Here, the self desires subjects more than
objects for itself. The self that seeks glory depends
upon others to recognize it as the origin of the greatness
which it continually attempts to demonstrate. Blinded by
its conceited ontology, this self strives "to do things so
that others will be 'converted' to itself." 34 in this
sense the desire for glory is another "perverted imitation
of God."
Yet while Augustine states that glory is a vice, he
recognizes that it can be regarded as a virtue as well, in
the sense that it checks other vices. In its best form,
glory, though it seeks "merely human praise, is anxious
for the good opinion of enlightened judges." 35 This
desire for glory seeks to identify itself with a good
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that is not merely its own good, but a good for others
as well. Augustine praises this glory in the early
Romans
:
They took no account of their own
material interests compared with
the common good... they resisted
the temptation of avarice; they
acted for the country's well-being
with disinterested concern; they
were guilty of no offence against
the law, they succumbed to no
sensual indulgence. By such
immaculate conduct, they labored
towards honours, power and glory,
by what they took to be the true'
way. Jb
This is an extremely interesting passage, because
it illustrates Augustine's belief that the ontology of
conceit could generate desires for social recognition
that could actually give rise to what he considered to
be altruistic "praiseworthy" behavior. (It is note-
worthy that the desire for glory is considered good in
Augustine's view only when it takes form in the world in
a way that stands in sharp contrast to the conceit in
which it is born.) Yet like the situation of fear, the
desire for glory, as Roman history itself attests, is an
extremely unstable basis for virtue, for it preserves a
conceited ontology that constantly threatens to engender
more depraved lusts. Hence, at first the passion for
glory gave rise to a love of liberty, "but when liberty
had been won, such a passion for glory took hold of them,
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that liberty alone did not satisfy - they had to acquire
dominion.'-37 The conceit that had taken an altruistic
form, undermined this very altruism when freedom and
altruism became mundane and insufficient to feed the
thirst for glory.
Thus Augustine writes that although there is a
difference between the desire for glory and the lust for
dominion, "there is a slippery slope... from the excessive
delight in the praise of men to the burning passion for
domination."-38 The best desire for glory seeks the praise
of "enlightened judges," but it harbors within it the germ
cells of deceit and domination. Furthermore, in its (most
common) degraded form, it enslaves people to the judgments
of other evil men. In this sense it enhances an experi-
ence of the world that obliterates the space for the self
as well as the other - the world that Augustine describes
as "massed thick." It leads to a world that "bore in
upon" him and "pressed him under."
Let us turn now to another lust which one comes
across in Augustine's writings: libido carnalis or sexual
lust. Here, I believe, Augustine is responding to another
form of what he perceived to be flattening objectifica-
tion. Without wishing in this work to explore the history
of antique sexual practices in any detail, let me simply
note a few references that might caution us against a
trite dismissal of Augustine's concern over sexuality on
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the basis of the belief that it was due simply to his
weird personality, his personal obsessions, etc. However
"weird" Augustine may have been, there is reason to
suspect that he was not responding to nothing.
There are good reasons to believe that antique and
late antique "sexuality" was constituted within a set
of practices and understandings based on a rigid split
between those who were subjects and those who were
objects. In the four volumes of Histoire do i a Seyu.lita
Michel Foucault conducts an archeological and genealogical
study of sexuality during different periods of western
history. His discussion of antique Greek sexuality is
particularly interesting in that it addresses the subject-
object dichotomy which we have argued was central to
Augustine's critique of the Roman pagan self.
Foucault rejects the notion that the modern French
"sexualite" can be used to translate the Greek term
"aphrodisia. 11
Our idea of "sexuality" does not
just cover a wider area; it applies
to a reality of another type, and it
functions quite differently in our
morals and knowledqe. Moreover, we
do not have a concept that specifies
and subsumes a set analogous to that
of aphrodisia. 39
Hence he employs the Greek term to maintain the distance
between our notions of those of antiquity. While there
are many important differences, the one that interests
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us here is the way in which antique "aphrodisia" was
totally a subject-object dichotomized activity. when
"aphrodisiazien" (the verb corresponding to aphrodisia)
was employed in its active form it referred to the
masculine subject of the sexual relation. The passive
form of the verb referred to the passive object -
generally women, boys, slaves or those who through
violence found themselves "reduced to being the object
of the other's pleasure." 40 The sexual act was one in
which active subjects viewed their potential "partners"
as objects for the subject's pleasure. According to
Foucault, this mode of perception and thought was a
frequent theme in antique Greek thought. The fundamental
assumption was that the "other" (generally non-adult male)
in the sexual relation was an object-for-the-self
.
With respect to Rome there are indications of
objectifying sexual practices as well (though I do not
imply an identity here)
. While in Book Two of The Art
of Love, Ovid argues that "men and women should share the
same pleasures," 41 his instructions are aimed at teaching
the reader how to find an "object for your love," and
Ovid assumes and affirms that each person views others as
potential objects for the self's pleasure and dominion.
When the "other" is viewed as a subject (of pleasure,
perception of action) , it is almost always in an effort
to enhance the self's dominion over the other. One finds
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evidence of the close association between sexual pursuit
and domination in the metaphors and analogies which are
employed in Ovid's poetry. The male who pursues women
is continually equated with the soldier and (to a lesser
extent) the hunter. indeed, "love is a species of war-
fare." 42 Ovid suggests that his poetic instructions on
love should be used as weapons: "As Vulcan made arms for
Achilles, so have I done for you: then use my gift, as
he did, to conquer." 43 m both Ovid and Petronius the
male sexual organ is referred to as a weapon. in
Petronius' Satyricon, Polyaenus attempts to apologize
for his impotence and writes to Circe: "Remember this
one thing, not I but my instruments were at fault. The
soldier was ready, but I had no weapons." 44
In short, sexual pursuit here seems to be largely
identified with struggle for dominion. The greater
the intensity of struggle, the greater the pleasure of
conquest. Perhaps Fellini's Satvricon provides us with
an illuminating modern artistic rendering of the inter-
twining of sexuality, domination and conceit in Rome
- an illumination which might help us situate Augustine.
I have come across no passages where sexual lust
is explicitly identified with the lust for dominion in
Augustine's own writing. Rather, the closeness of the
two seems to be an assumption that haunts his work. The
arguments in the City of God shift to and fro between
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the two lusts with an ease that is often difficult for
the modern reader (given his or her assumptions about
sexuality) to follow. As G. I. Bonner argues, one area
where sexuality and the lust for domination are brought
into a particularly close relation to one another is in
Augustine's discussion of Roman pagan religion.
In significant fashion.
. . the twin
libidines are brought together in
the official worship of pagan Rome
The glories of conquest are thought,
to depend upon ritual obscenities. 4 ^
According to Augustine both lusts originate in
ontological conceit and both are manifestations of the
enslavement of the self that occurs as the result of our
own "disobedience." It is this latter point (which sexual
lust illustrates more lucidly than any other lust) that
Augustine seeks to elucidate throughout much of his
discussion of libido carnalis . In a sense it seems to be
the sexual lust's domination over the self (a recurrent
theme in Ovid as well) that Augustine finds more profound
than its domination over others (this latter point was
perhaps so obvious that it was taken largely for granted)
.
As we have seen, the self of ontological conceit
attempts to become an absolute subject who lives according
to his own rule and denies any dependence upon God and the
world. Yet the ultimate irony of this self's claim to
be independent, self originary and self-controlling being,
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is that it initiates an atomization of subjectivity which
continues beyond the level of the self. m becoming a
self of ontological conceit the self becomes a kind of
being that is unable to control - and falls victim to -
the process of disintegration which it sets in motion.
The conceited self is a self which, as it tries to
separate itself off from the true source of being and
become absolute, initiates a process of separation and
disintegration in which parts within the self make similar
demands for autonomy and control which the self cannot
resist.
Augustine writes that, "the retribution for dis-
obedience is simply disobedience itself. For man's
wretchedness is nothing but his disobedience to
himself.
"
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...he who in his pride had pleased
himself was by God's justice handed
over to himself. But the result of
this was not that he was in every
way under his own control, but that
he was at odds with himself, and
lived a life of harsh pitiable
slavery, instead of the freedom
he so ardently desired.... 47
It seems that Augustine has two (related)
interpretations of man's fall into disobedience to
himself. In one sense, this disobedience was inflicted
upon man by God as a form of retribution for man's pride.
God transformed man's body - it became mortal, and certain
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parts of his flesh ceased to submit to his will. m
another sense however, Augustine views this disobedience
to be connected in a far more organic manner to the mode
of being to which the self of ontological conceit gives
rise to. As we have seen, the self of ontological
conceit is trapped in a mode of experiencing the world
which holds sway over it even when it tries to resist
this mode. Within this experience, the world demands
that the self dominate it. Hence as we have seen, the
lust for domination is a form of compulsion which the
self is unable to control. The self becomes subject to
a disobedient lust within itself. Yet this slavery may
or may not be apparent to the self, depending upon the
extent to which the self unguestioningly affirms its
domination over others.
It is the sexual lust which most undeniably announces
the self's disobedience to itself. Even those who affirm
this lust are continuously and obviously subject to it:
In fact, not even the lovers of this
kind of pleasure are moved... just
when they have so willed. Sometimes
the impulse is an unwanted intruder,
sometimes it abandons the eager lover,
and desires to cool off in the body
while it is at boiling heat in the
mind. Thus strangely does the lust
refuse to be a servant... it is quite
often divided against itself. It
arouses the mind, but does not follow
its own lead and arouse the body. 48
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The self of ontological conceit is linked to the
world in multiple ways through the immediacy of desi:
that are evoked by the self's erroneous experience within
which the world appears as an object-for-itself
. The
proud self is continually thrown outside of f in
its lust to appropriate the world. "it casts away what
is most inward to it, and swells greedily for outward
things." 49 Embroiled in the unmediated desire for the
world around it, the self is consequently an unreflective
self. Augustine describes his pre-conversion period as
one where he was "behind (his) own back." 50
It is at precisely this point that the proud self
becomes a victim of its demand to be a self-originating
subject. For the type of self which results from this
demand is so unreflective and beyond itself that it is
unable to control the various parts of its own body and
soul. The self's ontological conceit incites the various
parts of the self in such an immediate and powerful
manner, that they become autonomous subjects themselves.
The pagan self, as an unreflective conglomeration of these
desires, is unable to control them. Thus according to
Augustine, the atomization which the self initiated for
its own advantage when it claimed to be a self-originating
being independent from creation and God, proceeds beyond
the level of the self and actually disintegrates the ones
who attempt to "swell."
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The proud self becomes the locus of multiple
subjects, each of which attempts to govern the whole.
Sexual lust becomes uncontrollable, and at its height
leads to a "total extinction of mental alertness .
"
5 1
The undeniability of the autonomy of the sexual lust
which originates in pride, leads to shame. Humans are
according to Augustine, universally "embarrassed by the
insubordination of their flesh." 52
Thus, Augustine tries to show not only that the
self of ontological conceit objectifies and attempts to
dominate the world around it, but further that it is an
assemblage of self-defeating motives. Born in pride, this
self ends in shame. Its quest for absolute freedom leads
to slavery. Its attempt to be the self-centered locus of
expansion culminates in the disintegration and dispersion
of the self. In short, the attempt to live as self-
grounded being leads the self further and further away
from being. "Vanity," says Augustine, "is nothingness." 53
And nothingness has a powerful inertia. For to the
extent that the proud are absorbed in the external world,
they are "behind their own backs," non-reflective and
victims of habit. Trapped in immediacy, the self of
ontological conceit is "pressed under" by an experience of
the world that is "massed thick" and provides exceedingly
little room for self-examination which might lead to self-
criticism and change. Augustine laments, "I know how
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great is the effort needed to convince the proud of the
power and excellence of humility." 54
The ontology of conceit and the absence of self-
relection are inseparably linked in a mutually reinforci
dynamic according to Augustine. Conceited ontology
develops in those who are blind to their own dependence
upon God and the world and unable to see their weaknesses.
For Augustine, it is impossible to be face to face with
oneself and still affirm that one is the origin of
Being, Truth and Goodness. Likewise, unreflectiveness
proliferates in those who dwell in the confidence and
immediacy of their ontological error.
As Augustine stared into the face of the darkness of
his age, he saw at the origin of a multifarious evil, a
self that willed an ontology of conceit and was constantly
outside itself in its relentless expansive appropriation
of the world. His cure would consist in changing the
self's trajectory; rerouting its outward course back
toward the inner depths of the soul in search of the
voice of God within. The self would become a problem
for itself, and in the process a new self would be
created: a confessing-self
. But what would remain
hauntingly familiar in Augustine's portrayal of and his
existence as a confessing-self
, is a certain quality of
relentlessness
.
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Augustine's Cojifessina^self
in opposition to a world that was "massed thick"
with selves who were "outside themselves" and experienced
others as obj ects-for-the-self - a world largely dominated
by the lust for dominion
- Augustine sought to nurture
the civitas Dei. However, the City of God would not be
fundamentally understood in terms of a different institu-
tional structuring of life any more than the problems of
the city of earth were understood fundamentally to result
from any particular social arrangement. Rather, the city
of God would represent a type of self that stands in
diametrical opposition to the self of the ontology of
conceit.
But what would this Christian self be like? Would it
worship God and follow his commandments? Certainly, but
the difference between the Christian and the non-Christian
selves would run far deeper than a set of beliefs or a
moral code. Augustine's conception of the Christian self
was most fundamentally concerned with the trajectory of
the soul. If the self of the ontology of conceit had
engendered a way of being whose fundamental motion was one
of "going outside itself" in its unreflective enslavement
to the immediacy of lust, the new self would have to
change this motion if it was to recover a truer way of
being and a truer ontology. Instead of moving away, the
Christian self in Augustine's view would be fundamentally
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defined by its perpetual trajectory towards the depths of
itself in order to rout out Godless desires and conform
one's soul to the will of God. m a most profound way,
the Christian self would be this reflective trajectory.
Its existence would be transformed by this motion, through
which it would purify and create itself.
For Augustine, in the most fundamental sense, to
become a Christian is to be perpetually engaged in this
hermeneutics of the self. To be a Christian self, that
is, to be
,
is to be a confessing-self : a self that
has itself as an object for deep and endless Christian
discernment. The confessing-self has the perpetual task
of finding and telling the truth about itself, for it is
only through this ceaseless confession that the Christian
can be a being capable of truly embracing Christian
metaphysics and Christian moral standards. Augustine
believes that in absence of confession the ontology of
conceit and the "slippery slope" towards the lust for
dominion would continually reemerge. Put simply, in
absence of the deep self-reflection and self-discipline
according to God's light which occurred in confession,
vanity would assert itself and the self would be too
dispersed and multiple to be a responsible, just and
Christian human being.
To be just is not simply a matter of occasional
reflection for Augustine. Instead, the self must strive
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to be a deeply reflective confessing being: always. To
be a confessing-self is an endless and demanding course
requiring the continuous consumption of one's life and
one's energy. Yet for Augustine, the life and quality
and quantity of energy which one gains through confession
far surpasses that which is expended. To put it in these
terms however, is much too modern. For Augustine it was
a question of being or nothinan^.. The trajectory of
the soul
- towards or away from itself and God - within
one's daily life determined the larger trajectory of one's
life: towards justice and Being on the one hand, or the
"slippery slope" towards domination and nothingness on the
other.
The slippery slope was far easier to follow than the
ascending path towards justice and God. Slaves took the
former direction, those struggling for freedom took the
latter. The self as it naturally occurred in the fallen
world (or one might say unnaturally
, in the sense that
selves in this world were fallen) was, as long as it
remained in this unreflective state, insufficient for the
struggle for freedom. The confessing-self was a creation
which might make this struggle - this journey - possible;
and this journey would eventually make confession easier.
God was essential to both.
The fallen self however, with its lusts and deeply
buried dark drives would never simply be transcended while
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humans lived on earth. Rather it would always lurk in the
background; a source of suspicion which always called for
further reflection. Human evil was too ubiquitous, too
deeply rooted and too recalcitrant for the confessing-self
to ever cease its inward gaze.
Conversion: The Birth of the r-onfessinn ^ *
Augustine's life prior to conversion was not one that
was completely devoid of self-reflection. For years he
was aware of and disturbed by his sexual lusts. But when
and where reflection was not completely absent, it was
at best intermittent and false in Augustine's view.
Augustine the confessor, reflects upon his pre-conversion
life as one where he was a slave to his lusts and his
pride. When he saw evil within: "I very much preferred
to excuse myself and accuse some other thing that was
in me but was not I." 55 (Augustine's debate with the
Manichees should be situated within the overriding issue
of deep self-consciousness.) Of his iniquity Augustine
writes: I had known it, but I had pretended not to see
it, had deliberately looked the other way and let it go
from my mind." 56
In short, Augustine had tried to avoid self-
reflection, and where he could not avoid it, he attempted
to view the origin of evil in such a way that he would
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not have to identify with it and thus consider it more
seriously. Augustine was reflective in the sense that he
was consumed with questions on the nature of evil and God,
but he was not truly self reflective in the deep sense
which would later seem so unavoidable to him. These
former philosophical questions had a distance from
his inner soul which they would never have after his
conversion.
Augustine's conversion occurs after Ponticianus tells
him and Alypius about the conversion of two officials
prompted by a written account of the life of St. Anthony.
The experience of conversion as the birth of deep self-
reflection is striking in the passage that follows:
This was the story Ponticianus told.
But You, Lord, while he was speaking,
turned me back towards mvself, taking
me from behind mv own back where I
had put myself all the time that I
preferred not to see myself. And
You set me there before my own face
that I might see how vile I was, how
twisted and unclean and spotted and
ulcerous. I saw mvself and was
horrified; but there was no way to
flee from mvself . If I tried to
turn my gaze from myself, there
was Ponticianus telling what he was
telling; and again You were setting
me face to face with mvself. forcing
me upon my own sight, that I might
see mv iniguitv and loath it. I had
known it, but I had pretended not
to see it, had deliberately looked
the other way and let it go from my
mind. 7 (My emphasis.)
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Conversion, for Augustine, is not most fundamentally
a ohange in "belief." speaking to God of his thoughts
prior to conversion Augustine says:
I believed that You were... andthat in Christ Your Son Our Lord
and in the Holy Scriptures which'the authority of Your Catholic
Church acknowledges, You had
established the way of man's
salvation. °°
Yet the explicit faith in Christianity was superficial
insofar as it remained outside of the inner movements of
his soul, movements which implicated the self at this deep
and truest level in a very conceited metaphysics. if in
conversion one comes to truly face God for the first time,
the even more profound change which allows the self to
face God, as we begin to see in the above passage, is
that the self comes to truly face itself in God's light:
its "iniquity" and iniquity's implications. it is a
fundamental change in the self's being that transforms
the quality which God has for the self and the self's
relation to God.
There is probably no way for a modern human being
to feel the trauma of this conversion experience, for
deep self-reflection is one of the defining character-
istics of our age, albeit a deep self-reflection that
is not explicitly Christian and is inscribed in a very
different constellation of power - part of a very
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different epistemic terrain. (This theme is explored
more thoroughly in chapters that follow.) For Augustine,
becoming a confessing-self is the most traumatic expert
ence of his life. At the age of thirty-one Augustine's
existence undergoes a transformation which may properly be
conceived of as one of the most profound transformations
of the self in Western history. This is not to say that
Augustine's conversion is a watershed event which marks
the birth of the confessing-self
. Augustine was by no
means the first confessor. Yet his own life (as is the
case with many lives of Christians in late antiquity)
is divided by this critical disjuncture: on one side
Augustine dwells as a non-confessing being - a type of
being he would later despise; and on the other he is
a confessing-self
- a self which earlier was incompre-
hensible to him. (One of the things that makes
Augustine's thinking so interesting is that though he
writes as a confessing-self, he writes as one who has
dwelled within two radically different epistemes.) That
such a transformation was understood as the beginning of
a radically new life should not surprise us. That any
continuity remained at all is astounding.
"The day was come when I stood naked in my own
sight and my conscience accused me." 59 In the passage
quoted at length above, Augustine declares repeatedly
in astonishment, the experience of becoming a deeply
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self-reflective beinq. The^ +-kg * inese are the redundant cries
of one who confronts
- in this case becomes - the
unbelievable. At first Augustine felt horrified and
trapped, but finally there was "no way to flee" from
confession. Augustine has become a confessing-self
.
Being-as-Confession: "What Am t?»
Face to face with himself, Augustine asks, "What
then am I, o my God? What nature am I?" 6 0 Augustine
finds no simple answer to this question and he continues
to ask it in various ways throughout his life. However,
at one point
- a moment of remarkable insight - Augustine
discovers an answer that refers back to the question
itself. At the end of a wrenching inner debate over
whether or not the church should resonate with beautiful
melodies or bland monotonic psalms (to prevent ensnaring
pleasures) as well as the question of how his own desires
might be implicated in the answers he poses, Augustine
writes: "I have become a question to myself.
"
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Augustine will ask the question "What am I?" endlessly,
but each time he asks, the question will further
illustrate the truth of this assertion. Augustine is,
as a question to himself.
However, this self-understanding gives rise to
another question: Why does Augustine affirm being a
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confessing-self? why is Augustine a question to himself?
Given that Augustine is so thoroughly a confessing-self,
always seeking a reason or motive behind each thought and
action, it is not surprising that he addresses this
question. Nor is it surprising that this question leads
him to explore other dimensions of the question "What
am I?" For Augustine, the questions "what" and "why"
endlessly refer to one another.
Hence, in trying to understand Augustine as a
confessor we will have to keep these questions in close
proximity to each other. In addition, we should preface
our encounter with a brief reminder of the fact that
Augustine poses the question "What am I?" (and the
related question "Why?") in a way that is fundamentally
different from the way it was posed by non-confessing-
selves. With Augustine, the question, which had
previously been predominately ontological, becomes
inextricably connected with a depth psychology of the
soul. Unlike Plato, Augustine's attempt to answer this
question will be full of impassioned accounts of the
soul's secret desires and hidden thoughts. Yet the
ontological dimension of self-reflection remains as strong
in the confessing-self 's questioninq. To truly engage in
this hermeneutics of the self is to endlessly question
everythinq that one discovers about the self both in light
of God's truths and in order to further reveal His truth.
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To confess thoroughly is to constantly shift back and
forth between psychological and ontological questions
whenever they lead to one another. Hence Augustine's
understanding of confession moves to and fro, partaking
in both of these spheres.
To the question "What am I? 11 Augustine answers: »A
life powerfully various and manifold and immeasurable.
The fallen human self which he discovers, is a multipli-
city that is continually scattered in its involvement in
the world. Be it food, sex, our desire for another's
praise or beautiful sights and sounds, our relationships
with other human beings and things in the world cut
through us, divide us, push us out of focus and decenter
us. in an unreflective state, we generally do not engage
with other beings and things as whole human beings.
Rather the external world speaks to and incites various
parts of the body and soul, generally at the expense of
the self as a whole. Prior to becoming a confessing-self
,
the self is in a constant state of being "scattered abroad
in multiplicity. 1,63
Augustine examines his will and finds that even -
indeed, especially - his inner dimension is discordant.
While most parts of the body obey the will on command,
Augustine discovers that the will does not obey itself :
"the body more readily obeyed the slightest wish of the
mind... than the mind obeyed itself in carrying out its own
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great will which could be achieved simply by willing .„64
The problem is that the will "does not totally will-M
because it is divided within itself. Arguing against ^
Manichees that there is one extremely divided will within
us rather than simply two natures, Augustine says, "if
there be as many contrary natures in man as there are
wills in conflict with one another, then there are not
two natures in us but several. "66 (Augustine and the
Manichees reject the latter conclusion.)
For Augustine, the self as divided is
-monstrousness"
and a "sickness of the soul. "67 As we have seen, this
division wells out of the ontology of conceit in which all
fallen human beings dwell prior to deep self-reflection.
The divided self is bonded to the world in an immediacy of
desire in which it enslaves, distracts and weakens itself,
and endlessly attempts to dominate the world around it.
But in addition to the evil which it fosters, this self
cannot face God, the condition of its being, in such an
uncontrolled, dispersed and impure state. The dispersed
self is scattered in every direction except that which
faces God. Unable to face God, the scattered self moves
toward non-being and eternal death.
The goal of confession - a goal that can never be
attained completely and with certainty on earth - is to
unify and purify this multiplicity: to prepare the self
to face God. According to Augustine, the very act of
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confession, above and beyond the specific contents it
addresses, is unifying.
The Unified Self. rpnfessinn ao
Re-Memberina tjig Disinejibered
To confess is to stand face to face with oneself - to
endlessly search the depths of the self and proclaim the
truths that one discerns. However, one faces oneself not
fundamentally to examine what one is in the pure present
moment of the confession. For Augustine, the present is
infinitely minute and has no duration. The present is, as
merciless "ceasing to be, "68 an infinitely rapid "becoming
past." only God is pure presence, humans are condemned on
earth to be "divided up in time... and the deepest places
in [their souls] are torn by it." 69 The infinitely fast,
infinitely fleeting present moment scatters the self in
relentless uncontrolled change. Confession as a human act
occurs in time, and hence if the self faces the self in
the present moment, the self that the self reflects upon
has always ceased to be instantaneously. However, in
confession one does not face the self in the pure present,
because to do so would be to further sacrifice the self
to dispersion in the cutting edge of time. Instead,
confession makes the self present by holding its past
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(up to an instant before oonfession, «ore stable before
itself.
is a
The self confesses as a temporal being that ha £
history which it presents to itself in memory. Indeed
,
the self is this history. its action in the lightening-
fast present is dominated and "weighed down by customs. «™
The self is_not an ephemeral wisp which exists solely in
the present with "no duration," and hence it cannot know
itself if it takes itself to be this sort of being. The
self must know itself as a fundamentally temporal being,
for although the self continually ceases to be in the
present moment (and this is a crucial fact, but not the
only truth about the self) because the present moment
continually ceases to be, the self that was present does
not cease to exist altogether. (it simply ceases to be
in the infinitely fleeting present.) Rather, it becomes
lodged in the self's past; a past which is not only
capable of being presented frequently in memory, but
further presents itself indirectly through its uncanny
propensity to make the present through the inertia of
one's past being, customs and habits. (Indeed, for
Augustine, the extent to which the past makes the present
"behind one's back" is inversely related to the extent
to which it is presented in remembering.) Hence to face
itself truly and stably, the confessing-self must remember
itself.
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Confession as a remembering of the self partially
escapes the tyrannical scattering of the present and thus
begins to unify the self by transferring its attention
and the trajectory of its being to the stabler presence
of the self's past in memory. m remembering, the self
that was tossed and torn helplessly in the violent waves
of the sea's surface, dives into the stillness of its
depths where it can regain composure and control. By
remembering, the self - as much as is possible in this
life
- escapes the cutting edge of time. m memory,
the self can abide and hence become an object for its
own continuous considered reflection. One way Augustine
escaped self-reflection prior to conversion, was by
dwelling in the fleeting presence of desire. when he
had seen his iniquity, he "had deliberately looked the
other way and let it go from [his] mind" - he did not
remember it. When Augustine writes of being "turned back"
upon himself, he speaks of the reflective trajectory of
the gaze within, but inseparable from this is a "turning
back" upon the self as an historical being. Turning back
in the temporal sense is remembering; holding the past
that one is present before oneself, so that one cannot
flee from and hence avoid oneself.
That confession is to face, examine and understand
oneself as a temporally extended being is not only
indicated by Augustine's theoretical insights, but by
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the biographical content of the Confessions as well,
in which Augustine remembers himself beginning withhis
infancy and continuing through his ongoing struggles with
pride. Augustine holds his whole life present before
himself as a phenomenon for ceaseless overturning, inquiry
and suspicion.
Augustine refers to confession repeatedly as an act
of remembering. When asking God's help in confession he
says, "Grant me... to retraverse now in memory the past
ways of my error. "'1 m proclaiming to confess for the
love of God, Augustine writes that he is
-passing again
in the bitterness of remembrance over my most evil ways
that Thou mayest thereby grow ever lovelier to me." 72
in proclaiming the integrity of his confession Augustine
writes:
-Behold my heart, 0 my God, look deep within it;
see how I remember." 73
As argued above, the self
-remembering that occurs
in confession begins to unify the self by present-inn
the self in memory - a present that is less victimized
by the ceasing to be of the present moment. Yet there is
an additional sense in which remembering unifies the self
that Augustine addresses in Book X of the Confessions .
(The discussion of memory in Book X is exemplary of the
way in which Augustine brings himself through confession
to examine confession itself.)
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Augustine begins the first section of Book x with
the plea, "Let me know Thee."™ This of course u^
a reiteration of the plea of the Confessions and more
generally, the plea of Augustine's life. To know God
one must confess the truths of one's soul to Him and win
to extirpate that which is evil in his light. Thus he
writes: "He that does the truth comes to light. I „ish
to do it in confession. -75 Knowledge Qf GQd ^^
knowledge are inextricably intertwined. Vet in his
ceaseless questioning of both, he runs up against the
problem of memory: for "how shall I find You if I am
without memory of You?''™ similarly, with respect to
the self, Augustine writes, "in my memory too I meet
myself."" Indeed> everything ^ ^ ^
If Augustine is to "do truth" thoroughly, he will have
to
-
to as great an extent as is possible - examine the
part of him that contains and recalls truths. Hence the
examination of memory.
In Augustine's first attempt to grasp memory in
Book X, he refers to it metaphorically as "the fields
and vast palaces.
. .where are stored... the innumerable
images of material things brought to it by the senses...
the thoughts we think" 78
. . .and "the affections of the
79mind." Augustine is overawed by memory:
Great is this power of memory,
a thing, 0 my God, to be in awe
of, a profound and immeasurable
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fESPl^Z' • ' • In the innumerableields and dens and caverns of my
ab?e
r
kin^
nT^blY fUl1 of innumer-
all%h^f H° f thlngs "-in and throughll t ese does my mind range and Imove swiftly from one to another and
bu?TfraH e them Ho^y - I canout I find no end. 80
For Augustine, memory is metaphorically conceived of
as a spreading limitless room within8 ! that is impressed
by sensations, thoughts and emotions as they pass in the
present. B2 while things are kept distinct and those
entering by different senses are stored apart in their
right categories, «3 for the most part things in memory
are scattered and unarranged
.
84 it seems that for
Augustine the way in which things are contained in
memory is primarily a result of the manner and order
in which they were experienced. Hence their scattered-
ness corresponds to the scatteredness of the infinitely
fast, infinitely fleeting present in which our experiences
and we ourselves are scattered.
As brute storage alone, memory is of little use to
Augustine, for it embodies the guality of dispersion that
is so problematic for him. It is only in conjunction with
its power of thoughtful remembering that memory's value
is manifested. When one remembers things in memory, one
"places within reach," "collects out of dispersion" and
"draws together" things which were scattered in the im-
measurable depths of memory. 85 Augustine makes explicit
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the relation between "cogito" (I think) and "cogo" (I put
together,. 86 Thus
, when Qne ^.^^ ^ ^ ^
collects the self out of its dispersed for™ in the depths
of nemory and places it together within reach. Augustine
is guick to add however, that "if z ceased to give thought
to [things] for quite a short space of time
,
they would
sink again and fall away into the »ore reroote recesses of
memory. "87 For the drawing together to be effective, it
must be continuous.
Let us further explore this relationship between
memory and the self. Is it simply that memory is a part
of the self and the self is something that can be
remembered? The relationship Augustine sees is much
deeper than this, for indeed he identifies the self with
memory: "this thing I am." 88 The self is the manifold
and constantly expanding field of memory and the scattered
sensations, thoughts and feelings therein. One does not
simply have a past, a memory, thoughts and desires; for
Augustine one is these things. Thus to confess - to
remember
- one's thoughts and desires is not simply to
cpllect them out of dispersion, but to collect the self
out of dispersion, to draw the self together. As memory,
the self is both the locus in which its existence is
"impressed" as scattered, and the possibility for
purposively drawing together this scatteredness
. It
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is this latter possib ility which Augustine^ ^
realize in confession.
The task of collecting the self is an endless process
for Augustine. New experiences continually scatter the
"fall away" if they are ignQred ^ g^^ ^
time," and the self is Measurably deep and can "find no
end" to these depths. „ one is to avoid ^ uncontroUed
quality of being scattered, the evil that may lurk in
the scattered depths of the soul, and the even greater
evil of being behind one's own back, one must collect
oneself and face oneself continually: one must remember.
Remembering a^ch is a focusing, healing, strengthening
and disciplining activity in Augustine's view.
Humble Confession
Thus far we have discussed two ways in which
remembering as such begins to unify the self. First
by partially decreasing the scatteredness that is
generated when attention is on the infinitely fleeting
present; and second by collecting out of dispersion a
self which is scattered. However, the substantive
manner in which the self is remembered is also extremely
important to Augustine, for it undermines the falsg
ontology of conceit
,
fosters a new understanding of the
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self ana leads to a different type q£^^ ^^
understanding. Through his own
shows that deep self-reflection leads to a very powerful
^prehension of one's finitude, dependence and iniqu ity
The conceited self „as only ahle to uphold an ontology in
which it was the origin of being
,
by being „behind ^ _back." Facing itself in God's lirthr- «-kc g t, the self discovers a
very different order of things.
in attempting to know and speak the truth about
himself, Augustine immediately confronts his own finitude-
he discovers that he is a life which he cannot entirely
know. Rather than being the origin of truth that the
conceited ontology believes itself to be, Augustine
realizes that he cannot even grasp himself totally
and with certainty. Augustine's forgotten infancy is
accessible to him only indirectly through the accounts
of others and through his observations of other infants.
These limits have a powerful impact upon Augustine:
I am loth, indeed, to count it [hisinfancy] as part of the life I livein this world. For it is buried inthe darkness of the forgotten as
completely as the period earlier
Still
sShat 1 sPent in my mother's
womb . ° y
Yet Augustine cannot simply discount his infancy any more
than he can discount the forgotten depths of his soul
which he discovers can never be rendered completely
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intelligibXe. For Augustine is this hidden depth
, tnis
partially hidden life, which demands to be known for
the truths it reveals and the evils it hides. Even his
prenatal life haunts him: .j „as conceived in iniguity
and in sin my mother nourished me in the womb, then where,
my God, where, o Lord, where or when was I, Your servant
innocent?" 90
The answer is nowhere and never. One stands accused
in light of God's morality as one reflects this light
deeper and deeper into one's soul. Through Christian
self-reflection one discovers that instead of being the
pure origin of the rules of morality that oneself and
others should live by, the self is an actuality ridden
with imperfection and iniquity. Augustine discovers
that even his infancy is full of conceit and jealousy.
His present as well is laden with "impure" desires.
Just as he is neither the origin of nor the complete
possessor of truth and goodness, so too confession shows
him to be a dependent being rather than self-originating.
Recalling his infancy, he is in awe of his dependence on
the miracle of his mother's nurturing. His account of
his slow evolution towards conversion and fully embracing
God is saturated with continual acknowledgement of the way
in which the people and events around him allowed him to
develop. Yet his understanding of dependence goes beyond
a mere dependence upon people and things. For Augustine,
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to thin* deeply about the being Qf ^^ ^ ^
surrounding world is to recognize an abundance ^ harmony
and beauty which signifies a greafcer being^^
all things depend, of the things in the world Augustine
says: ,they cried out . great^ ^^ ^
«V guestion was my gazing upon theffl and^^ ^
their beauty."*! The final book Qf ^ £i£y_^^
»any of the miseries of human existence on earth, hut
it is elso full of an appreciation of the world as
overflowing with beauty and miracles. Not only the
sky, the earth, the sea, food, health and the "soothing
coolness of breezes," but "even the body, which is
something we have in common with brute creation.
.. even
here what evidence we find of the goodness of God, of
the providence of the mighty creator!"" For Augustine,
to look deep within is to realize the overwhelming extent
to which we depend upon miracles which originate not in
ourselves, but elsewhere. Only having grasped "the
truth that is within them" can people see that God is
the condition of all beings. 93
God of Self-Consciousness
This realization which emerges with self-reflection,
feeds and shapes an intensifying dynamic of confession.
In his state of dependence, Augustine realizes that we
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»ust live in God's grace to be truly satisfied strong
human beings. Indeed, to live in any sense that is not
dying, We must live in His grace
. However
_
^^ ^
achieve God's grace, the self must f^^. To turn
away from God
- His Truth, His Goodness - is to lose His
light.^ Augustine , s insight that iQses^
unless he goes fro* Thee,"" provides him^ a^ of
hope which can and must be constantly returned to. Yet
the hope harbors an anxiety which fuels relentless and
continual deep self-reflection. For how can a self that
is a torn scattered multiplicity face God? How can a self
that is immeasurably deep and cannot grasp all that it is,
know that it faces God? The answer to both questions is
'
that it cannot.
The hope that wells out of the insight that "no man
loses Thee, unless he goes from Thee," would die in the
despair of uncertainty were it not continually reborn in
confession. Through perpetual confession, the self must
draw itself together, place itself within reach, so that
it can face itself towards God and conform to His will
in as complete and unified a manner as possible. it
cannot allow dispersed parts of the self to "fall away"
from God in pride and lust. It must probe its depths
endlessly for evil thoughts and desires which might turn
the self unwittingly away from the Being to which it owes
its being.
59
Yet the creation of the confessing-self - this
gigantic task of revering - is not fundamentally a
heroic feat of the self which must he accomplished in
order to face God. For Augustine, Cod dwells too deeply
within and is too thoroughly the condition of our being
to be merely the goal or endpoint of the self's action.
Rather, God is internal to the process of remembering.
The Christian self's relationship to God is one where
both, the self and God make the self more self-conscious,
for it is through confession that the self is slowly
brought from the injustice of conceited ontology to the
justice of God.
The act that initiates the self-God relationship is
less the remembering, than the will to tell the truth
about the self and do nothing to deceive God. When
Augustine exclaims, "Woe is me! See I do not hide my
wounds..., "96 he is not proclaiming a complete and
"successful- confession, for there is always a surplus
of truths and evils that far exceeds those that can be
discovered and disclosed. Rather he is expressing his
desire to reveal the truth about himself - as it appears
in God's light - to himself and God. it is the purity of
this desire to show God everything that is all important.
Thus Augustine asks God to "behold his heart" and see his
will to confess.
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When one wills to place himself ^ ^
becomes a partner in the development of the self's
deep self-consciousness.
-j entered into my ^
with you as my guide; and I was able to do it because
You were my helper.. Augustine , s God . g ^ ^ ^
self-consciousness. He makes the weak strong, not by
bestowing upon them an abstract power, but by facilitating
the transformation of the non-reflective self of the
ontology of conceit into a confessing-self
. it is in
God's grace that "every weak man is made strong in that
he is made conscious of his weakness."" When Augustine
refers to God as "You in whom all that is scattered in me
is brought into one,"" he is not writing of an external
power that comes out of the sky and carefully makes the
self a unity, as if God were using his hands to reassemble
a shattered egg. God is within, and he unifies the self
by succoring self-consciousness, by turning the self's
trajectory inward in deep Christian remembering.
Compulsive Confession
Thus we begin to see what is at stake and what is
possible for Augustine's confessing-self. For Augusti
the choice is between being a non-reflective self that
dwells in a world that is falsely revealed through a
conceited ontology - a self that is scattered in
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an immediacy of desire in which it enslaves and is
enslaved; or a reflective way of being which tends
towards increasing unity, strength, justice and God.
The choice is between being and non-being.
Out of Augustine's understanding of the self,
the world and God, comes a deep and continuous self-
examination that restlessly strives to collect,
penetrate and bring under control all parts of the
self. Having confessed about his life from his infancy
to the period following his conversion, Augustine proceeds
to relentlessly examine his present condition according
to the truths of Christian morality. Largely freed from
the grasp of sexual concupiscence (though not in his
dreams) he moves towards an increasingly meticulous study
of himself. Nothing escapes his gaze:
As for the allurement of sweet scents,
I am not much troubled: when they
are absent I do not seek them; when
they are present I do not refuse them;
yet at any time I do not mind being
without them. At least so I seem
to myself; perhaps I am decp.ivpd .
For that darkness is lamentable in
which the possibilities in me are
hidden from myself: so that my
mind, questioning itself upon its
own powers, feels that it cannot
lightly trust its own report:
because what is already in it does
for the most part lie hidden. 15 "
(My emphasis.)
The "hermeneutics of suspicion" passes from one
thing to the next. Augustine examines the "pleasures
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of the ear," and discovers that while he is not held as
persistently by them
, he stm „ find[s] ^^ ^^
what is their due place,.101 Augustine , s descriptiQn Qf
the inner dile^a this proble* leads nim to i s amazing
Wondering if he may desire church bodies in the „rong
way:
At times indeed it seems to me that T
?he?r
Y
duI
greater h°nour thafis
f?!f
l
v
US" when ' f°r example I feel
22i5 e holy words my mind ?bkindled more religiously and ferventlyto a flame of piety because I hearthem sung than if they were not sung:and I observe that all the varying
emotions of my spirit have modesproper to them in voice and song,
whereby, by some secret affinitythey are made more alive it is
not good that the mind should be
enervated by this bodily pleasure.
!£ t ?ften ensnares me, in thatthe bodily sense does not accompanythe reason as following after itin proper order, but having been
admitted to aid the reason strivesto run before it and take the lead.
In this matter I sin unawares, andthen grow aware.
Yet there are times when through toogreat a fear of this temptation, I
err in the direction of over severity
- even to the point sometimes of
wishing that the melody of all the
lovely airs.
. .should be banished not
only from my own ears, but from the
churches as well. 102
After more turmoil Augustine hesitantly and
tentatively decides that church music is probably for
the better. But the outcome is really unimportant. What
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is lmportant, and the reason I quoted the passage at such
length, is the extent to which Augustine has prohie.atized
all corners of hinSel f . The ^ of listening ^^
music is of relati v^i
^
ely little importance compared to
the problematic pleasures, desires and stives which may
lurk beneath. The latter are buried deep; sometimes they
are invisible. MWays they are susp^ ^
impurity threatens to scatter the self back into the
madness of conceit, far from itself, far from God.
To view the above passages as stemming from
"Augustine's hatred of worldly existence" is an error.
It is impurity within the self that is at stake here
for Augustine. In Augustine's view, beautiful colors,
the sound of birds singing, delicious foods, etc., were
Messinas.103 Indeed> despite & ^
of the miseries which are a part of human existence,
Augustine still views the world as "that miracle of
miracles.
"
1Q 4 Yet the world was most importantly a
polyphonic sign of the God who created it. When enjoy-
ment of the world became an end in itself and obliterated
the primacy of one's awareness of God, Augustine sought
to eliminate or contain it. Yet this is a problem of
the self, not of the world. The world could be loved,
but it had to be loved "justly" with an eye towards the
"intrinsic value of things." 105 Desires and pleasures
that aided one's awareness of God as the condition of all
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being were acceptable, but they were alw.v. hy J
-ways dangerous for
they harbored the potential to place the *Pi self unwittinglym God's place as the origin and ground of things.
Confess ing-self- ^ w1 r , , ,^
As the trajectory of the self is redirected from
the world towards the inner depths of the self, the self
becomes identified with the inner stives and desires
which hide there. The self is not fundamentally its
actions, but the motives buried below. it is the latter
which must be surveyed, interrogated and controlled in a
manner that is every bit as relentless as that in which
the self of conceited ontology sought to dominate all that
was "other." Indeed, for Augustine it is the persistent
form of the latter, that necessitates that of the former.
Yet the development of the confessing-self should not
be reduced to being understood simply as this persistent
attempt to purify the self. To see it wholly in these
terms is to obfuscate the more positive aims of the
confessing-self which were at least as important to
Augustine. For Augustine, self-consciousness was not
of value merely because of what it could control or
repress. Just as importantly, Augustine affirmed the
birth of the confessing-self because it gave rise to a
set of possibilities for being in the world that he
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believed were never before possible. The confesslng-
self was not simply a new way of controlling an old self
eradicated, out deep self-reflection gave rise to a ^«U as well. Deep self-consciousness was accompanied by
two interrelated qualities which Augustine thought were
almost entirely lacking in the late antique pagan self
depth and freedom. These two elements not only gave
rise to new possibilities for the self, but perhaps more
essentially, constituted
"possibility" in a new manner -
allowed it to be.
Since freedom wells out of depth in Augustine's
thinking, let us explore the latter first. There are two
senses in which depth is important for Augustine. m one
sense depth is an attribute of all human beings, yet in
another sense it is an achievement only of the confessing-
self
.
For Augustine, all people are deep beings in the
sense (revealed in the above passages) that they become
identified with the motives and desires which lurk below
their actions. Human activity becomes a surface beneath
which there is a largely invisible interior in which are
born and lie the real truths of the self. These depths
are for Augustine what is most real about the self, while
the surface is often determined and shaped by realities
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largely outside of the self l.. To know anybody - an
impossible task to complete - is to know these^
interestingly however, what accompanies Augustine's
realization that we are all beings with a depth is a
continuous critique of non-confessing-selves as one-
dimensional flat beings. The self „f „y in o conceited ontology
dwells
..outside" of itself in its compulsive relationship
to the world. its gaze, its activity and its concern is
directed outward away from the self and toward things.
The self is to a very large extent flat because its life
is one of denying its depths. m its claim (either
explicit or implicit in its way of being) to be absolute
self-originating being the self must deny these depths,
for the invisibility and ambiguity which depth discloses
threatens the self's claim to omnipotence and certainty.
Further, the evils that lurk beneath the surface threaten
the self's claim to be worthy of being "its own rule."
For Augustine, the conceited self denies the depth that
it is and hence lives outside of this depth: its way of
being is flat.
Living in the immediacy of desire, the self of
conceited ontology is as shallow - has as little
thickness
- as the fleeting present which consumes
it. Moreover, the world towards which it lusts is
flattened as well; reduced to the single dimension of
being an object-for-the-self
. The multi-dimensional
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polyphonic character which Augustine believes is
intrinsic to beings is reduced to the characteristics
that are revealed by the self's desire. The flat self's
relation to the flat world is described by Augustine as
the meeting of two surfaces, a meeting in which one is
"pressed under" and unable to move.
It is only the disciplined inward turn of continual
confession that allows the self to become a deep being in
a way that is very different from that of the flat self.
Only by perpetually observing and dwelling in one's depths
can one become deep in a sense which is different but
related to the sense in which all selves are deep, what
is this relationship between the depth one becomes through
turning inward and the depth which as human beings we all
are
As discussed above, the turn inward is for Augustine,
essentially a remembering of the self. m remembering,
the self recalls what is absent from the self's attention
prior to remembering. it collects out of dispersion what
was scattered in the depths of the self and places the
"forgotten" within reach of the attentive gaze. it is
precisely because all selves are largely deep interiors
of thoughts, desires and feelings that are - for the most
part - not present at any given time, that remembering
can have any meaning. A self that was totally present
to itself would not have any need to remember itself,
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its consciousness at anv inQf a nfy l st t would be totally
identical with its being. But nor would it b^ to
remember itSSlf
;
f°r
" is th* ^pth which lies below the
surface of attention which makes memory as such possible
For Augustine, it is the non-present depth of selves -
the partial absence of one's being to oneself - that
establishes both the desirability of and the possibility
of relating to oneself in self
-remembering.
It is the distance, the difference within the self
between its dark non-present depths and its luminous
present attention
- this ever shifting interstice - which
provides the space for the remembering act of confession.
It is the interval between the thought and the unthought
which the confessing-self traverses, and in the process
of traversing, it changes the boundaries of difference
which is ineliminable. Every depth that is exposed in
remembering becomes the surface of another depth. "Know
the self! Know thyself!" yearns the confessing-self as
it attempts to pass out of the interstice and render its
dark depths in God's light. Yet no matter how much it
illuminates, it remains on the edge of a beaconing
darkness
.
In another work Augustine states:
Gaze at the sky, the earth, the sea,
and all the things which shine in
them or above them, or creep or fly
or swim beneath them. They have
forms because they have rhythm;
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longer"^ ^ they Wil1 "°
The rhythm of the confessing-self is the constant
unfolding of its movement in the region between its
light and its darkness; a movement which can never be
completed, but which Bust never be discontinued lest the
self lose its rhythm and "fall back into nothingness."
Again, if "the deep" harbors the evil and multi-
fariousness which must be controlled, so too it harbors
the space that makes reflection, control and a new type
of self possible. The depth of selves, the interstice
between the present and non-present provides the space in
which the self can turn inward and initiate the rhythm
which constitutes the confessing-self 's deep way of being,
in eternity, "all is present. -107 Hence> there , g ^^
for remembering. Indeed remembering, in that it presumes
a region of absence, is impossible. Remembering indicates
a change in the self's state of being, yet when being is
totally and completely present to itself, there can be no
change. As complete presence, there is nothing to make
present. Of God Augustine states, "Thou art always the
self-same." 108 God's conception of Himself (and His
creation) is identical with His being. For God, being,
though it is limitless, has no surplus. It is equivalent
with and completely present in His Word, and His Word is
eternal. Where there is identity there can be no depth,
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for depth signifies the absence Qf ^^^^ t^
signifies difference. Depth is what is left over what
is not present in attention, the non-identical. God is
infinitely complex, but as total visible presence He is
not deep (for Himself).
Augustine is constantly confronted with the fact that
he "cannot totally grasp all that [ne] is _„ 109 ^ ^ ^
seen, this depth is of endless concern to him due to the
fallen state in which he finds humanity, and it also
provides the possibility for reraembering . Remembering is
for Augustine, a transformative activity in the sense that
it creates a "collected," more controlled, more Christian
self. yet there are at least two other senses in which
memory is transformative which are equally important to
Augustine.
First, remembering transforms the self (in a way
that is perhaps obvious, but still needs to be stated)
in that by taking up remembering as its primary endeavor
in light of which it guides all of its other activity,
the confessing-self is transformed from being the
iniquitous thoughts and desires that guided it before-
hand and increasingly becomes a yearning for God's truth.
Through continually shedding light upon its desires, the
self comes to be governed by another desire.
Second, in remembering, the self makes itself present
in such a way that it is not purely identical with the
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parts of the self whir-h ;t- _ic it remembers, when the self1-es in the immediacy of desire, d^^^
fche
self's perceptions and actions, and render critical
discernment of the desire itse1 f il l f impossible. Desire
becomes identical with the self in that it has ^
sway over the self. Kemembering in contrast allows the
self to make dark elements of itself present, while
simultaneously establishing a distance between itself
and those parts of itself which if hi" n n t discovers. Rather
than being disguised in their own false light, in
confession, evil desires are critically illuminated
in God's light. For Augustine, the self makes itself
present in confession in such a way that as it identifie.
the evil thought, desire or emotion as a part of itself,
it simultaneously creates a germ cell of non-identity
between itself and that which is illuminated. The light
of the will to God's truth vitiates the evil that is
presented and diminishes the latter's power to hold sway
over the self. The non-identity does not occur through
a denial of the fact that the desire is a part of the
self, but through a particular affirmation of this fact.
When the desire holds sway, it is that which makes other
things present (or absent) to the self, but when the
desire is placed before the self in remembering, at
least for that moment, it is not hegemonic, it is
presented as an object by another desire (will to God's
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truth,. n is precisely this particular objectification
of desire which establishes a distance between the desire
and the self, and allows the self the possibility of
Shzmim to separate itself from the desire. The light
of the will to truth places desire within reach, but as
Placed, the desires can be dis-placed from the self. m
short, to know oneself, one must make present parts of
the inexhaustible depths that one is, and it is this
presenting which allows the self to become other than
these identified depths.
It is here that we begin to see the connection
between confession and freedom in Augustine. It is only
through remembering
- presenting parts of itself to itself
-
that there is any hope for freedom in Augustine's view,
for it is only in remembering the self that the self can
become an object of conscious choice for itself. m
absence of truthful remembering we are not free beings,
but beings dominated by habits and lusts.
All people have free will in Augustine's thought,
yet most people do not will freely. True living freedom
is an arduous task which can only be achieved to the
extent that the self remembers deeply, truthfully and
perpetually. Only the confessing-self
, the self that
dwells in the deep, can be free, for only this self is
sufficiently unified and self-conscious to carry out
the work of freedom. Yet even the confessing-self is
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in constant danger of forgetting and slipping back into
slavery.
Humans are born with the capacity for freedom,
but their first choices enslave them to habits and
lusts which henceforth tend to overshadow and conceal
their freedom. it is only when the self is he id face
to face with itself in conversion, that it begins to
be released from the tyranny of habit. As the birth of
deep self-consciousness, the conversion is the point at
which the self begins a new mode of being, the essence
of which is precisely the ability to free oneself from
the causality of unconscious habit and begin. Reading
Augustine's account of his conversion, one is struck by
the sense of sudden freedom that seems to overwhelm him.
"Thou hast broken my bonds." 110 of his life prior to
conversion he asks: "But where in all that long time was
my free will, and from what deep sunken hiding-place was
it suddenly summoned forth in the moment in whirh t bowed
my neck to Your easy yoke ..." 111 (my emphasis). Yet if
this transformation brings a sudden freedom from many of
the past lusts that haunted him, his exuberance is soon
tempered (as I have illustrated in the account of his
"present state" above) with the realization that though
his new life in communion with God delivers him from the
worst cares that gnawed' 112 it by no means delivers him
to a life of pure and easy truth and freedom. Far from
74
it. As Augustine looks inward, the initial fn u *un flash of God'*
light (in a region Augustine claims to have previously
been fleeing) helps him truly see and transcend the most
prominent lusts of his past. Yet at the edge of this
radiance is a deep, dark, hidden region which demands
further interrogation and illumination. God's freeing
light is infinite, but only for those who will join Him
in diligently extending his truths into the depths of
their souls. God offers freedom, but it is a freedom
marked by a strong awareness of its own present finitude
and a responsibility for expanding its boundaries through
ceaseless confession. The sudden freedom of conversion
calls forth an inner struaal. for f^eedoi that is
laborious, uncertain, never finished. The confessing-
self is free precisely because it can partially release
itself from its identity with unconscious habits and
desires
- from the past that it is - through reflection
and begin to be otherwise. Released from this causality,
the will is its own beginning. 113
As a confessing-self, the self actualizes the freedom
it is born with. All selves are free from being totally
passive objects of the world's chain of causes, but few
are free of the causal dynamics within themselves, and
they have done so only through relentless remembering.
Freedom for Augustine does not well lightly, easily, or
perhaps even wildly, out of the beings we are. It is not
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the effortless ability to put down our pencil and rise out
of our chair at an unpredictable moment. True freedom, is
the most arduous task humans can accomplish. Moreover,
the gay thoughts of one who comfortably dwells in the
'
knowledge that one is "free- are the most deceptive
thoughts of an, for habit and desire enslave the self
under the guise of freedom. Freedom demands a new self,
a deeply reflective self. The ahilitv <-„ >,in cui y to begin demands
the ability to remember. Freedom demands responsibility
not only because through it we become the initiators of
events with important consequences, more primordially for
Augustine, freedom demands responsibility because it is
only through responsibility (as continual will to truth
about the self) that freedom is released into being. it
is the depth of human being that provides the possibility
of the confessing-self, and it is the confessing-self that
frees freedom.
There are other important relationships between
depth and freedom for Augustine as well. The self of
the ontology of conceit is locked into a dependence
upon the opinions of others to affirm its being. its
action in the world is bound in the incessant attempt
through force and persuasion to sway others to affirm
the self's absoluteness. In contrast, the turn inward
of the confessing-self is a turn away from this external
dependence on the "mob" and towards a dependence upon
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the Truth that dwells within when the self faces God
Conscience with respect to Truth, Goodness and Being
free the self from the tyranny of "public opinion":
[W]e detect weakness in a mindthat cannot bear... the stupid
opinion of the mob; we rightly
ascribe greatness to a spiritthat has the strength todespise the judgment of men -
and in particular the judgment
of the mob, which is so often
clouded in the darkness of error
- in comparison with the purelight of a good conscience . I* 4
As the self turns inward it dissolves the compulsive
flat relationships it had with the world when it dwelled
in the immediacy of desire. The world can no longer press
the deep-self under in the way that it did the flat self.
The depth of the self is infinite; the more the world
presses, the deeper the self dwells.
However, the quality of the world changes for the
confessing-self as well, for as the self dwells deeply,
it releases the world from the one-dimensional form in
which it was imprisoned by the self of ontological
conceit. Freed from being an object-for-the-self
, the
world becomes a multi-dimensional reality with a depth.
The world is always a surface wh ich signifies the
"transcendental signified" God. Far from being flat
and transparent, things in the world are ambiguous and
offer multiple truths to those who encounter them. The
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invisible depth which is designated below the surface of
the sign calls forth an endless henneneutics. indeed,
the "obscurities" and "ambiguities" which well out of'th.
depth of some things "are provided by God to conguer pride
by work.
. .
.
»
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Confessio Erqn fin^
Gareth Matthews has made some interesting observa-
tions on the important differences between Augustine's Si
Fall °r
'
S,m (If 1 am mistaken, I am) and Descartes' Cogito
Ergo Sum . 1^ And certainly Augustine's confessing-self
does not occupy the position of the subjects in the sen
that Heidegger understands Descartes' notion of man. 117
Nevertheless, perhaps there is a profound way in which
Augustine is distinctly modern. Perhaps it is not the
cogito, but Confessio Ergo Sum which Augustine shares
with modernity. We will have to wait until the following
chapter to decide with respect to modernity, but for
Augustine, confession is clearly the condition for human
being. God of course is the ultimate Being of beings for
Augustine, but we cannot face God and hence partake in his
Being unless we confess continually. As we have seen, the
vanity which leads one away from confession, at the same
time leads toward "nothingness."
se
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As the above discussion reveais, oonfession not only
allows us t^ in terms of our direct relation to Cod
but is the condition for our living lives which avoid
the compulsive domination over the world around us which
results from ontological conceit rv>„*« •^ x . Confession is the
possibility for realizing all that is good in humanity
and purifying the self of the dangerous "pride" that we
are always prone to. It carries and proliferates God's
truth deep within us - a truth which for Augustine is
identical with being.
However, strangely located in a work that affirms
confession as a way of being, one discovers the following:
...God, hear me and look upon me
and see me and pity me and heal methou in whose eyes I have become a'question to myself: and that is myinfirmity
.
1
Be it a moment of brilliance, or a simple recognition of
the obvious, in this concise statement Augustine appears
-
if only for an instant - to peer into the heart of the
confessing-self and see a problem. in the depths of his
soul, Augustine comes face to face with the "infirmity"
that results when the will to truth confronts the
ambiguous nature of a self that is largely and in-
eliminably invisible to itself (on earth)
. Augustine
must know himself, but he cannot. He can only be "a
question to himself." Not a question which he can affirm
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as a mystery, but a question that is an infirmity - a
question he must try to eliminate. This deep question he
is, this question that is the source of his strength and
hope, is at the same time a problem for Augustine. Vet
neither the questions nor the problem can be put to rest
since each question only leads to more questions. The
Christian conception of the "disease of curiosity limits
in important ways the nature of the self's interrogation
of the world around it. But with respect to itself, the
questioning-self is driven beyond all limits. For an
instant Augustine seems to understand the confessing-self
to be essentially problematic. What was to lead to health
appears to be the cause of infirmity.
However the infirmity does not pose a fundamental
challenge to the confessing self for Augustine. Indeed
it appears that further confession is the only solution
to the infirmity. A little later in the text Augustine
repeats: "Again, let me examine my self more closely." 119
The confessing-self moves towards the God who will "heal."
"I beseech you, 0 my God, show me to myself that I may
confess.... »!20 As long as Augustine , s God existS( the
confessing self remains impervious to any fundamental and
sustained problematization.
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Prelude: Augustine and Modernity.
Over fifteen hundred years separate us fro, Augustine
and the world to which his writing belongs and refers.
Moreover, an equally awesome chasm lies between modernity
and Augustine: for many, Augustine <s God is dead or at
least missing in action. The strong steady Light that
illuminated Augustine's perception and thought - the sun's
Sun
-
has faded and become at most, the dim struggling
light of a distant star.
Augustine's affirmation of the confessing-self is
inextricable from his faith in a God that is the supreme
creator of all things and dwells within. God is the telos
of confession; not only because through confession we may
eventually "cleave" to God in Heaven, but equally because
God as perfect Being is the qualities that the confessing-
self strives toward (recognizing that God and not the self
is the source of being). God's transparence to Himself,
His pure presence, His unity and His truth and goodness
are all qualities which the confession intrinsically
leads toward. Though they are unattainable during
one's existence on earth, they are Being and to the
extent that the self simply accepts opacity, absence,
discord, "evil" and "error" within itself, it tends
toward non-being. The values of confession and the
qualities that are intertwined with it - that is, the
values which constitute the self's relation to itself -
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are aiyen in Augustine's faith in God and his under.
standing of humans as God's creation.
Of course, it is not simply faith which lea<Js
Augustine to embrace the confessing-seif
. His writing
offers us many interesting insights and arguments
concerning the problems that result from ontological
conceit and non-reflective being as well as the virtues
that are associated with confession. yet many of these
understandings and all of the prescriptions Augustine
draws are grounded in his understanding of God and the way
He intended humans to be. The arguments that Augustine
constructs, through which confession comes to be seen as
the only possibility for being are, to borrow Jaspers-
words, "guided by a faith that has become one with
reason.
»
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But what is left of Augustine's arguments for the
confessing-self in an age where Augustine's faith is
rapidly becoming less tenable? What is confession in
the modern age? What can confession be in the modern
age? What possibilities for being open up if the notions
of transparency, control, unity and presence - God's
qualities
- cease to be absolute ideals which hold
complete sway over our being? Are we really "deep"
selves or is this merely an attribute that is posited
and then colonized by Christianity? Does the death
of God allow us to transform "depth" and reveal new
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understandings of being, or does it entail a complete
renunciation of depth? What possibilities for a greater
affirmation of "difference" open up in Christianity's
twilight? These are some of the questions which must
haunt the following chapters.
And these questions are important. Confession
did not die with Augustine, but has become one of the
defining features of our age. Self-examination and the
examination of selves are, Foucault maintains, continually
constituted by a constellation of discourses, disciplines
and institutions which probe deeper and deeper into the
self in order to control it. indeed, modern self-
examination is central to a form of power which controls
and normalizes populations on a micro-level never before
imaginable. God is dead, but the Christian will to truth
is not. Far from confession being a mode of being which
challenges the hegemonic forms of power as Augustine
believed it was in late antiquity, Foucault argues that
confession is at the core of the modern configuration of
power-knowledge
.
Modern confessing-selves confess in a world where God
is dead (or at least very different and much weaker) and
the form of power is drastically different from that which
existed at the birth of confession. if in many important
ways confession remains confession, it is also true that
there are important differences between confession today
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and Augustine's conception of it. A careful study of
Foucault's work Urinates both the similarities and
some of the differences.
Exactly what dimensions of Augustine's analysis
are salvageable and what might be worth saving are
guestions we must hold open until we have carefully
confronted Foucault's critique of the confessing-self
and its place within the operations of modern normalizing
power.
Perhaps what is needed most in pursuing Foucault's
call for the creation and promotion of new forms of
subjectivity which free us from modern power struc-
tures, is Augustine's "pious seeker." "For to be
Pious," in Peter Brown's words, "meant refusing to
solve the problem simply by removing one of the poles
of tension." 123
It is a bit ironic that with the death of Augustine's
God, we must become more pious (in the above sense) than
Augustine. For all the tensions which God held open for
Augustine are small when compared to those which emerge
when our idols prove hollow. We discover that Augustine's
confessing-self is a dream and a nightmare. Augustine had
but the briefest glimpse of the latter. In this chapter
we have illuminated the dream. In the following chapter
we will explore Foucault's critique of the will to truth
of and about selves in modernity, and his opposition to
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the ontological assumption about human beings and the
world which he believes are tightly intertwined with all
affirmation of the confessing-self
. His critique is very
powerful, but tensions remain which we must inhabit in
following chapters.
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CHAPTER III
FOUCAULT
Introdunt-i
The man described for us, whom weare invited to free, is already inhimself the effect of a subjectionmuch more profound than himselfA "soul" inhabits him and bringshim to existence which is itself
a factor in the mastery that power
is th^^,°Vr thS bod*- The
P
souIhe effect and instrument of apolitical anatomy; the soul is theprison of the body. 1
Foucault rejects the soul - this "prison" - as well
as the belief that it should be the ground and target for
our explorations of truth and freedom. To the extent that
it is possible he asks "what is man?" at the boundaries of
man's being; at the battered and embattled surfaces where
man confronts his others. For Foucault argues that it is
the interrogation of man's interiors, the questioning of
depths below surfaces of carefully bound and circumscribed
realities which so characterizes the operation of power in
modernity that he seeks to thwart. Depth, the dimension
in which Augustine sought truth, freedom and increasingly
unified subjectivity, is for Foucault the dimension in
which human beings are identified, interrogated,
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constituted and rarified. Depth is th= „" l e dimension of
subjugation. The constellaH™ „onstel ation of g 1Ven, fixed, absolute
truths, and a freedom that hinae^ on <->,n g s the progressive
discovery of these truths i <= fh =cn , s t e promise that lurks in
the depths and draws people deeper and deeper into
subjugating examinations of themselves and others - deeper
-to the prison and its reign of continuous pure light
The crystalline motionless transparency of Augustinian
heaven where even our internal organs would be visible is
for Foucault a nightmare towards which modernity presses.
in this chapter I explore Foucault 's critique of
Modernity on two levels. First
, , briefly develQp ^
context in which the objectification and subjectifi-
cation of selves occurs in modernity, and highlight
some of the disciplines, discourses and institutions
which help make it possible. „y purpose here is nQt ^
summarize Foucault's project as a whole, but rather to
very selectively illuminate dimensions of this project
which serve as indispensable groundwork for understanding
and situating my reading of Foucault in the remainder of
this chapter and the chapters which follow. (it is not my
project to make it wholly sufficient for those who have no
familiarity with his work.) m particular, I have focused
on the way in which the interplay of depth (production of
the deep self), objectifying and subjectifying illumina-
tion and the will to truth have been central to the
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constitution and controlQ
° f ^rouPs and individuals in
modernity.
Second, I have attempted to elucidate Foucault <s
meta-theoretical understanding of this phenomena as it i
^"atea in Tn^ordS£
_2f_iDjjlas . Hhile ^ ^^
we lose much of the texture found in the genealogical
Foucault, we gain a level of generality „hich offers us
-sights into the central understandings of modernity
which govern his worx; insights which are guite valuable
and less visible in his micro-analyses.
Since at this point I am interested in elucidating
my understanding of Foucault <s arguments, saving criti-
cism for later, I sometimes simply write from Foucault's
perspective in order to prevent overburdening the text
with
-Foucault argues,"
-Jn Foucault's view," etc. This
is not necessarily to suggest my affirmation of his
arguments. My position is made most explicit in the
concluding chapter where I discuss the three theorists
in light of each other.
The ContPvr
In order to situate the discussion which follows, let
us briefly place Foucault's discussion of the production
of deep subjectivity in the broader historical context
as Foucault sees it. Foucault rejects all theories of
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economic determinism on both historical and theoretical
grounds. m while he denies fchat ^ instance(
economic system are the ultimate subjects of history
he readily affirms
- and his works illustrate this
affirmation
- that the production of subjects "cannot
be studied outside their relation to the mechanisms of
exploitation and domination. »2 Rather, subjectification
and economic exploitation coexist in "complex and circula
relations.-
.3 since these relations play an important rol
in some of Foucanlt-'c *-^-u-4-„ • j. •* ault s texts, it is worthwhile to summariz
his understanding of them.
Foucault maintains that the proliferation of
techniques of subjectification was largely linked to
the problems and demands that were associated with
the rise of capitalism. As wealth was accumulated in
increasing quantities in workshops, warehouses and ports,
a more systematic and continuous form of policing and
punishment of theft was necessary to replace the old
system with its dangerous spectacles and tolerated
illegalities. it became necessary to make the power
to punish "more regular, more effective, more constant
and more detailed in its effects; in short [to] increase
its effects while diminishing its ... costs .
»
4
simulta-
neously, the increasing emphasis on productivity and
growth required that the bodies of the workers be rendered
disciplined and docile to maximize their utility and to
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integrate them into relatively rigid mechanized proces.es
It became necessary to "increase the forces of the body
(in economic terms of utility, and diminish the same
forces (in political terms of obedience, .» 5 Furthermore,
the increasing concentration and utili zation of larger
populations required a means of constituting and
controlling large groups of people in a manner that -
as „e shall see
- bears interesting resemblances to the
constitution of selves. Populations too had to be ordered
in a way that optimized their utility and mastered the
potentially resistant powers of the newly assembled mass.
"Bio-power" refers to the sum of these disciplines,
institutions, techniques, and discourses that develop to
track, survey, constitute, regulate and most importantly
make more productive both individual bodies and popula-
tions, m Foucault's view, these mechanisms do not all
come into being simply to meet the demands of a developing
global economic system. Rather they are heterogeneous
in origin, developed to meet the requirements of local
situations, and are henceforth "invested and annexed by
more global phenomena." 6 The relative causality of
various historical factors varies widely and is for
Foucault, a question which must be investiqated
historically case by case. What is certain is that
the body can only be utilized if it is at once pro-
ductive and subjected. Hence the micro-powers that
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constitute subjects aro <~*il e indispensable to political
economies endlessly engaged in enhancing productivity
Whxle the original context of the development of
disciplinary power is the capitalist system, this
form of power has been widely deployed in other
societies as well (e.g., socialist and fascist).
Objectification anH gjabjastificatj on
in this discussion of subjectifying practices I win
focus first upon the ways in which persons afe objectif
as soul bearing subjects, and then discuss Foucault's
understanding of the manner in which individuals
constitute themselves as deep subjects in the modern
context.
The growing emphasis placed on achieving maximum
utilization and control of life was accompanied by the
development of what Foucault has characterized as "the
art of light and the visible. During the classical
age, military camps, workshops, schools, hospitals,
asylums, housing projects, etc., began to be constructed
and organized with greater attention to the principle
of increasing the visibility of those contained within.
Gaps, aisles, openings, walls, the position of tables and
beds
- were designed to optimize surveyability
. Groups
were divided, organized and hierarchized to facilitate
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Purpose. In addition to the perfusiQn ^ igenerai
gaze- throUghout a myriad of institutions>
that the
-threshold of visibility" within th«y rn e gaze was
markedly lowered.
For a long time ordinary
individuality
- the everydayindividuality of everybody -
remained below the threshold of
^th
r
H
Pt
t°
n
*
The di^iplinary
Hoc k i°wered the threshold ofS^ a le individuality and madeof this description a means ofcontrol and a method of domination. 8
in schools, factories and armies careful attention was
given to gestures, punctuality, attitudes and subtle
variations in behavior that had previously gone unnoticed.
Regions of the visible were divided and divided again with
an ever intensified focus on detail.
One of the mechanisms that rendered people
increasingly visible was the examination, which
became widespread in schools, psychiatric practices
and hiring processes. The examination allowed for
a minutely specified objectification and tracking of
individual characteristics, and simultaneously facili-
tated the measuring and grading of individual differences.
Through the proliferation of the examination persons
became objects of a meticulous and relentless will to
truth. "Micro-penalties" were introduced at various
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Points to influence behavior according to ^mjudgments that were intrinsic to the exam's operation.
The function of the normalizing gaze and the
penalties that accompany it is to constitute certain
actions, attitudes and abilities and to exclude others.
Vet it is a serious oversimplification to understand the
exercise of this power solely in terms of an enhancement
°f homogeneity.
„ithout a doubt ^ ^ ^
narrow the range of acceDi-ahioy r ptable heterogeneity in a radical
fashion. Behaviors, thoughts and emotions that fall
outside a narrow range are identified as perverse
abnormalities and excluded. Yet within an accepted
range, the gaze also identifies, orders and indeed
helps constitute differences. Foucault summarizes:
In a sense the power of normaliza-tion imposes homogeneity, but itindividualizes by making it possibleto measure gaps, to determine levelsto fix specialities and to renderthe differences useful by fittingthem one to another. 9
Somewhat paradoxically, at the same time that people
are abstracted as commodified labor, made exchangeable
in highly routinized labor processes and become formally
equal members of political systems, "the individual is
carefully fabricated." 10 within the limits of the
"tolerated," disciplinary power establishes careful
hierarchies, and "separations" between those at the
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same ran*. The gaze penetrates ^.^ ^^ ^
exclude differences that do not meet institutiQnai
requirements, but in addition tQ
^^
system of differences: ,,he continuQus individuaiizi
t7
amid
-
lfc att
— ^» ^ individuals by sei2ing
hexr pecul iarities as deviations fro, detailed norms
The gaze manifests a relentless win to "truth" (from
which the exercise o £ power is inextricable, which seeks
to transfer™ the atoms of hodies into objects of Knowledge
to be ordered, altered, fixed or excluded.
It is obvious that light and vision are neither
neutral events nor innocuous realities in Foucault's
work. Rather they are among the most central characters
-
both literally and metaphorically - in his understanding
of the functioning of power in modernity. One of the
cardinal features of disciplinary power is the frequency
and extent to which it is based on a "mechanism that
coerces by means of observation.-" Illumination and
observation (accompanied by penalties and rewards) ensure
the production of those behaviors which are desired and
excludes those that are not. It is no wonder then that
Foucault compares these modes of observation with "the
telescope, the lens and the light beam." 13 Just as the
latter were central in the development of knowledges that
facilitated ordering and utilizing the physical world, so
too the "observatories" of human beings made it possible
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to constitute humans as obiect^ vj s of knowledge - things tobe used.
The architectural scheme which most embodied ^
principles of light and vision „as ^ ^
the
-Panopticon." Bentham's structure was a ring of
completely illuminated cells in the center of which was
a watchtower that was designed to allow the guard to
observe the prisoners, without them being able to see
him. This not only allowed for continuous observation
but more importantly, the structure gave the prisoner tfcaSSD^of being under continuous observation even though
he could not verify this suspicion. This situation - the
ever-present possibility of the invisible gaze - compelled
the individual continually to watch over his own behavior.
The Panopticon manifests "a gaze which each individual
under its weight will end by interiorizing to the point
that he is his own overseer, each individual thus exer-
cising this surveillance over, and against, himself..."
And here we arrive at the heart of disciplinary
power: the constitution of subjects that relentlessly
subject themselves to self-observation. The aim of the
panoptic gaze is not simply to trap and control subjects
that would otherwise resist, but ultimately to constitute
subjects that will generate their own gazes - gazes that
will envelop them with a continuity and thoroughness that
the gaze of another could never sustain. The reign of
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Pure light
, the proliferating wiu tQ observatiQni confcroi
and productivity demands finaUv that the objects^
—
•«^ of light
. Everything
shxne, there must be no shadows. The Panopticon was to he
autocatylitic:
"the perfection ofP C l thls Power should tend
to render its actuai exercise unnecessary:
...in short
the rnmates should be caught up in a power situation of
which they are themselves the bearers. "15 „ence the
creation of an ideal economic situation: maximized
control and benefits at a minimal cost.
Vet what is the nature of this disciplinary panoptic
gaze and its internalized counterpart? Do they merely
judge surfaces, actions, immediately visible behaviors?
Certainly these are observed and judged, but conjointly
cne witnesses a much more profound observation taking
Place. Foucault argues that with the emergence of
disciplinary power it is no longer simply the crime,
visible deviation or error that is judged, but the
passions, potentials, drives, instincts, desires beneath
the visible as well: "these sh*^ lurlrin„ hoh;^
case itself-16 (my emphasis)
. perhaps ^ ^^
obvious in our courts, prisons and mental institutions,
yet it is equally at work in "tracking" children through
schools, and hiring and promotion processes where people
are often subjected to interviews and exams aimed not
simply at discerning relevant capabilities, but the
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inner nature character
.-aptitude" of the self as „eUThe disciplinary gaze judges with a remarkable degree
'
of aepth: it examines, deciphers, grades. draws suhtie
» -re ways
,
to discover and constitute truths about the,
» an effort to raaximize utility and ^ ^ ^
*». that we internalize and perpetuate. This gaze is ^to he S3mtSa with the confessing gaze discussed heXow
but it is important to note fche exfcent ^ ^.^ ^^
even this discipiinary gaze has a reaarKably subterranean
quality to it.
Of course, as we iooK out our windows or walk through
the streets we discover verv few mn«H 4-y r round transparent build-
ings with cornerstones dedicated to Bentham - even if
there are many prisons modeled to varying degrees on this
architectural form. Yet Foucault's discussions of the
Panopticon are not primarily an attempt to persuade us
of the pervasiveness of its literal reality. Rather
Foucault's writing traces the lines of light, the walls,
the angles, shapes, patterns and the intended effects
of this structure as he finds it in Bentham's text. it
captures his attention as an "ideal form"*? of a mechanism
of power which has been extremely important during the
last two centuries. The themes articulated in this form
have been embodied in a variety of ways, not all of which
have been architectural (e.g., the exam), and we can all
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thxnk of numerous panoptic devices i„ our everyday Ufefrom one way Errors, visibl e and invis ible cameras in
'
banks and stores, intercom system in schools that allow
the principal to listen into classroom, to urine
analysis.
One should not read Foucault to he contending that
people located within panoptic institutions are slml^
pacified, constituted and rendered transparent to the gaze
of power. These latter are the objectives of a certain
strategy of power, and indeed they do inscribe their
effects into the very being of people; yet those
objectified by power are not simEly products of fcheir
objectification, and strategies of power are met with
counter-strategies. (More is said on this in chapter
four., with this caveat however, it remains the case that
the deployment of vision and light - the principles of the
Panopticon
- have been central in Foucault <s analyses of
power and his understanding of the types of selves we have
become today.
The correlate of these principles and the penalties
that accompany their operation is the soul, as both the
effect of this power and that which reproduces it at
the level of the self. Just as the body of the king was
duplicated and became the unchanging atemporal body that
maintained the kingdom in the Middle Ages, Foucault argues
that the bodies of those housed in the institutions of
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mg a
discipline society give rise tQ fcheir dupucates ^
wen, in the form of the modern soul
_ ^
semi
-se=ularizea vestige of Christianity or simpJy J
ideological fiction, the soul is a real product of
-dernity. It is that which is constituted by disci-
plinary power in schools, the workplace, prisons and
-
psychiatric practices. The sou! is the "reality
reference" of this power: that which is educated,
trained, punished, normalized, identified; that which
is codified and inhabits the body in which it is produced
But perhaps even
.ore importantly the soul is that which
surveys and governs man from within, in the name of
freedom. The soul is the profound subjection of humans,
for it buries the effects of power deep under the flesh
of their being. The soul is the panopticon which each
self harbors within it<?Pi f - 4»x n se t
- in a space which itself is
a product of the power that constitutes it.
It is within this context of the production of
the modern soul that we can best situate Foucault's
discussion of the deep self-examining self in Volume
°ne ° f The History of Sexual ity
, for the latter is an
additional strategy of subjugation which, though different
in important ways, is nevertheless quite consonant with
- and often overlaps and is intertwined with - the
deployment of the disciplinary gaze. To avoid confusion
before pursuing a more extensive analysis of the modern
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confessing-self X „ish briefly tQ ^
diSC^--- **«..„ this deep-self and the above
discussion of the disciplinary self.
With respect to si railarities, perhaps most i.portant
-
the fact that both work to generate a self that is
related to itself through a colonized, codified and
continuous self-reflection; a self
-reflection which
tends to nonnalize as it observes, both by impregnating
the self with self-definitions constituted by hegemonic
discourses and practices and by engendering certain
"desirable" characteristics while reducing those that
are "undesirable" or "other » pw+-k«v-~r.n . Furthermore, the conception
of the self as deep-harboring hidden truths and secret
circuitous causalities
- which is tightly bound up with
the confessional practices also conveniently serves
to multiply the disciplinary holds over the self. it
is these similarities which are so conducive to the
overlapping deployment of conceptions and practices of
the deep-self and disciplinary technologies. We see this
overlap in modern treatments of madness as evidenced by
the nineteenth century "moral methods" which operated
through "that psychological inwardness where modern man
seeks both his depth and his truth." 18 with the birth
of the asylum guilt was organized to produce deeper more
detailed self-consciousness, responsibility and unity.
Similarly, as we noted above, Foucault argues that our
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juridical practioes have moved tQwards ^ examination
of the desires, drives and deep personai ^^^^^
beneath the relevant acts." This is not .J-ni immediately
deep self-reflection, but it is reflection on the depths
of selves, a reflection which, when continuous enough
^ins to he generated within selves. If sexuality p^
a central role in the constitution Qf^^ ^
deep self-reflection, it also plays a role in prolifer-
ating disciplinary arrangements: the segregation of
nineteenth century working class bedrooms by age and
sex, the surveillance of parents over children.
Both disciplinary power and the confession of the
deep self are characterized by an obsession with minutiae
But here however we arrive at a central difference between
the two as well. Por „hat drives the confessing.self ^
endless circles of self-reflection is the attempt to
discern the meaning and deep truths buried within and
beneath the details of existence. "For the disciplined
man.
.
.
[however] no detail is unimportant, but not so much
for the meaning that it conceals within it as for the hold
it provides for the power that wishes to seize it." 20
in contrast to the disciplinary gaze, whose direct and
primary objective is utilization and control, the gaze
of the confessing-self is driven by a "hermeneutics of
suspicion- that delivers it to infinite depths, meaning
behind meaning, if the panopticon ends in pure light , the
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confessing-self on the other hand is after gn object
15 to such an absolute ^
ana an tne deep truths humans see, to discover about
'
themselves in the modern episteme is st y, <-fj-oue a best a "dark
shimmer,--
.
truth that continually recedes with each
approaching gaze
,
a truth demanding a confession that can
never end.
„ the panoptic gaze is driven by an endiess
imperative to maximize utility Foucamf
'
*° cault argues that the
confessing gaze - with its partly overlapping ^
deployments
-
is driven by an imperative stemming from the
very being of
..man" as he exists in modernity. The most
immediate effect of this imperative is the constitution of
a he^eneutic subject. Yet as we turn to discuss this
subject, let us not forget that it disciplines as it
confesses
.
As noted above, the manner in which "western man-
is constituted as a deep self-examining self is elucidated
in Foucault's discussion of sexuality as a locus of modern
confession. m Volume One of The History of Sexuality
Foucault argues that: »We have become a singularly
confessing society. "22 Confession has become increasingly
important in our institutions, our relations to others -
indeed confession has come to constitute the self's
relationship with itself. Inextricable from confession,
as both its precondition and its effect is the under-
standing of the self as a deep subject. It is this
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interplay between depth and confession and the role
Foucault argues they perform in the constitution Qf
subjectivity that I shall explore in what follows
Depth is not, according to Poucault, an essential
quality of selves. Rather it 1=M
" 3 a dimension that comesinto being as an effect of power- a, space created as a
correlate of a varietv nf <-._v. ,y of technologies that operate upon
selves. m conjunction with the production of the "soul "
depth is created through the discursive deployment of
sex as
-the secret" that is subtly and surreptitiously
signified by all the actions, thoughts, emotions and
desires of the self. As indicative of "a universal
signified"" to which all things refer, the visible
manifestations of selves point beneath themselves to
their
-true.- meaning. Always to be un-covered, sex
constitutes the whole of the visible as the surface of a
depth. sex is not secret simply because it is "elsewhere"
than the direction in which we look: it does not lie in
the field of the visible, requiring only that we shift the
trajectory of our gaze. Rather, the visible lies between
ourselves and the true meaning we seek. The visible is
laden with the weight of a thickness that lies beneath it
-
a depth it simultaneously signifies and conceals. As
sex is discursively attached to the visible, the surface
of the visible swells open like a balloon to harbor the
secret in its interior.
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Yet we become deep selves nnfP ot only because we are
constitute, as beings^ .^ ^
we become beings directed ^ _^ ^dwell in ana grope through depth. For depth harfcors
the secret truth that to surface sq ^ ^
«y obtain our health, freedom and intelligibility 24
Because the promise of liberation Ueg buried ^^
what one does, what one recollects and what one has
forgotten, what one is thinking and what one thinks he
is not thinking.-*. Failure to e)£plore ^
our dark interiors will perpetuate our
--repression, --
••^authenticity" and blindness to our
--essential nature.--
However, Foucault arques thai- fh0o0xy m t these claims that depth
is the dimension of truth anHrn d freedom are merely the ruse
which lures people into a for™ of subjectivity that is a
trap, m fact, the space is colonized at its inception
and remains a locality that is continually penetrated and
invested by a variety of power strategies. Truth is not
"the child of protracted solitude, -26 the essences that
rise in the soul's silence. It does not emerge in purity
from deep within. Rather '-[tjruth is a thing of this
world, it is produced only by multiple forms of con-
straint.-' 27 we discover within, the being we have been
fabricated to be; and we perpetuate and intensify this
form of being when we exalt it as truth. The soul is
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an effect of a form of power that proliferates in^discovery.
„owever/ the content Qf a^
are not estahlished once and fQr ^ ^^
ates in the discovery of the self the tM> * „•rn as* of discovery
itself proliferates in denth ae 4-v,Q p s the dimension of the
hidden which one never depletes HPnn0Pi c . e ce power perpetually
strives to define our deaths u ,p , to help us define them, ever
anew.
Foucault illustrates this dynamic in his discussion
of the "latency., that oo.es to be attributed to sexuality
-
a latency which conceals the truth of sex from the self
sex "truly" resides in regions even deeper than those into
which we are able to submerge ourselves. „e must delve
deep, but we are unable to delve deep enough. The last
part of the search requires the help of "the other who
knows.-.28 As beings of such ^^^^ ^^
require an other (psychiatrist, psychologist, therapist,
counselor, priest, teacher, etc.) to identify the real
truths of our soul: a "master of truth" who will decipher
what we really are. Through the interpretive voices of
these others, a plethora of discourses endlessly develops
around the task of deciphering, identifying and codifying
the gems extracted from the deep. In the scientific
discourses, subjects come to be defined and located on
a scale stretching from the normal to the pathological.
In these discourses selves are tracked, fixed attached
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o operatives ana ultimately constituted ^ individuais
is the relation between discourse and^^
^termines the truth discovered in ^^ &^
The
-economy" of discourses - their
ot S2?i° teChnol°gy. the necessities
«pS?"tSS
e
e?^2: ^e tactics th
**
under1 » S S of power which
" is what dland - Which the* transmit• .. etermines the essent-i.ifeatures of what they have ?o sav
written ?rL°t
f
h
SeXUality
-
'
-™st be
history
1
^courses^"
1
°
f 3
Depth is the place we are identified and held fast
as objects upon which power is exercised. Even more
deesly. and fundamental than we can know, we are what
the psychiatrist tells us we are. The truth of our
bSing is depth as s~n in th» eyeg of 1n -thM
And this truth is unity. Beneath the ambiguous and
shifting surfaces of our flesh and word, signified in
multifarious ways, one discovers the "one true sex." This
discovery of unity in depth can be grasped metaphorically
in Foucault's presentation of the hermaphrodite Herculine
Barbin. The examinations of Barbin are important for
Foucault because they exemplify the disciplinary seizure
of the body. Read metaphorically, however (substituting
"deep self" for bodily depth) they draw attention to
the violent and reductive aspects of the search for deep
truths, on the surface, Barbin appears to be a most
"extreme mixture" of the two "true" sexes. Yet deep
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below, discovered first- h«rSt by Pirating touch and later
by means of the surgeon's b lade one finds the real truth
Barbin is extricated from
-the happy Umbo of her non-identity^ and hurled intQ ^
"indeterminate anatomy where the doctors and lawyers
and judge determine the single truth of her being-
•male," before which the truth of Barbin's apparent
ambiguous difference as a "hermaphrodite" is evaporated
in the prefix
-pseudo." Depth is ultimately not a
dimension into which ambiguity and difference are
extended and proliferated. Depth is a dimension of
reduction. The illusion of richness that depth might
conjure
-
each surface refers to something else - shatters
in the "reality" that ultimately they all refer to the
same thing, it is not only that Barbin's ambiguous flesh
is finally fixed as male, but moreover that "his" whole
being is fixed as "male sex ." Barbin's protean being is
crushed, ground homogenized by the immense weight of a
depth which in the end Barbin cannot bear, an engulfing
depth in which "he" drowns.
Vet, if we are simultaneously produced and reduced
in depth, we do not all experience depth and sex as did
Barbin. Indeed, the task of recovering the truth of our
sex has been constituted as something desirable. Hence we
seek this truth of truths in the name of liberation. Our
freedom is to free sex. In fact however, Foucault argues
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that in trying to free „ sex „ ^ ^ ^side
Power, but .. are fastened to ^^^^ ^ ^
» which „e think we see Qurselves renected _ ^
shiver of sex .„31 we strive ^ truiy^ ^^^^^ ^terms of this darlc shiranering unifcy witMn
_ ^ ^
Foucault refer to the "flaw, >." ^ dark shmmer " of sex? How can a
shiver be dark? Perhaps it is because ^ ^ ^
darkens ail the living surfaces which are referred to it
endlessly as it swallows their radiant plenitude. Perhaps
it is because the shiver is surrounded by the darkness
it produces as we enter the Paustian bargain in the name
of liberation and "exchange life in it, .„,.,, for sex
itself -32 (my emphasis)
_ perhaps , t ig , nel , m . nabie
darkness of monochromatic light.
The paradox that governs the deployment of sexuality
cannot be overstated. On the one hand a unity is posited
within as the "truth" and key to our being. But while
the creation of this "unity" has great effects on our
self-understanding and our being, it is elusive enough
to require continually renewed self-surveillance and
examination by others in order to approach closer to
its "origin." Thus the will to truth about sex spreads
to new areas and "penetrat [es] bodies in an increasingly
detailed way." 33 m the nineteenth century sexuality
begins to circulate throughout the family; great attention
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xs paid to infantile sexuality, masturbation, separating
boys ana girls and parental surveillance. Sexual forms
and deviations are specified, multiplied, and so too
the "surfaces of intervention" through „hich individuals
can he identified. We are in the midst of an extremely
multiplicitous search for unity.
in addition to the effects of depth discussed above,
Foucault maintains that the conception of the self as a
'
subject of deep truths functions to disguise the operation
of power in which it plays such an important part, since
truth originates in the purity of the inner dimension (the
reasons for error are "deen" +-o^ \ ,a p too...), we avoid examining
the social, economic and political practices in which
truth and the subject are produced. Instead, to the
extent that we examine the effects of the social world
upon the self at all, it is in the form of the "repressive
hypothesis" in which power plays a purely negative role
over against the deep-self. Hence the constitutive
effects of power are disguised, and ironically, people
exalt the very effects of power in rather poor attempts
to be free. As the deep-self - one of the most profound
effects of power - becomes the a priori assumption of
the analysis of power, power itself becomes increasingly
invisible.
One should not read Foucault to be arguing that
self-examining unified deep-subjects are produced solely
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.ces
he
through modern discursive and non-discursive practic
of sexuality. Fouoault has^
^
understands it to be very important in ^ production ^
modern subjectivity, out egually because it Actions so
well to illuminate the ontological understandings that
underlie hegemonic modern ideals of the self „hich are
by no means limited to sexuality. Poucault sees similar
themes embodied in modern
"self-absorption, "34 therapeutic
practices and Sartre's notion of "authenticity . "35 And
though the self-observing self constituted under the eye
of disciplinary power is not identical to the hermeneutic
subject, we have already noted the way in which a notion
of deep truth has made its way into juridical and edu-
cational discourses. In short, Foucault believes that
the constellation of depth, unity and self-examination
constitutes the epistemic terrain upon which most
contemporary discussion occurs: it is a central
feature of what he calls the "epistemologico-juridical"
formation. 36 m order to gain a clearer understanding
of Foucault's analysis of the self as it is constituted
within the modern episteme, we now turn to his meta-
theoretical insights in The Order of Things .
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Meta-Theoretir^n
^paly^s
Th^d^f_rhin^, Foucault conducts a meta-
theoretical analysis of the modern sciences of ..man.«
in this investigation, he does not attempt to define
the various ideas that the human sciences have in common,
nor the framework of thought within which they operate.
Rather he is striving to comprehend what he calls the
"historical a priori" of modern theories about man.
This a priori is what in a givenperiod, delimits in the totality
of experience a field of knowledge,defines the mode of being of the
objects that appear in that fieldprovides man's everyday perception
with theoretical powers and definesthe conditions in which he can
sustain a discourse about things
that is recognized to be true. 57
Hence Foucault is interested in the "conditions of
possibility" of the modern discourses on man. Because
(as we shall see) he contends that man is situated at the
heart of the modern "episteme" as the subject and object
of knowledge in a way that is very different from previous
epistemes, an exploration of the being of man in modern
theory is central to his project. in a sense Foucault is
unfolding what we might call a relative ontology of man;
an ontology that addresses not the being of man's being in
any essential or ahistorical sense, but rather an ontology
that addresses "man" as that being which burst upon the
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scene at the turn of the nineteenth century, and makes
possible and governs the human sciences.
Foucault confines himself to archaeological method-
°l0gY
^ ^^^hin^, and hence the connections
between knowledge and power which one finds in some of
his earlier and later works are absent. indeed, the
appearance of man as that which made the human sciences
possible is seen in this work not as a consequence of
technologies of power, but instead as "an event in the
order of knowledge . "38 Tne methodological snortcomings
of this stage of Foucault 's thinking have been cogently
discussed by Dreyfus and Rabinow39 and retrospectively
by Foucault himself. 40 However, one of the things that
remains of great value in this work is the sustained
analysis of the mode of being of "man" as he appears in
a wide variety of modern discourses. We find here a level
of generality which sheds light on some of his later works
which tenaciously remain at the level of the particular.
I believe that if we read Foucault's archaeologies and
his genealogies in light of each other, we can reveal
important insights into modernity which are far more
illusive when these texts are read separately. In an
effort to do this, I will first briefly situate the
sciences of "man" in the contest of power, and then show
some of the ways in which his archaeological discussion
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of "man" sheds liaht nr.g on the general characteristics of
man as the subject and object of power.
Zt is in ^iniine_^n^uni^ that Foucault most
clearly situates man and the sciences of man in the
context of technologies of power. Rather than simply
being "an event in the order of knowledge," man is
understood to be an "object-effect" of the modern
techniques of
"domination-observation, "41 and the
sciences of man are understood to develop largely in
the midst of relations of power: the observation and
definition of incarcerated persons, the relationship
between psychiatrists and patients, the widespread
subjection of person and populations to examinations,
ever more continuous observation, detailed attempts to
constitute desired behaviors. In short, the sciences
of man develop in a panoptic society in which humans
are increasingly under observation, and the "man" they
study is the man that is constituted within these
power relations. Knowledge and power "presuppose
and constitute" one another: "The subject who knows,
the objects to be known and the modalities of knowledge
must be regarded as so many effects of these fundamental
implications of power-knowledge." 42
If knowledge is born in and proliferates operations
of power, then we should not only be able to situate
and gain a deeper understanding of modern knowledge by
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power by studying the characteristics of Knowledge. If
the man who is both an effect of power and a being that
extends it, is also the man that is the subject and object
of the human sciences, then a study of the being of this
man that has governed these sciences is likely to give us
greater insight into man's relation to power. For this
man
-
his relationship to his life, his language, his
labor and his consciousness, the things he must think
^ d° " iS ^Mng^oX_ms_world of "war by other means."
The human sciences attempt to describe a being that
exists, and their effort itself, in part, both manifests
and constitutes this extant being. And if there are
fundamental characteristics which define his being for
all of these diverse sciences we should examine them
carefully in an effort to discern some of the fundamental
aspects of the functioning of power in modernity. The
man of finitude and the things he "must" do, provide us
most profoundly with a general description of man-in-
modern-power
.
In order to bring Foucault's discussion of the Age
of Man into relief, it is helpful to briefly outline his
conception of the Classical Episteme which preceded it.
The Classical Age conceived of the world as a great chain
of being created by God. Each of the beings lodged within
this continuous chain varied only in the slightest manner
114
from its neighbors in the chain. Each being was repre-
sented, but its representation was not the creation of
another being. Kather, significations and that which they
signified were transparently and internaliy connected. I„
the "Classical Aae the =i g , sign is the representativity of
the representation in so far as it is representable.
"Each [representation] posits itself in its transparency
as a sign of what it represents."" The place of human
beings in this scheme of things was to compare the
representations of a world that had been scrambled by
time to examine the minute identities and differences
between beings, in an effort to construct an order that
would resemble as closely as possible the Order that God
created.
As is readily apparent, the Classical episteme
lacked the space in which humans could be originary
beings. Representations did not emerge out of the
density of man's being, they existed in a completely
transparent "strictly binary" 45 relation with the things
they represented; the order which man sought to construct
was not the product of a creative effort to make some
sense out of a chaotic Godless world, but simply an effort
to reconstruct the God-given. The representations given
to humans and the things themselves were unproblematically
linked in the language people spoke. Hence "man, as a
primary reality with his own density, as the difficult
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object and sovereign subject of an ^J r 11 Possible knowledge,
has no place in [the Classical episteme] . "46 The
discourse that joined representation and being
"provided the link between the *i think' and the
*I am' of the being undertaking it. "47 And . f ^
being of the "I am" remained unexamined, it was because
it could not constitute a "problem" in an episteme where
thoughts and beings pressed up against each other so
tightly that there was no space to ask a question which
would soon become imperative. Man as the object for
complex interrogation and analysis did not exist.
Foucault argues that a new epistemic space with new
possibilities and new requirements began to emerge at the
end of the eighteenth century with the recession of the
Classical Episteme. (This is a change Foucault is content
to describe as an "archaeological mutation," and makes no
attempt to explain until later works.) in the Classical
Age the truth of a thing was defined by its position in
the table of representations which was constructed to
mirror God's Order - itself and order of the visible.
The thing's visible representative qualities manifested
its identity which could be comprehended in its relation
to other representations. Hence, representation - the
visible surface of the world - was the locus of beings
and their truths. However representation began to be
displaced, as labor escaped from the table of needs with
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Smith and became an "irreducible absolute" standard of
measurement for analyzing exchange; as ^
natural history began to be based on organic structure
"an internal principle not reducible to the reciprocal
interactions of representations" ,48 as the
principle of inflection usurped the primacy of represen-
tation in analyses of language. Foucault argues that
these initial changes were further transformed and that
they established a complete break with the Classical
Episteme in Ricardo's originary labor, Cuvier's primacy
of functions and Bopp's emphasis on grammatical wholes.
Things withdrew beneath their visible surfaces; truth
came to reside in their hidden regions. As beings
"withdraw into the depths of things, "man" emerges
in the space left behind - a being at the center of a
murky world who provides himsPlf with representations.
As thought falls outside of its previously transparent
relationship to the world, Kant awakens. Restless and
uneasy, he begins to ask about the "conditions of its
possibility.
"
Foucault contends that the man that emerges in
modernity discovers that he is indicated by the positive
forms of life, labor and language which he finds himself
in the midst and mist of. "Man is designated - more,
required - since it is he who speaks, since he is seen
to reside among the animals ( on extremity of a long
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series) and since... he is necessarily 4-v,the principle and
means of all production." 50 ver »Y t as man is indicated at
the center of life, labor and language, he simultaneously
finds that his existence is only accessible in these very
forms, and that they are older than he is and determine
him. Man can only be known as he works, speaks and lives.
Yet only through an ancient language can man speak, only
by means of processes older than himself can he work,
and he lives only as part of a primordial life that
precedes him. Everything indicates man, and everything
man can reveal about himself indicates an "irreducible
anteriority"
- gestures towards his ineliminable finitude.
However, if everything bespeaks man's finitude,
nothing enables him to "contemplate" it; for everything
which is given in his thought - even his finitude - is
itself based on finitude. As man attempts to elucidate
the system of words, production and life that outdates
him, that which he is attempting to clarify "always
already partially and surreptitiously constitutes his
elucidation. Man - what he is and what he is not - is
elusive. But that which man is unable to completely
contemplate because of its irreducible anteriority" is
at the same time only possible and given to experience
on the basis o f man's finitude. The mode of being of
space, life, production and language are only given to
man on the basis of his body, his desire, his work and
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his speech. TnUs the finite ex . stence wh . ch iim . ts h^
access to things is also that which Makes all access
possible.
It is precisely the evasiveness of finitude - the
endless reciprocal referral of man and things - which
harbors finitude's promise. if man is unable to
comprehend with clarity the precise nature and
boundaries of his finitude there is always the
possibility that there may be a way out: a form
of life, labor and language - soon to be discovered -
that would be completely transparent, rational and
unalien. Oddly, man's finitude is accompanied by
hope more than by submission or resignation.
Heralded in positivity, man's finitudeis outlined in the paradoxical form
of the endless; rather than the rigour
of a limitation, it indicates the
monotony of a journey which, though
it probably has no end, is neverthe-
less perhaps not without hope.
5*
Indeed, this hope and the struggle to realize it are not
possible options for man to pursue; they are imperative .
For this finitude which originates in man's strange being
threatens to completely cut man off from the truth of
himself. The ambiguity of finitude which harbors the
possibility of escape from an ambiguous existence into
a realm of pure truth threatens to snuff man out under
the tragic weight of error, alienation - the Other within.
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The possibility of the 1ai-^>.y n l tter generates the imperative
quality of the former.
The strategy employed by man in his effort to
achieve transparency and rise beyond his finitude takes
the general form of the "repetition of the positive within
the fundamental,-.52 in which man attempts ^ ^
those things which determine him and indicate that he
is finite, in the positivity of his own being. Foucault
argues that there are three ways in which this "analytic
of finitude" is "deployed": the repetitions of the
transcendental and the empirical, and return and retreat
of the origin and the cogito and the unthought. Each
of these doubles deserves discussion, for each is central
to the trajectory which he believes modern man follows:
a trajectory in which man makes his Other, the Same.
Foucault states that man in the analytic of finitude
is an empirico-transcendental doublet: "a being such
that knowledge will be attained in him of what renders all
knowledge possible." 53 As the analysis of representation
recedes, man becomes the " site of anaiy^^' which must
be continually interrogated and defined in the effort to
provide a stable foundation for knowledge. One form this
takes is that of mechanistic, physiological and biological
attempts to discover the conditions of knowledge in the
nature of the human body. The most recent manifestation
of this effort is witnessed in the sociobiology movement
120
that has become quite popular in the past decade. Here
truth is bound to a fixed understanding of the human
nature that makes it possible. Another form of the
exnpirico-transcendental double is the effort to ground
knowledge in a history which can be known with certainty
and simultaneously prescribe the forms of this knowledge
(here he has in mind Comte and Marx)
.
Thus man as he appears in modernity is constantly
traversed by knowledges which reduce him to the status of
an object which is uncritically given, and/or define him
in terms of what he is becoming and will be. In both
cases "truth" is constituted and man is defined as "the
same" meaning that man is to be identified within a
constellation of truth which does not ^Vnnw.^ tnat
in humans which is other than, non-identical with or in
opposition to this constellation. And this is of no
little consequence. As we see in other works, a plethora
of discursive and non-discursive practices is launched
to make man be what he "truly is." These practices are
tightly intertwined with the way in which man appears in
the modern episteme. What is unavoidable is that man -
as the finite subject and strange object in which dwells
and from which emerges an elusive truth - must continually
be traversed, interrogated and illuminated in the effort
to discover and make him conform to a truth which is
nevertheless impossible to secure in modernity.
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The second awkward double in which man in the
analytic of finitude discovers himself is the constant
referral of the ^itp. to the unthougnt
. within ^
modern episteme, man is unable to infer a total, immediate
and transparent "I am" from "I think." The "I think" is
only able to think what it thinks on the basis of what it
does not think. As we have seen, man's thought is carried
along by a language, a life and a labor that are older
than he is and not completely intelligible to him. Man's
thought constantly refers to what he is not and does not
think. As such a being, man is the "locus of misunder-
standing
... that constantly exposes his thought to the risk
of being swamped by his own being, and also enables him to
recover his integrity on the basis of what eludes him." 54
Being neither a dead object nor an absolute subject, man
is "always open, never finally delimited, yet constantly
(but always only partially) traversed" 55 by a gaze, a
thought driven by fear and hope.
The unthought that haunts man does not have the
character of an external limitation. Rather, that which
man does not think - his Other - is born with man: it
is the "shadow" he casts with each thought. Thus the "I
think" which led Descartes to truth and certainty, must
be for modernity a project that is never completed and
ceaselessly renewed. And if Kant stepped to the threshold
of modernity when he began to question the conditions of
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possibility of truth, fully modern man ig ^
the possibility and actuality of "what eludes him."
Hence man "must traverse, duplicate and reactivate in
an explicit for, the articulation of thought on everything
within it, around it, and beneath it which is not thought
•*- a ^^^y renewed i ntorrogation.. 56 (my emphasis)
^
Everything which
- in the depths of man and that which
surrounds him
- evades man's thought, now threatens man's
entire existence (no longer transparent and stable: now
increasingly opaque) with error, alienation and madness.
The shadows that man casts with each thought have been
cast by all men during all of time, and the darkness of
this collective shadow carries him forth as a grain of
sand on the crest of a turbulent wave. Better yet, as
an inept god thrashing uneasily in a dark murky ocean of
his own creation. The ocean roars to man's horror "I am
Other,
»
yet without it he would be desiccated and succumb
to an unlivable gravity, for the other is the necessary
condition of man's being - a life, labor and language
which he is not identical to nourishes and sustains him.
In his effort to recover his promised position as
the pure origin and certain sovereign of thought, man
penetrates into the region of the Other. However this
constant obsession with and interrogation of the unthought
does not culminate in the dissolution of opacity. Rather
than an end, man establishes himself in the endless
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"Agnation of the eleaent^darlsness that cuts raan
off from himself"" (my emphasis)
_ ^ .^.^
the depths which prevent him fro* being self-identical
self-presence. This is the essence of man and thought
in modernity.
Hence Foucault argues that "for modern thought no
morality is possible, "58 for it is always in movement
towards, but never arrives with certainty of a secure
self-identical thought unplagued by an unthought residue
which might enable us to grasp the laws of the world's
order which have grounded western (non-religious) morality
in prior times. (Another certainty ground religious
morality and this becomes problematic in modernity as
well.) Indeed, the only imperative which this thought-
which-never-arrives can generate - an imperative of
no small importance - is that of its own movement:
continuously expanded reflection-illumination of its
atramentous depths.
Yet if thought must ceaselessly shed reflective
light, this is not to say that thought is simply bound
up with itself and, due to its uncertainty, unable to act.
On the contrary, Foucault maintains that "modern thought,
from its inception and in its very density, is a certain
mode of action." 59 In modernity, thought has always
"left itself," it has never stayed within the domain of
the theoretical. Modern thought has always been compelled
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to move beyond itself to what is not thought - to what is
•'-thought." And where contact has been made there has
been disturbance. For thought does not simply
"reveal,"
but rather is « modification of what it knows...60 J
thought ide^tifie^ it "offends or reconciles, attracts
or repels, breaks, dissociates, unites or reunites:
it cannot help but liberate and enslave. "61 Thought
exercises power not merely because of its content and
its bases in societal struggles. Moreover thought is
linked to power because of its fundaments t^^..
.
because it is always "advancing towards that region where
man's Other must become the Same as himself."" Modern
thought moves to make all that is Other identical to
its concept, and in so doing enslaves and obliterates
the Other's difference (it may establish the Same's
differences)
.
it constitutes a new thing that is the
Same. Before prescribing action (based on morality),
thought in modernity is action. Hegel might serve as
an appropriate illustration of this point, his dialectic
moving restlessly from one thing to the next, identifying,
reducing, exhausting the meaning of things to the truths
they contain within his phenomenological "museum." Even
Hegel, the master of that final synthesis, senses the
ineliminable proximity of an unthought about to caste a
tremendous shadow upon our current truths. If "the owl
of Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of the
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dusk,"" what is this but a subtle acknowledgement that
thought never quite keeps pace with the cutting edge of
the historical wave which bears it along? what is this
if not a delicate confession about that twilight region
in which thought is condemned to fly its unthought always
just below the horizon
- never to spread its wings in the
pure transparent light of a new day? More concretely, we
can think of the ceaseless efforts to ensnare the untame
protean world within truths that reduce it to the terms
of hegemonic discourses - terms of "the Same." The
reduction of dreams to Oedipus, of homosexuals to medical
categories, dissidents to psychological classifications,
nature and people to the discourses of utility, the self
to deep truths
- lest the True, Normal, Healthy, Useful,
Deep man be forever cut off from himself.
There are few places in The Order of Things where
Foucault comes as close to leaping out of the archaeo-
logical dimension as he does in the above passage. More
than simply a discussion of thought and unthought as
archaeological contemporaries, Foucault offers us the
broad contours of his understanding of the manner in
which modern thought in its very being manifests a type
of power. In this analysis of the episteme he recognizes
characteristics of modernity - the restless unending
illumination, identification and transformation of
Otherness in an effort to constitute the Same in its
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purity
-
which he studies on a micro-level in his more
genealogical works. while there are many very important
differences between Foucault's archaeological and
genealogical periods, the broad insights in the former
and the particular analytics in the latter both belong
to a "structure of perception" which remained remarkably
constant in important ways.
The final double Foucault discusses is the "retreat
and return of the origin." m the Classical Age, humans
returned to the origin of things by discovering the order
of representation that perfectly and transparently repre-
sented the world. With the attainment of this order man
could unproblematically witness the primordial origin of
all things including knowledge itself. However as things
withdraw into their depths and transparency clouds over,
the origin that existed in theory in the Classical Age
becomes impossible. In modernity, when man looks for the
pure origin of his being, he discovers that he is always
"bound to a previously existing historicity." 64 As we
have seen, the dawn of his own being is always attached
to a life, labor and language which began long before him.
In fact, the nature of modern man's origin can no longer
be conceived of as an immediate and pure beginning, but
rather as the way he "articulates himself upon the already
begun." 65 Instead of "the immediacy of a birth" which
would reveal him as and allow him to be a self-present
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subject, he finds himself always already infused with and
borne along by what is not identical with his own being.
Far from leading back, or even
merely pointing, towards a peak...
of identity, far from indicatingthe moment of the Same at which thedispersion of the other has not vetcome into play, the original in manis that which articulates him from the
?2 t
Up°n something other thanhimself; it is that which introducesinto his experience contents and formsolder than himself, which he cannot
master.
. .scatters him throughout
time. 00
Unable to bear this, modernity has made multiple
attempts to recover man's origin from the naive positivist
attempts to "insert man's chronology within that of
things" 67 to the very diverse strategies of Hegel, Marx,
Spengler, Nietzsche and Heidegger. Whether it is in the
form of man-as-realized-being, or as the retreat of the
origin which alone makes experience possible, Foucault
maintains that "modern thought makes it its task to return
to man in his identity."
We might summarize the discussion of the analytic of
finitude, by contrasting the trajectory of the thought it
generates with that of the Classical Age. The Classical
Episteme as we have seen, was based on an ontology of
continuity. The world was perceived as a great chain
of beings which varied only in the slightest manner from
their neighbors in the chain. It is easy to see how
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thought which identified reality with the well ordered
table would be likely to violently distort and subjugate
reality under the guise of transparent and innocent
representations. This order of things could be - and
as Foucault shows in other works was - indicated in a
set of practices which constituted certain forms of
behavior and excluded others. The exclusion of madness
in the Classical Age illustrates the extent to which this
form of reason could be involved in the obliteration of
Otherness. Foucault never indicates that the Classical
Age was a "good time" or a period we should return to.
Yet upon the perceived ontological continuity of being,
classical theory was concerned with distinguishing
difference
: among "the secretly varied monotony of
the like." 68 The trajectory of Classical thought was
towards "the never-completed formation of Difference." 69
Modern thought in contrast, moves in the opposite
direction. In the attempt to secure man from the erosive
forces which threaten his precarious being as it is given
in the analytic of finitude, man must ceaselessly show
that he is the complete foundation of what can be a stable
truth; that the unthought can always be thought; that he
can seize his origin. Man must attempt to squeeze shut
the gaps where the Other might arise. In a state of
complete self-presence man would be the absolute sovereign
entirely rid of the temporal and spatial lacuna that might
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spawn the other. As self identical/ ^^ ^
so thoroughly that the unthought would be unthinkable.
Yet the Same is for modernity only a promise, a direction
to be pursued, never entirely attainable.
Foucault summarizes: in modernity "we have moved
from a reflection upon the order of Differences [Classical
Episteme]...to a thought of the Same, still to be con-
quered in its contradiction.-.™ " It is always concerned
with showing how the Other, the Distant, is also the Near
and the Same." 71 The ultimate consequence of this is
that modernity harbors within itself a most compulsive
imperative to obliterate difference. All that is other
threatens "man's" inherently unstable position and must
succumb to the Same. if the Classical Age closed out the
Other at the level of its ontology, modernity is founded
on an ontology in which the Other is continually reborn
in the depth of being - not simply exterior to but within
the very flesh of man - and must be ceaselessly trans-
formed, identified, made the Same. The Same is no longer
the ground for activity, it is now the essence of the
trajectory of activity itself. And it seems that Foucault
perceives the activity of revealing the Same to be even
more dangerous than the ground of the Same. If in the
latter, the Other might avoid recognition and exist simply
as a non-being, in the former there is absolutely no place
for the Other to hide. The Other is ceaselessly present
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as an absence recognized as the danger of Death and
Madness, and must be the target of continuous, detailed,
deep illumination and intervention.
But precisely at the point where thought has become
a restless activity that must ceaselessly reflect upon
the question of man, Foucault maintains that thought
is "falling asleep.^ The point at which modernity
perceives the awakening of philosophy - the point at
which man kills God and dissolves the visible surface
of His Classical Order into depth - is for Foucault only
an instant of consciousness that is engulfed once again
by Morpheus. This time however, Morpheus does not rule
as a God from without, but from within - as man in the
analytic of finitude.
Rather than overcoming pre-modern dogmatism, the
analytic of man merely "consists in doubling over
dogmatism." 73 The positive and the fundamental are
made to refer to one another endlessly in an effort
to render the foggy depths a place fit for sovereignty.
In this Fold, the transcendental
function is doubled over so that it
covers with its dominating network
the inert grey space of empiricity;
inversely, empirical contents are
given life, gradually pull themselves
upright, and are immediately subsumed
in a discourse which carries their
transcendental presumption into the
distance. ...All empirical knowledge,
provided it concerns man, can serve
as a possible philosophical field in
which the foundation of knowledge, the
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definition of its limits, and in fch*
Yet the ideals which govern man's being - transparency,
identity, sameness
- are precisely those which were
shattered when man killed God. They can be for man
only an impossible promise. As man steps to the vacated
throne he finds that God's world has deserted him. The
dim godless world resists the principles which rendered
God's sovereignty so unquestionable. The order crumbles;
being sinks beneath the reach of his gaze. m man's
attempt to be the ground of the Same, he merely situates
"his language, his thought, his laughter in the space
of that already dead God;" 75 and hence man's death is
simultaneous with his murderous birth.
Man is born in the effort to see man - not God -
as the self-present self-knowing origin of his own being.
With the death of God however, there is no ontology which
will enable man to attain the presence God had before man
dethroned Him. Man cannot be the God he killed, he is
somnambular in his efforts (to use a word Nietzsche
enjoyed)
.
Morpheus is the only god man can be.
Foucault ends The Order of Things with the ambiguous
prophesy that man may soon be "erased, like a face drawn
in sand at the edge of the sea." 76 What - if anything -
Foucault hopes will emerge, we will hold until the next
chapter. What is clear so far however, is that for
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Foucault, man, and the attempt to discover the "truth
of all truth" in himself which defines him, leads power
and knowledge in a direction that makes freedom and
thought increasingly impossible.
"The man whom we are
invited to free, is already in himself the effect of
a subjection much more profound than himself. "77
We have seen the sense of this statement in light of
the practices of power which define the truths of human
beings and fasten them to these truths. So too this sense
emerges in the practices in which selves fasten themselves
to both the truths that are deployed and the deployment
of truth. The studies of man in the analytic of finitude
are deeply entwined with this project, for they perpetuate
an ontology and a specific understanding of "liberation"
which is central to the operation of power in modernity.
Correlatively, they necessitate a will to truth and a
will to light which is also fundamental to these forms
of power. The archaeology of these sciences reveals
dimensions of our modernity which illuminate our situation
in ways that may help us transform it.
But if Foucault rejects deep man and the search for
the "truth of all truth," does he then simply revel in the
pit of irrationality? Does this abandon leave him in the
existentially crippled condition of absolute relativism?
Is he unable to affirm one set of practices over another?
Does he thoroughly reject enlightenment and its counter-
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discourse? is in +->,-: ~he ln thls sense a "neo-conservative" as
Habermas claims? 78
No.
The arguments to support such lucid bluntness lie
in the next chapter, but the "no" whispers in the final
pages of the "Man and His Doubles" chapter we have been
discussing. Here Poucault does not celebrate the death
of man as the end of thought, but rather as thought's
dawn :
The end of man... is the return tothe beginning of philosophy. it is
no longer possible to think in ourday other than in the void left by
man's disappearance. For this voiddoes not create a deficiency; itdoes not constitute a lacuna that
must be filled. It is nothing more,
and nothing less, than the unfolding
of a space in which it is once more
possible to think. 79
And lest one think that by "thinking" Foucault has
in mind something that originates only in Foucault 's
skeptical laughter - and it does find a home there - we
might note that he speaks of awakening modern thought "in
order to recall it to the possibilities of its earliest
• ft ndawning." These passages should caution us against
quickly leaping to the conclusions which may have seized
to dismiss Foucault.
A space. Nothing more, nothing less. A space of
possibility. In the following chapter, I will argue that
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the space that emerges in which it is once again possible
to think arises from the counter-ontological claims of
the human body which appear most forcefully when the
deep soul of man has deserted it. More precisely it is
Foucault's counter-ontology of the body which constitutes
the possibility of thinking and the "work of freedom."
indeed, thinking, freedom and self are reconceived on
the ground of this ontology. what emerges is nothing
short of a radical transformation of enlightenment;
but a transformation which Foucault nevertheless places
squarely within the tradition it transforms. it is a
transformation explicitly attuned to the possibilities
of enlightenment's earliest dawnings.
Conclusion
Thus we have explored Foucault's understanding of
the way in which depth, truth, light, liberation, and
the confessing-self function together in modernity to
constitute the Same and exclude the Other. If confessi
is ubiquitous, it is not simply because as moderns we
are attached to the imperative of discovering our "one
true sex." The hermeneutics of the sexual subject is
only one part of the confessing-self understood in a
more fundamental sense. At the epistemic level, the
confessing-self is synonymous with man in the analytic
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of finitude who must ceaselessly attempt to bring forth
the entire empiricity of his being; who must endlessly
seek to think the unthought that lurks in all thought;
and who incessantly strives to recover his lost identity
-
his absolute presence in which he would be completely
the Same, entirely rid of the Other. Man must attempt
to proliferate the will to truth throughout every
corpuscle of his being and the beings which surround
him. Everything must be brought to light. m modernity,
the being of man (as individual and as society) consists
of ever-tightening circles of reflexivity which increas-
ingly bind him to the Same.
In the next chapter, as we develop the positive
dimensions of the Foucaultian project, we will see some
of the understandings which govern modernity undergo
radical transformation, while others drop out altogether.
We will consider the tenability of this project in the
final chapter where we will discuss Augustine, Foucault
and Merleau-Ponty in light of each other.
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The Affirmative T>-aiectory
Of Foucault's Thnnght-
Introduction
.s
Foucault's critical insights have spawned debate :
that vary widely in their acuity and value. Yet thii
is not the terrain upon which he faces his most serious
challenges. Even among those who acknowledge that
Foucault's studies illuminate dimensions of our modernity,
we hear the incessant charge that Foucault is essentially
nihilistic and unable to tell us why he criticizes some
things and not others, let alone provide us with a
positive vision or affirmative ethic. Thus Habermas
has claimed that Foucault rejects the enlightenment,
is a "young conservative" 81 and lacks "normative
yardsticks"; 82 Charles Taylor refers to Foucault's
"monolithic relativism" and his inability to affirm one
set of practices over another; 83 Michael Walzer charges
him with "infantile leftism" and "anarchism/nihilism"; 84
Richard Wolin accuses him of an "aesthetic decisionism"
within which he is forced to take "irrationalist leaps"
to affirm anything. 85 The list of these dismissive labels
is a long one.
However, in spite of Foucault's frequently conspicu-
ous silence regarding the affirmative dimensions of his
thought, I believe that a strong argument can be made
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that his criticism wells out of an ontological position
which not only plays a central role in determining the
domains, focus, character and style of his work, but
is entwined with a positive "ethos" which provides the
general outlines of an alternative vision of selves and
social relations as well. Moreover, I maintain that the
ontological and ethical dimensions of Foucault's thought
-
missed all too often by many of his interpreters - are
among the most important aspects of his work. Foucault's
ethics provides a general framework for post-metaphysical
criticism and supplies us with a loosely defined vision
of the human world which affirms diversity, dialogical
artistic existence and a transfigured sense of "belonging"
with different others. I will begin with a discussion
of his ontology and follow with an interpretation of his
ethics.
Ontology of Difference
Guarding the entrance - and seeming to prohibit
entry - to an understanding of Foucault that seeks to
place an ontology of the body at the center of his
thought, is the following: "Nothing in man - not even
his body - is sufficiently stable to serve as the basis
for self-recognition or for understanding other men." 86
This passage might be interpreted to mean that we are
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:ause
hopelessly cut off from "the truth" of ourselves bee,
there is nothing in our being "sufficiently stable" for
us to seize and interrogate in an effort to understand
who we are. indeed, the "who" at any moment is merely
the "current episode in a series of subjugations, "87 and
the effort to essentialize the "who" is an important
strategy in this episode. Certainly if the body is
infinitely malleable and there is no basis for self-
recognition, talk of an ontology of the body seems
absurd?! it is the domain of Merleau-Ponty
, but far
removed from Foucault's thought. One wonders if in
absence of such a ground there is any basis for or
direction to Foucault's critique.
It seems to me that this interpretation of the
passage, while it starts on the right track, largely
misses Foucault's point; and that rather than being a
barrier to an ontology of the body, this passage leads
directly towards such an ontology - even though it is
one which radically opposes the unitary, essentialist and
teleological theories which are so common in the western
metaphysical tradition (understood in the broadest sense)
.
In fact it is the latter which are the most formidable
barriers to the ontology that Foucault seeks to develop.
Hence the first movement towards a new ontology of the
body involves shattering these barriers; and this is
precisely one of the functions of the passage in question.
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The cited passage must be read as part of Foucault's
deployment of a "knowledge made for cutting"" apart
these metaphysical constructions. The "self-recognition"
which the body cannot provide - indeed defies - is that
of a "rediscovery of ourselves"" which would demonstrate
the metaphysical truth of our being in an origin. Yet
in "shattering the unity of man's being" 9 0 Foucault's
genealogies do not leave non-ontology, but rather provide
us with a different ontology: one which "introduces
discontinuity into our very being." 91 instead of
perceiving discontinuity as the surface beneath which
one can discover the truly unified character of being,
genealogy perceives the continuities and unities which
metaphysical thinking takes to be truth, as constructions
which insidiously attempt to obfuscate, master and enslave
beings which are often multiple, heterogeneous and recal-
citrant.
Foucault discovers plurality beneath our carefully
fabricated identities. Our body, is the target of various
power strategies which aim to fashion it into a control-
lable and utilizable entity. It is conceived of as stably
governed by laws, instincts or morality. Within this
identity however, Foucault perceives "a complex system
of distinct and multiple elements, unable to be mastered
by the powers of synthesis." 92 The genealogist hears
a cacophony where modernity imagines perfectly pitched
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harmony. The genealogist hears each note straining,
unstable, reverberating uneasily, as the churoh bells
chiMe (unwittingly)
: .„ God is dead< then metaphysical
man is too."
But the genealogist does not simply discover that
man is not the original unity he claims to be. As
essentially engaged knowledge genealogy instigates and
enhances the dissonance it discovers and is "capable of
liberating divergence and marginal elements." 93 we might
think here of "ars erotica" or cacophonous erotica, in
an age of heterosexual ity, true sexuality; insubordinate
dimensions of the self which resist surveillance, order
and utilization in an age of hierarchies and disciplines
aimed at increasing productivity; friendship in an age of
insidiously possessive love; non-codified distinction and
abnormality in an age governed by the norm. Genealogy
seeks to arouse that which is ostensibly excluded or
lodged uncomfortably; not to integrate and obliterate,
but to bring to light and life the "face of the Other"
that always lurks within the Same.
Perhaps Foucault would have been better understood
if he had said "Nothing in man - especially not his body"
can ground metaphysical self-recognition; for the body
is a rather unstable target for such unities. It is a
"volume in perpetual disintegration. 1,94 Indeed, it is
that to which Foucault frequently appeals in his attempt
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to unseat the perpetual rediscovery of the self-as-origin.
It is to "bodies and pleasures" « in^tMi^jmlU^lic^^
that Foucault gestures in Thejis^v_p^^ Volmne
I as a possible locus of opposition to the unifying de-
ployment of sex. 95 Wnile the „demagogue dGn . es ^ bQdy
to secure the sovereignty of a timeless idea," 96 and
others can affirm the body only as a timeless idea,
Foucault evokes the body in order to radically question
timeless ideas. The body is ontologically different
from these ideas - a locus of differences which exceeds
and resists them, a being both fabricated and torn in
the midst of other bodies to which it is inextricably
and often discordantly related. The different-body is
not the end of critique but the beginning of a critique
that wells out of a sense of ontological difference.
Foucault aims not at the end of all self-recognition,
but at a recognition distinct and often multiplicitous
dimensions of the self which do not fit comfortably
within and are not reducible to the hegemonic categories,
a recognition that these dimensions one discovers within
the self are not things of Truth, but rather contingency,
voices in the cacophony of our being. The beginning of
a more profound self-recognition lies in the discovery
that one is different from the metaphysical conceptions
and prefabricated identities one is offered.
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Foucault's understanding of the resistant aspect
of bodies makes little sense when one tries to understand
it apart from this ontology of difference. m fact, the
notion of "plebs" can almost appear to be mystical In
this reading. The "plebs" is that which "in the social
body, in classes, groups and individuals themselves...
in some sense escapes relations of power.... There is
plebs in bodies... in a diversity of forms and extensions,
of energies and irreducibilities .
"
97 if one reads this
passage in light of the unified continuous ontology that
governs so much of modern thought, then one is at best
brought to a state of confusion. What escapes? How do
individual bodies generate resistance? However, if this
ontology is dislodged - and this is the aim of so much
of Foucault's work - a new insight into the phenomena
of resistance is revealed. If human beings are not
essentially unified "individuals," but rather, in the
world as multiple, discontinuous, divergent, discordant,
irreducible and flux - in short, as ontologically
different, then there is no reason to believe we could
be completely subjugated. The heterogeneity, contingency
and non-prefabricated distinction of our beings makes
us impossible to target in toto . There is always a
continually renewed surplus that is unidentified -
Other than that which is targeted. Our being is such
that while it is open to the imposition of rather extreme
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forms of subjuqation it- ic /t.yd l
'
l : 1-a not (by any means) in complete
complicity with these forms. It is this discrepancy which
fosters resistance and perpetual "war by other means"
rather than hermetically sealed hegemony. Nothing is so
simple as to be susceptible to complete identification.
The notion of difference with which Foucault works
needs clarification, for it is remarkably divergent from
those which are most often expressed in western thought.
It is in "Theatrum Philosophicum, " a very favorable review
of Gilles Deleuze's DifJ^n^^^ and Lg^^
de_Sens, that Foucault most explicitly discusses differ-
ence as it appears in these texts. Foucault 's admiration
for Deleuzian philosophy echoes throughout this essay
in which he says that with Deleuze "thought is again
possible- and "perhaps one day this century will be known
as Deleuzian." 98 Given this expressed concordance and
the concordance between this essay and other of Foucault 's
works, I will discuss the notion of difference in this
review as one which Foucault affirms.
Characteristic of western thinking, and its
"first form of subjection," is that " [d ] if ference is
transformed into that which must be specified within a
concept, without overstepping its bounds." 99 As specified
and without excess, difference is made equivalent to the
concept (s) which identifies it - the Same as the thought
which thinks it. The unmastered singularity of events is
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obliterated as thought makes the, identical with it
categories. Yet this obliteration of Otherness which
occurs the instant that thought specifies in order to
totally seize, is merely the first stroke of a long
grinding process. As specified, difference is specie-
fied; made to appear on the basis of differentiations
within commonalities that are considered to be more
fundamental. "For the concept to master difference,
perception must apprehend global resemblances
... at the
root of what we call diversity . "100 Herculine Barbin is
identified and seized as "male hermaphrodite": a species
of sexuality. The genus defines the species and both
define Barbin. What is this peculiar body-event called
Herculine Barbin? It is a type of male hermaphrodite.
What is a hermaphrodite? A type of sexuality. Herculine
Barbin 's difference assumes significance for hegemonic
nineteenth century French society only when it is
essentialized and made to appear within the categories
of the Same. Barbin 's raw difference is eclipsed as
Barbin only appears in hegemonic society as essentially
male sexed. The individual differences of Barbin's body
are examined, measured, compared with those of other
members of this species and located within an organized
spectrum of variation. It is the assumed underlying
identities that call forth examinations, make possible
comparisons and provide the framework within which the
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pseudo-recognition of differences occurs. Of course,
the establishment of a codified range of differences
' is
,
for Foucault, not simply a characteristic of Western
"thought," but is an imperative that is embodied in
techniques, institutions and other practices as well.
The Deleuzian/Foucaultian alternative to the
tradition of western metaphysics is difference conceived
"differentially": difference as "a pure event,^ not
completely reducible to conceptual generalities. The
"freeing of difference" demands "thought that accepts
divergence; affirmative thought whose instrument is
disjunction; thought of the multiple - of nomadic and
dispersed multiplicity that is not limited or confined by
the constraints of similarity." 1^ instead of perceiving
reality as a teleological unity (and all a priori unities
are teleological for Foucault)
, Foucault points towards
the Nietzschean thought of being as "the recurrence of
difference." 103 The first task of such thought would
be to seek the unique singularity of events and the
multiplicity within them.
Central to Foucault 's project is the attempt to free
the difference of events - that is, to make us aware of
these differences - and to lodge difference between the
self and the world. In "The Order of Discourse," written
at about the same time as the review of Deleuze, Foucault
cautions us against imagining that we have a "primordial
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complicity with the world"104 tnat^^ ^ ^
perfectly know and identify it with our thoughts.
The world is not the accomplice
of our knowledge; there is noprediscursive providence whichpredisposes the world in ourfavour. We must conceive dis-
course as a violence which wedo to things, or in any case as
them
3^06 Which we imP°se upon
In light of Foucaultian ontology, difference appears
everywhere, unstable, elusive - emblematic of the in-
eliminable excess through which beings escape from the
clutches of identifying thought. The world around us is
always partially Other. However, far from leading towards
some form of relativism or nihilism, this ontology - in
which the self and world are always together in their
inextinguishable difference in which discord and division
are inherent in all constructed unities - constitutes the
space in which it is "once again possible to think." Or
better still, as we shall see, this ontology opens the
opening - shut by western metaphysics - in which it is
possible to reformulate the practice of freedom . For
difference conceived differentially is ultimately not
simply a new way of thinking, but more profoundly a new
mode of being.
Difference is a broad prescription for action as well
as a thought about the being of the world. Difference
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signifies a new engagement with the otherness of being.
It calls us to act with an eye towards difference rather
than in the light of preconceived identities. This does
not mean that existence is to become a blind deconstruc-ts rampage that smashes and shatters everything within
reach in order to maximize "difference" and worship atoms.
Rather, it means that the differences within our own being
and between ourselves and that which is other should be
acknowledged and moreover reckoned with in our efforts
to create our existences, rather than insidiously denied,
obliterated, ignored or dealt with through moral cate-
gories of metaphysical origin. Foucaultian ontology
calls us to throw the metaphysical veils off of ourselves
and others, and dwell with more "maturity" in the midst
of the living multiplicitous particularity of ourselves,
others, our social practices and our history. There is
clearly a delight in difference that radiates from many
of Foucault's texts. Yet this should not be understood
as an overall plea to simply "let difference be," for such
a plea is itself laden with metaphysical residues which
are no longer tenable in light of Foucault's ontology.
The injunction to simply "let difference be" assumes that
there is some sort of preordained harmony in the world
that makes life livable and worth living without human
praxis and intervention. It assumes that the good life is
ready-made and endows each human being with a presumptuous
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position of cosmological importance as a being for who,
things and others exist to be both life-sustaining and
satisfying. Equally important, it assumes that the
self would cohere as something interesting without
any imposition of form, content, commitment, etc.
Yet the human world revealed by the genealogist is
far too discordant for any of these fantasies to remain
standing. Even at the level of the body: what sense
does "let difference be" make as an overall prescription
when the body is a "volume in perpetual disintegration"?
Not much sense at all; and hence it appears that at the
same time that Foucault undermines metaphysical unities
which obfuscate difference, he also undermines what is
perhaps the last gasp of metaphysics: "let it be."
But then what prescription for action wells out of
this ontology of difference? What does dwelling with
maturity in the midst of bodies, pleasures and others
who are different from the given hegemonic identities
and harbor no deep truths mean? Foucault writes: "From
the idea that the self is not given to us, I think there
is only one practical consequence: we have to create
ourselves as a work of art." 106 This artistic existence
in which we seek to give ourselves form takes place at
the limits of our being in dialogue with that which is
different from us or that within us which finds no place
within the reigning identities. For Foucault, "freeing
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difference" is a step towards confronting the particulari-
ty and untaxed nature of existence, towards confronting
an existence that is not that of our categories. it is
a step towards the artistic ethos; a necessary part of,
but not the end of this ethos or existence. Giving for,
to one's life involves accentuating and developing certain
dimensions, placing others in the background, foregoing
certain possibilities. Yet these decisions are made in
the midst of and with an ear to the multiple and differing
voices within and around us. But is not this injunction
that we create ourselves still rather empty and unable to
inform our creativity in any way? Does Foucault leave us
with anything more than an absolutely relativistic sense
of creativity which is not much help at all? it seems
to me that his notion of artistic existence both avoids
relativism and is able to inform our creative activity in
an important manner which avoids nihilism and indifference
at the same time it avoids the metaphysical solutions to
these very problems. This results from the fact that
Foucault 's notion of the artistic ethos provides us with
a loosely articulated conception of the social context
conducive to artistic existence, which, in a very broad
sense, might guide our activity. In its creativity,
artistic existence seeks in part to work towards and
enhance conditions in which an artistic ethos might
become a more general and vital possibility. If human
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life should be a thina of artu g r , then the artistic practice
of caring for life should be linke<J ^ ^ ^
situations and^ o^ of existence where life can flourish
as art. It is towards this end that Foucault's corpus
-
as in many ways exemplary of the artistic activity
he describes
- strives. The artist in part seeks to
contribute to a world in which one could answer the
question,
-Couldn't everyone's life become a work of
art?" 10 ? with a resounding "Yes." Let us explore what
this seems to entail.
The DialoaicaT Artistic R.hnc
Shocking as it may be to some of his readers, in
his later essays on Kant and the enlightenment, Foucault
places himself in a certain fundamental respect squarely
within the enlightenment form of reflection. Foucault
argues that the reflective questioning which is central
to the task of freedom originates in a line of thinking
pursued by Immanuel Kant. Yet is not Kant one who
initiates the analytic of man and the analytic of truth
which Foucault has so vehemently opposed? How can one
who stands in direct opposition to this central late
enlightenment theme simultaneously claim to belong to
the tradition of enlightenment? Foucault understands
his discrepant positions on enlightenment to well out of
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discrepancies within enlightenment itself and particularly
within Kant. On the one hand, Kant of the Critigues
begins a tradition of philosophical reflection which
is aimed at discovering the truth of truth in man.
Foucault has consistently opposed this tradition and
shown it to be closely aligned with modern forms of
power and subjugation. On the other hand however,
Foucault sees in Kant's essays on enlightenment and the
French revolution the beginning of a radically different
sort of reflection, one which characterizes the dimension
of enlightenment within which he situates himself. "Here
it is not a question of an analytic of truth, but what
one might call an ontology of the present, an ontology
of ourselves." 108 Most succinctly, this philosophical
tradition consists in "problematising its own discursive
present-ness.
»
109
It is this latter "attitude, » rather than any
specific doctrine or legacy, within which Foucault
places himself. Central to this modern relationship
with the present is what he identifies as a "belonging "
and a "task." 110 with respect to the first, the
philosopher questions the knowledge and practices of
the present as those to which he or she belongs, and
as those which are necessary to comprehend in order to
understand the produced-ness and context of his or her own
being. Indeed, it is in problematizing and understanding
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this present
- and the fact that one belongs to it - that
one "is to elicit at once [one's] own ^raison d'etre' and
the foundation of what one is to say." 111 It is through
understanding the present of which one is, that one
determines what one is to do, say and become. Thus in
Kant's case, it is 1 '.s understanding of the present, the
fact that his answer to the question "Was ist Aufklarung?"
is "man's release from his self-incurred tutelage" 112 and
the free use of his reason, that calls for and guides the
work of his critical efforts to determine the conditions
of possibility of truth and the legitimate uses of reason.
It is because philosophers belong to "a certain *we, ' a
we corresponding to a cultural ensemble characteristic
of [their] own contemporaneity," 113 that their self-
understanding, self-direction and self-creation are
inextricable from an inquiry into their social present.
The question regarding what one should say and do concerns
the "we"; the ontology of the present is an "ontology of
ourselves" - not one self in isolation.
Here we arrive at a more profound understanding of
the "belonging" of modernity. For insofar as we recognize
that self-creation demands an interrogation of the "we,"
as moderns, we belong to this ceaseless inquiry. What
characterizes the modernity which Foucault describes
in "What is Enlightenment?" is the belonging to the
questioning of that to which we belong . As moderns we
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create ourselves by ceaselessly taking up the question
of our present. This is the "task" to which we belong,
a task which as moderns we share. m short, part of
modernity's unity lies in this question, our belonging
to the present as socially constituted beings is de. facto;
our belonging to the questioning of our belonging is the
practical appeal modernity makes to each of us. We make
it real by assuming the task.
Let us examine this question - this task - more
carefully. Foucault understands it as »a critique and
permanent creation of ourselves in our autonomy: that
is, a principle that is at the heart of the enlightenment
itself.- 114 Consistent with his genealogical efforts
and his emphasis on local inquiry, Foucault's notion of
critique and creation - the artistic ethos - does not
imply that we completely jettison who we are at present
in favor of some totally new being. Such efforts have
repeatedly led to disaster. Rather his conception of
critique-creation revolves around what he calls a "limit-
attitude," which would continually direct us to the limits
of our being - to that edge at which we face the Other.
Again, Foucault is not advocating a blind rejection of
all limits, but instead, a careful analysis of the
boundaries of our being. Such an analysis would focus
on particular regions of our self and social world which
have become reified as unquestionable givens, in an effort
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to understand their historicitv ftmrMHuu ry, functions, effects and
the possibilities and desirability of going beyond the,.
This analysis of limits would attempt to illuminate "in
what is given to us as universal, necessary, obligatory,
what place is occupied by whatever is singular, contingent
and the product of arbitrary constraints. -115 In contrast
to the Kantian project of determining the boundaries of
the legitimate use of reason, Foucault advocates a
critique of established boundaries to determine areas
of "possible transgression." Rather than determining
why we must remain the Same given the "truth" of who we
"are," the task is to determine in what ways it might
be "P^sible and desirable " to become different and "to
determine the precise form this change should take" 116
(my emphasis)
.
Foucault is careful to stress that this critical
ontology of ourselves is not a doctrine - which would
insidiously reestablish a Truth - but rather an "ethos."
Here what is involved is a general manner of living.
This ethos is elaborated in the notion of the "self as
a work of art," which is most developed in Foucault 's
later essays and interviews, and is rooted in Baudelaire,
Nietzsche and the ancient Greeks. As a work of art, "one
take[s] oneself as [an] object of a complex and difficult
elaboration" ±J- in an effort to create one's existence.
As we have seen, this effort takes place at the limits
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of our being and involves a questioning attitude within
which one seeks to define the shape of one's being and
contribute to the creation of the social world. One is
hardly a work of art if one unconsciously accepts the
shape of the boundaries that have been defined for selves
by history.
Even considered most narrowly, this task, though
it aims at creating an existence which is not intended
to be established as a universalized norm, but rather
a shape only for a particular self, is not an isolated
self-enclosed project. indeed this self-enclosed
selfhood-ness is characteristic of those projects which
seek to "liberate" and realize "the truth" of oneself -
to become what one "really is." The encounter in this
case is an inner one with one's "identity" - the Same.
But this is diametrically opposed to Foucault's notion
of the self as a work of art. in the latter, the task
is to create the shape of one's life through a careful
experimentation with limits. And dwelling at the
boundaries of one's being essentially entails a continual
dialogical encounter with otherness and others . Hence
the self as a work of art entails the exploration and
transformation of more than just the self.
In an effort to gain a clearer understanding of
this relationship between the notion of the self as a
work of art and the encounter with otherness, let us
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take Poucault hi.self as^ exemplary Qf^
self-understanding and self-creation; understanding and
creation that as „e have shown is inextricably connected
to understanding and showing possibilities for creating
the "we" to which tho CQ i ^n n e self belongs. (Already we have gone
beyond the boundaries of the self, but the self does not
dissolve into the we, for each person, as "different" will
have a particular understanding, particular practices
he or she embraces and a uniquely shaped life on these
bases.) Indeed, Foucault patiently and in a self-
disciplined manner fashioned his life around this task
as he understood it. His life was, to reflect back
upon himself words he uttered in another context, "a
philosophical life in which the critique of what we are
is at one and the same time the historical analysis of
the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with
the possibilities of going beyond them." 118 it seems
to me that there were some ways in which his work
persistently engaged with otherness that were central
to his life as artistic self-creation.
To begin with, Foucault continually sought to elicit
the "insurrection of subjugated knowledge" 119 - knowledges
disqualified and silenced by hegemonic discourses and
practices. The purpose of this attempt to make these
Other knowledges audible was twofold. First, Foucault
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sought to amplify these knowledges in an effort to
establish an historical memory of the struggles through
which hegemonic forms of power and discourse established
themselves. By doing this he illuminated some of "the
contingency that has made us what we are.-^O He
attempted to show that the practices and understandings
that we perceive to be necessary, universal and currently
hegemonic because of their unquestionable virtuosity,
are
-
at least in part - products of conflicts for power
in which the hegemonic powers have sought not only to
produce certain utilizable forms of being and eliminate
Others, but to reduce all expression of conflict with
the Others to silence as well. Thus for example, he
elucidated the way in which modern methods of discipline
and punishing are to a large extent tightly implicated
in the exigencies of capitalist accumulation rather than
simply the emergence of a benevolent good-willed humanism,
by showing the resistances and struggles in which they
were born - a struggle with those who were not "always
already" docile and useful. Likewise in Madness and
Civilization, Foucault records a history of "that other
form of madness, by which men, in an act of sovereign
reason, confine their neighbors, and communicate and
recognize each other through the merciless language of
non-madness, 1,121 rather than a history which assumes the
unchallenged superiority of "reason." He shows reason
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to be in part the outcome of its atmiwn* r,-i4-uxc s ruggle with an Other
- "madness" - rather than => na teleological development of
its own pure essence. m short, to guote Madness_and
emulation (and I think this indicates the continuity
of Foucault 's project} "what i c i M ~,p ), n is in question is the limits
rather than the identity of a culture." 122
By bringing the contingency of our thoughts and
practices to light, Foucault seeks to loosen our identity
with them
- an identity which is most complete when the
terms of the present appear too ubiquitous and necessary
as to allow neither the possibility nor the desirability
of criticism and change. it is only when our identity
with the Same is slackened that we can consider possi-
bilities of creating existences other than those that
are "given."
The second reason for amplifying the "insurrection
of subjugated knowledges" is to provide a different
perspective on the truths, norms, unquestioned identities,
imperatives and practices of a period. The objective here
is to question the hegemony of certain discourses from
the perspective of the Others which they exclude: "to
entertain the claims to attention of local, discontinuous,
disqualified illegitimate knowledges against the claims of
a unitary body of theory which would filter, hierarchise
and order them in the name of some true science." 123
Hence Foucault seeks to rediscover the knowledges of
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mental patients, prisoners, students,
"hermaphrodites,"
etc.
,
in an effort to make audible the voice of the other
in a world where it is rarely heard. Through these other
claims, Foucault seeks to shed critical light on features
of the present which aspire to the status of universals;
and he seeks to help enter different voices into the
discussion about what the Order of things is and how it
should be.
Another way in which encountering otherness was
central to Foucault's life-as-art has less to do with the
way in which otherness explicitly and directly confronts
dominant knowledges and practices, within a given period,
but rather concerns the value of the experiences and
practices of other periods of history in illuminating
possibilities of living differently. His analyses of the
relationship of the early Renaissance to madness and of
ancient techniques of the self are precisely such efforts
to think about how we might formulate different social
practices. But not merely "social practices." Equally
at issue is the shaping and transformation of Foucault's
own thought and existence.
The connection between philosophical-historical
understanding of otherness and the creation of self is
perhaps most explicit in The Use of Pleasure . Reflecting
in the introduction upon what motivated his work Foucault
says
:
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ILl ri°slty-'-not the curiosity
IrltJ- *
t0 assimi^te what it is
k n
°ne t0 know
'
but thatwhich enables one to get free of
Shfn
e
^*-'* There are times ^ lifew e the question of knowing if onecan think differently than one thinksand perceive differently than one
sees, is absolutely necessary if oneis to go on looking and reflecting
«LI Pe°Ple wil1 say, perhaps,that games with oneself would betterbe left backstage. But, then, whatis.
.
.philosophical activity
... if itis not the critical work that thoughtbrings to bear on itself? in whatdoes it consist if not in the endeavorto know how and to what extent it
might be possible to think differ-
ently, instead of legitimating whatis already known? 1 ^ 4
The understanding of otherness is part of the
"critical work" that enables "one to get free of oneself."
(Of course, Foucault is perfectly aware of the limits of
getting free of oneself, which is exactly why the labor of
freedom always takes place at the limits of our being. We
cannot simply leap over our limits.) Since we are beings
essentially embodied in the social world, artistic self-
creation implies critically understanding and creating
this world. The dichotomy between creation of the self
and the creation of the social world breaks down in their
internal relation. But the dissolution of this dichotomy
does not lead to the obliteration of difference and the
ushering in of a simple "harmony of interests" (nor a
complex harmony of interests with rigid predetermined
pseudo-differences) between the self and this world. As
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it is the discovery of otherness and of the contingent
limits of the present that is an essential aspect of
creating the self, so too it is to a large extent in
becoming different that the self partakes in the creation
of the social world. The form the self takes as a dif-
ferent, often transgressive being is aimed in part at
transforming the social world towards enabling greater
possibilities of different expressions of artistic
existence.
It should be emphasized that the engagement with
otherness in the creation of the self as a work of art i
thought of "differentially"; not in terms of a reversed
identification where the self seeks to become the same
the other. If Foucault rejects the ceaseless trajectory
towards the Other in order to make it the Same, he also
rejects the will to discover the Other in order to become
the same as it. Such naive appropriations tend to ignore
problems inherent in past alternatives and they tend to
ignore historical changes which would make such trans-
formations untenable. More importantly, they close
freedom's opening (in the perception of the possibility
of difference and the adoption of an "experimental"
attitude) at precisely the point at which it could burst
forth. In contrast, for Foucault, though encounters
with otherness may gesture in helpful ways in certain
directions and away from others, what is most important
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in the encounters is that they reveal the possibility of
being different. m the light of difference, thoughts
and practices previously considered necessary begin to be
seen as contingent; and in recognizing the contingency of
being we return to the possibility of creating alternative
practices which might enhance the artistic ethos - we
return to the possibility of freedom. it is partly
because his work is governed by this end, that Foucault
is so evasive when Dreyfus and Rabinow repeatedly question
him about whether or not the Greeks offer an "attractive
and plausible alternative. «•« 5 Indeed/ it - s Qnly the
notions of "art of life" and "self as a work of art" that
Foucault offers as specific helpful insights we can gain
from the Greeks. And these are in the realm of "ethos"
- an ethos of creative activity - rather than specific
concrete practices.
Yet I think this conception that Foucault repeatedly
engaged himself with different modes of being in order to
reveal the possibility of creating himself/ourselves, or
even in order to gain insights for his/our creative task,
obfuscates a dimension of this engagement at the same
time that it clarifies certain others. For there is an
important sense in which the ends-means separation that
lingers in this formulation fails to do sufficient justice
to the "ethos" towards which Foucault gestures. Inherent
in this artistic ethos is a vision of exemplary meta-
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itoOl. And this meta-style is precisely that of dulling
analogically with that which is and those who are differ-
ent at the limits of our being. (i call it "meta-style"
in order to emphasize the diversity of dialogical styles
within this more encompassing notion. This dialogical
engagement with that which is other is for Foucault
the stylistic essence of the artistic existence; it is
through this engagement that we create ourselves. This
conversation within which one gives shape to one's life
as a specific voice is creative activity. Hence while
the content aim of the artistic ethos can be defined
very broadly as the enhancement of conditions that make
possible the "permanent creation of ourselves in our
autonomy"
- and central to this are more dialogical
non-disciplinary social discourses and practices, the
exemplary meta-style is achieved to the extent to which
we fashion ourselves into dialogical beings - beings who
dwell in the difference of being and shape our lives there
rather than beings who blindly accept hegemonic identities
and dwell in complacent indifference in the home of the
Same, the Norm, the Truth. In this sense, Foucault 's
dialogical engagement with difference, while in part a
means to another end, is also in part an end in itself -
the embodiment of the meta-stylistic ideal of the artistic
ethos. This is further exemplified in the manner in which
Foucault 's work develops and is portrayed. Is there any
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Is a
other philosopher in modern times who has so persistently
utilized the conversation/interview format to expre!
and develop his ideas - and also, to gesture toward,
particular way of being?
The importance of the dialogical essence of both
the style and content of the artistic life must not be
underestimated, for it is at the heart of Foucault's
understanding (sometimes it is explicit - more often it
is the "unthought thought- Heidegger refers to) and is
what links the affirmation of the self's distinction
inextricably to the distinction and difference of others.
In a late interview with Rabinow, Foucault stresses that
the "dialogue situation" was not only essential to his
"way of doing things," but moreover that "a whole morality
was at stake" in the difference between dialogical versus
polemical styles of existence - a morality which concerns
"the relation to the other." 126
By sketching a vision in which the notion of self
as art is intrinsically related to encountering otherness,
Foucault is able to suggest a way in which the affirmation
and enhancement of the self's creative activity and dif-
ference would occur not in atomistic oblivion to others,
nor through obliteration of others as is the case when
difference is conceived of on the basis of equivalence,
but instead through the dialogical engagement with others
who are different. A primary virtue of this philosophy
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of the self is its increased appreciation of otherne!
Foucault points towards a philosophy in which dialogue
Plays a central role in deterging what one will say;
in which dialogue is essential to sel f
-creation
. it is
^^^^"-^-^^
'^^^^
And it is within this dialogical
situation with others that our freedom acquires the form
and content of a carefully shaped existence.
It seems to me that Foucault 's understanding of
the relationship between the encounter with otherness
and freedom offers us a fundamental reworking of the
latter concept as it has often been formulated. For
Foucault, freedom does not arise out of some sort of
access to "the truth"; it is not to act according to
self-generated transcendental laws of reason; it is not
most profoundly opened as we face the possibility of our
death and return from the anonymity of the "they" (das
man) to the particular "there" of our Being; nor does it
arise out of an "authentic" relationship to our "true
self." Rather, we are returned to the contingency of
the world and our relationship with it, as well as to
our being as the possibility of self-creation, through
dialogical encounters with otherness. (This is not simply
the absence of our own being, or that which opposes us in
contradiction . ) We are exposed to the radical contingency
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of our practices
- and more generally that of the world
we experience and partake in - through our encounters
with others with different nr^H^ou± Li practices and experiences and
the Other experiences within our own being. (E.g., it
is Foucault's encounter with Other social perceptions
of madness (Renaissance) that allow him to grasp the
contingency of modern perceptions of madness. Madness
and CiviTization is an archaeology and genealogy which
reveals the producedness and contingency of our own
perceptions
- of the "constitutive.
.. action that divides
madness." 127 Foucault's effort to expose us to this
contingency is the central aspect of his attempt to
return us to the possibility of our freedom.) Hence
our own freedom is inextricable from - and thus in part
should be guided towards creating - a social world that,
to a greater extent, provides space for others who are
different and difference within the self, when we close
this space we simultaneously drain our world of the
possibility of self-creation through dialogue (often
agonistic dialogue)
. An increasingly disciplined
normalized world increasingly closes off freedom not
only at the level of the constitution and exclusion of
selves, but equally important, because it increasingly
withdraws the experience of otherness which both opens
the possibility of our freedom to begin with and provides
us with multiple points for creative engagement. The
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more we approach otherness within the terms of the Same,
the less we encounter otherness. of course, we never
completely encounter otherness. Rather, our experience of
otherness begins when we sense the surplus of the other -
that which is different. The encounter with otherness is
in this sense always in a state of beginning. Normalizing
practices attempt to disguise the surplus and thwart this
beginning.
No doubt, an important guestion which comes to
mind concerns the possibility of social and political
coherence within this philosophy of distinction. m
addressing this issue I think it is helpful to return to
and consider anew the rather interesting paradox we noted
earlier. Foucault's work over the years has persistently
attempted to reveal the many ways in which insidious
forms, discourses and mechanisms of power function in
modernity to conceal, control and obliterate otherness.
We have been told that rather than enhancing a creative
ethos that grows out of dialogue with others, modernity
constitutes subjects around "norms" and "Truths" which
serve a productivity that has little to do with enhancing
our freedom. We have been told that power in modernity
is not dialogical, but hierarchical and coercive. Rather
than an ethos which calls us to the limits of our being,
modernity has us digging deeper into our centers for
a truth - freedom which lies in our core - if only we
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can secure it and bring it to light. Even among beings
equally under the normalizing gaze, we are told that
modernity thwarts dialogue. Let us not forget that
"lateral invisibility" and "partitioning" are as integral
a part of panoptic power as visibility and transparency.
Uncontrolled "multiple exchanges" - the unexpected dia-
logue
- must be eliminated if this power is to function
optimally. Yet Foucault claims in his enlightenment
essays that the "ethos" of modernity is precisely the
critique of its limits and the exploration of "possible
transgressions"
- possible sites of artistic creation.
As already argued, this is partly explainable by the fact
that Foucault does not perceive modernity as a unified
beast, but rather as laden with multiple characteristics,
some of which develop in radically different directions.
Nevertheless, these essays appear to make assertions about
the "ethos" of modernity that make one wonder why so much
of modernity has been the object of such intense criticism
from Foucault.
I think this essay should be read as what Foucault,
following Beaudelaire calls an "ironic heroization"
of the present. In doing so, we are better able to
understand it in the context of Foucault 's other works.
Moreover, we can gain a better understanding of the place
of "belonging" (in the Enlightenment essays Foucault
"belongs" to modernity) in a philosophy which not only
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emphasizes the value of differences but also confers
normalized identities a very central role in the evil:
of modernity. since the thought of a society without
some sort of belonging is little more than an infantile
illusion, the tenability of Foucault's "artistic ethos-
hinges in part on how well he can address this question.
Before discussing "ironic heroization, " let us very
briefly
- and somewhat simply - summarize three notions
of belonging which one can draw out of Foucault's thought
as we have discussed it thus far. First, we are essen-
tially beings whose existence is inextricably intertwined
with the social milieu of which we are a part. Hence our
self
-understanding and self-creation must refer in part to
the society to which we belong. Second, as moderns, we
belong to the questioning of that to which we belong. m
spite of radical differences in style and content, this
questioning is something we do - or should - share; it
should bind us to some extent, and lend us a degree of
solidarity - even if very loosely. Thirdly, since our
freedom wells out of and develops within our dialogical
encounter with others who are different, each of us should
belong to the task of creating a society and politics
which enhances the possibilities of expressing differ-
ence (differences which are not constituted around the
obliteration of different others)
. At least in this very
broad sense, the freedom of others is entwined with our
170
own: our creative freedoms - with all their agonistic
tensions
- belong together if they are to be at all.
But one gets to the end of this list wondering if
there is any relation we can take to the present - to
who we are at prPs^nt - that is anything other than
genealogical criticism and "possible transgression."
Can we belong in any way to our present? is our freedom
in any way entwined with the present or does it simply
lie beyond it? To the extent that societies have ever
"held together" in a non-authoritarian manner, they have
done so in part out of some sense of shared belonging
to a set of values and practices which guide life in
the present and help generate the dreams for the future.
Albeit that these traditions have always involved the
exercise of power and subjugation, they have for better
or worse been the foundations of the order of their day.
While we want to move in a direction away from these
subjugative practices, we cannot move away from some
sense of shared practices and values. It is a very
textured identity which makes social life possible. As
fundamental and illuminating as Foucault's vision based
on the artistic ethos may be, it is difficult to believe
that what we have discussed thus far would be sufficient
for the existence of a social order. There has to be a
way to belong to the present which is not merely that of
getting free of it.
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It seems to me that the notion of ironic "heroiza-
tion" which is developed in the context of his discussion
of Baudelaire points in this direction. For Baudelaire,
in Foucault's words, one of the central characteristics'
of modernity is "the will to Zeroize' the present. "128
Heroizing the present involves an attitude of recapturing
"something eternal" that lies within the fleeting present
-
a present which is extremely fleeting and impermanent
in the modern world. it is the attempt to "extract- the
"poetry" from within modernity. Yet this heroization is
ironic in that while seeking the eternal in the present,
it does not seek to eternalize the present. Instead,
the eternal which is made manifest is itself a "trans-
figuration [which] does not entail the annulling of
reality, but a difficult interplay between the truth
of what is real and the exercise of freedom." 129 m
this transfiguring, "beautiful" things become "more
than beautiful." 130 The one who heroizes illuminates
the worthy aspect of things in such a way as to make
it dominate them whereas before it may have been barely
a perceptible trace. One stretches reality towards what
one dreams it could be, by grasping and developing that
within reality which most closely embodies this dream.
Foucault writes: "For the attitude of modernity, the
high value of the present is indissociable from a
desperate eagerness to imagine it otherwise than it
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is, and to transform it not by destroying it but by
grasping it in what it is." 131
Perhaps as illuminating as Foucault's attempts
to explicitly describe "ironic heroization, » is the
essay "What is Enlightenment?" itself, considered as
an exemplary manifestation of this endeavor, what is
his characterization of modernity as the "ethos" of
critiquing our boundaries and exploring the possibilities
of going beyond them if not ironic? Has not the great
bulk of his work aimed at showing us the ways in which
modernity insidiously disguises itself and drives
towards an organization of being which posits the Same
as fundamental and the Other as that which must be
made the Same? in the essay "Kant on Enlightenment
and Revolution," Foucault includes Hegel as an early
representative of "a form of reflection within which I
have tried to work." 132 But there are few essays where
Foucault has not in some way argued against Hegelian
dialectics or at least hurled a sarcastic remark in that
direction simply in order to distinguish his own project.
Can a Foucaultian heroization of Hegel be anything but
ironic?
But it is still a heroization. And in this notion
of ironic heroization of the present lie the germ cells
of a theory of "belonging" which is quite different
from theories of identity which have dominated western
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metaphysics. m the latter tradition, identity has been
thought primarily in terms of equivalence. 13 3 The goal
with respect to the self has been to discover the truth
of what one is and govern one's thoughts and actions in
accordance with this identity, to the extent that it is
humanly possible to do so. To identify with a community -
worldly or spiritual
- has been to thoroughly embrace its
fundamental faith, truths, and the practices which follow.
However, identity, as a grasping of the "essential truth"
of ourselves as individuals and as a society becomes
impossible to conceive on the basis of an ontology that
emphasizes contingency, multiplicity and difference.
For Foucault, the "who" to which we belong is not
a truth to be apprehended in its essence. Rather, the
determination of the "who" to which we acknowledge our
belonging is always a partially transformative activity
in which we selectively illuminate our being in the light
of who we long to be. We do not choose our identities out
of nothing, but neither are they objectively given for us
to simply acknowledge as true. The belonging of ironic
heroization is "an exercise in which extreme attention to
what is real is confronted with the practice of a liberty
that simultaneously respects this reality and violates
it . ,,134
But why would Foucault seek to acknowledge a
"belonging" and affirm a "respect" for the present?
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Why would he ironically heroize Hegel? I think that
his affirmation of "belonging" is rooted in his ontology
just as deeply as is his notion of freedom as artistic
transfiguration. Foucault reads the world to be a
contingent often discordant interplay of differences.
His statement: "My point is not that everything is bad,
but that everything is dangerous, "13 5 is based on this
reading, and most of his work attempted to illuminate
dangers, violence and subjugation which modernity has
disguised in the name of truth, virtue and humanism.
In accordance with his ontology and understanding of
subjugation, his vision of the future has been guided
towards a world which would affirm far more space for
difference. Yet this ontology which demands critique and
transformation also issues forth a warning of caution .
For if everything is dangerous, transformation is
dangerous - requiring "patient labor." And in the
ubiquity of danger, we must not simply dismiss all of
the present world, but rather carefully search for the
possibilities it presents which may be worthy of our
affirmation. Since the possibilities for freedom are
as tenuous as they are, those thoughts and practices
which make it possible in the present should not be cast
aside in a reckless fashion. Those thoughts and practices
which encourage dialogical encounters with otherness and
artistic existences (or those within which this ethos
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can be encouraged) are too rare to be taken lightly. By
belonging to them, we place ourselves in the opening they
provide, in order to refuse closure with our own being -
or, in more positive terms, to affirm * sjJaiaj^ that
enhances artistic existence. In a world that continually
attempts to suture shut the openings, belonging is crucial
to our freedom. The possibilities of the present should
be carefully held in an artist's hands - transformed "not
by destroying [these dimensions] but by grasping [them] in
what they are." The artist carefully works on the being
of the present in part through the openings it provides,
to increase their scope and create others in a way which
will avoid collapsing that which is beneficial in the
present. These favorable dimensions of the present which
call us to make explicit our belonging serve as focal
points around which we might coalesce and develop a
greater sense of the ways in which we belong together
as diverse beings affirming certain shared practices.
In this manner, Foucault heroizes Hegel and enlight-
enment. Having criticized Hegel in a variety of ways,
he nevertheless sees in Hegel a project - an ontology of
the present - worthy of affirming and belonging to, albeit
in a different form. If it is true that we can thwart
certain trajectories of our present through critique, it
is equally true and equally necessary that we accentuate
other trajectories of this present through our belonging
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as ironic heroization. The Foucaultian task is "work
carried out by ourselves UEon^urselves . « 1 3 6 when
situations for freedom exist in who_we_Jkre, they must
be maintained and enhanced. There is little possibility
of creating openings and situations for freedom ex nihilo
in a world that is as radically contingent, dangerous,
discordant and always very incompletely understood. it
is thus that we belong to aspects of mowiL^dsteQce
which offer us possibilities for existing artistically
-
shaping our lives in face of the plenitude of things.
This is not to say that there is not a lot in our
present which Foucault would seek to drastically alter
or do away with. Clearly there is. Yet there are also
aspects which have made his own work possible. it is
in acknowledgement of and for the enhancement of the
situation within which one exercises freedom, that one
"belongs" to certain dimensions of the present through
ironic heroization. But we do not "identify" with certain
thoughts and practices in order to use them as a ruler
to measure our progress towards or away from truth and
freedom. Rather we "belong" to aspects of our past to
the extent that they offer us possibilities for embracing
a dialogical artistic ethos - carefully - in ways which
respect and in part are guided by, but also violate, the
present itself. We heroize that which offers us the
possibility of freedom. But our heroization is rarely
rid of irony. our be-longing is always constituted in
tension with who we long to be.
Conclusi on
It seems to me that this is where Foucault jumps
off the boat of theory and onto the shifting sands of
the shores of the modern world. Here, continually at
the edge of our existence, he has taken up the task of
meticulously combing through who we are. Beyond (or out
of) the above themes, what Foucault offers us, I believe,
is an acute awareness of the limits of these themes -
of the way in which questions of ontology, ethics,
belonging and freedom and the concrete individual and
social practices which embody the dialogical artistic
ethos demand profoundly historical inquiry. it is when
the philosophical task of creating ourselves becomes
historical that it begins the activity of freedom.
Having developed the thought of Augustine and
Foucault in relation to their understanding of their
respective worlds, the task remains in the final chapter
to bring them together. There is more to be said about
Foucault 's thought on depth, truth reflection and freedom,
but we have reached a point where further illumination
will be far more fruitful if we explore the thoughts of
each theorist at their limits where each confronts the
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Other. Prior to this however we shall explore the thought
of Merleau-Ponty in an effort to oast yet another light
on depth, difference, ethics and the self. True to form,
Merleau-Ponty successfully challenges the opposition we
have been developing in a manner that illuminates things
thus far concealed.
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CHAPTER IV
MERLEAU-PONTY
Merleau-Pontv's Philosophy of Depth
Introduction
Augustine sought depth as a dimension of refuge and
Truth. Foucault's studies reveal depth as a "dimension
of reduction," and "truth" as the dazzling lure with
which we are led into depth in order to cleanse ourselves
of "the other." For Augustine, depth is the dimension
of salvation. For Foucault, depth is the dimension of
subjugation. If one of Augustine's most central yearnings
is to return humans to depth, one of Foucault's most
important tasks is to expose depth as a myth and thereby
free us from it: depth is a dimension constructed in
disciplinary society through which to wage "war by other
means" upon selves. It seems to follow that a key
strategy for resisting current modalities of power is
to sabotage depth and deep truth.
It appears perhaps that these alternatives cleave our
conceptual universe regarding depth right down the middle:
these positions seem exhaustive. We must struggle for our
freedom within either one or the other. At best we can
allow the thesis we ultimately reject to inform us of the
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underside of our most basic convictions, and possibly
can utilize it to tame partially the imperatives that our
own position generates. Perhaps.
A dialogue between these two positions is indeed
worthwhile and it is part of the project at hand. But
before the discussion takes place it will be helpful
to consider the work of Merleau-Ponty
, for though his
position is sympathetic to certain dimensions of both
Augustine and Foucault, there is a way in which his
writing contests the very terrain upon which they
oppose each other.
Merleau-Ponty explicitly rejects the notion
that philosophy and life should assume the Augustinian
project of turning inward to seek deep truths. He does
not believe that "truth dwells in the inner man." Yet
he is equally opposed to any position which would deny
that depth is "the most » existential ' of all dimensions.
"
1
If he can simultaneously oppose both the Augustinian
and Foucaultian positions on depth - while offering us
a position capable of appreciating important aspects of
each effort - it is primarily because he has reformulated
depth in a manner that partially escapes the excessively
constricting universe which the two have unwittingly
appropriated and perpetuated together. It is the
implicit thesis of this chapter (though his relation
to the other two theorists will only be developed in
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the conclusion) that Merleau-Ponty
< s understanding of
depth is an important contribution to our discussion
because it alerts us to dangers inherent in each of
the other two positions that otherwise go unrecognized
and simultaneously, allows us to fortify some of their
most valuable contributions. Merleau-Ponty sketches
an understanding of being in the world which gestures
towards an ethics and politics with which to move away
from nihilism, resist disciplinary power and affirm human
identity and difference.
The Trajectory Away from Hn^erlian "Angustini sw »
Although I wish to forgo a careful analysis of the
relationship between Augustine, Foucault and Merleau-
Ponty until the final chapter, it is helpful to introduce
Merleau-Ponty 's philosophy of depth by situating it within
the context of some of the themes that have arisen in
earlier chapters. Perhaps the best place to begin is
with a brief discussion of Merleau-Ponty ' s understanding
of his relation to Husserl. This is helpful because
the early Husserl - as Merleau-Ponty interprets him -
elaborated a philosophy which illustrated some of the
worst developments one might try to trace to Augustine's
thought and exemplified some of what Foucault considered
to be the most dangerous and insidious characteristics
182
ous
e
of philosophy in the modern episteme. (As I will argue
later, the connection between Husserl and Augustine is
tenuous at best. Yet Husserl is illustrative of the
consequences of reading Augustine under the influence
of the modern philosophy of the subject, and these
consequences deserve clarification and response.)
Merleau-Ponty's relationship to Husserl is a curi
one, for although Husserl is the philosopher to whom h
believed he had the greatest debt, at the same time
Merleau-Ponty appropriated key Husserlian terms such as
"phenomenological reduction," "cogito," "intentionality"
in a way that radically transformed the meaning they
had for the early transcendental Husserl and, even in
Merleau-Ponty's words, "pushed" the later Husserl of
the Lebenswelt "further than he wished to go himself." 2
(Some maintain more bluntly that Merleau-Ponty attributed
his own ideas to Husserl. 3 ) There can be no doubt that
Husserl 's later formulations in The Crisis of the European
Sciences
,
Ideas II and III , and Cartesian Meditations were
vitally important for Merleau-Ponty, no matter how much
one wants to argue that he "coherently deformed" much
of what he found there. However, one misses what most
fascinated Merleau-Ponty about Husserl if one reduces it
to the theses that can be selectively appropriated from
the latter 's late and unfinished works, for what most
enthralled Merleau-Ponty with Husserl was "instead of
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his theses, the very movement of M« +v^^ ..4 what
he discerned in Husserl's work was a trajectory, a path
of projection whose course and value emerged as much in
the impossibilities, shortcomings and dangers illuminated
in the early steps as in the later more sophisticated
formulations. Even more important was the "unthought
thought- which Merleau-Ponty perceived to be implicit in
the partial successes and failures of Husserl's thought-
as-movement. Husserl's thought was, in Merleau-Ponty
'
s
view, a gesture, and as such its meaning was not to be
found so much in its specific statements as in that which
was beyond itself towards which it moved. Merleau-Ponty
was not interested in producing an accurate repetition
of Husserl's formulations, but rather in resuming the
movement of his thought, in formulating the "unthought-of
element in his works which is wholly his and yet opens
out on something else." 5 For the purposes of the present
work, it matters little whether or not or to what extent
Merleau-Ponty correctly interpreted Husserl. I am only
interested in Merleau-Ponty 's discussion insofar as it
illuminates Merleau-Ponty and hence I will make no attempt
to discover the "real" Husserl. I will simply pursue
Merleau-Ponty 's reading.
I will argue that Merleau-Ponty ' s development of
Husserl's "unthought-of element" led him to a philosophy
of "depth being" (etre profond) , but to begin, we must
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briefly explore his understanding of Husserl's "movement."
He summarizes this movement most revealingly in the
following:
Originally a project to gainintellectual possession of the
world, constitution becomes
increasingly, as Husserl's
thought matures, the means of
unveiling a back side of things
that we have not constituted.
This senseless effort to submit
everything to the properties of
"consciousness" (to the limpid
play of its attitudes, intentions,
and impositions of meaning) was
necessary - the picture of a well-behaved world left to us by classical
philosophy had to be pushed to the
limit - in order to reveal all that
was left over: these beings beneath
our idealizations and objectifications
which secretly nourish them and in
which we have difficulty recognizing
noema. (My emphasis.)
On Merleau-Ponty's account, Husserl's early phe-
nomenological efforts exemplify classical philosophy's
most extreme attempt to flatten being. They are an
attempt to "arrive at an evidence concerning [reflective
consciousness] which is absolutely final" in which "what
appears and what is are not distinct." 7 Husserl went
through remarkable contortions to maintain this absolute
transparent certainty with respect to the subject and the
world it experiences - a transcendental world devoid of
Otherness yet the most general contours of his project are
captured in the final words of the Cartesian Meditations :
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"I must lose the world by epoche, in order to regain it
by a universal self-examination," followed by Augustine's
famous line in De Vera BgligigHS, "Noli foras ire, in te
redi, in interiore homine habitat Veritas. (Do not wish
to go out; go back into yourself. Truth dwells in the
inner man. )
"
8
Hence Husserl 's attempt to flatten and reduce the
meaning of the world to being a "universal constitutive
synthesis" of the transcendental ego was intricately
entwined with a rigorous self-examination in which all
that was other would ultimately be shown to be rooted
in the transcendental consciousness. While Husserl
of the Cartesian Meditations realized that "the world
* transcends' consciousness, » he nevertheless maintained
that "it is conscious life alone, wherein everything
transcendent becomes constituted." 9 Augustine's search
for the transcendent God within was transformed by Husserl
in to the search within for the transcendental ego as the
source of the world's intelligibility. in the depths of
the ego Husserl seeks a flattened world and a flattened
empirical self.
But as the passage quoted above at length indicates,
Merleau-Ponty thought that Husserl increasingly came
up against "the back side of things," an intransigent
world that resisted his scheme. Husserl pushed classical
thought as far as it could go only to discover an endless
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horizon beyond his well-behaved world. The relentl,
attempt to objectify inadvertently led him to reveal the
essentially inexhaustible dimensions of being which in
part nourished, but also resisted his objectifications
.
Merleau-Ponty claims that in Husserl's late works his
project fundamentally changed with his heightened
recognition of the lebenswelt (the life-word the self
discovers herself in the midst of) as the inexhaustible
ground out of which reflection arises and to which it
must return. Husserl's attempt to possess the world
was short circuited and moved towards becoming a project
that revealed the impossibility of complete possession.
"Willy-nilly, against his plans and according to his
essential audacity, Husserl awakens a wild world and a
wild mind." 10 ("Sauvage," here translated as "wild,"
also means untamed, uncivilized, savage, rude.) Husserl
discovers the depths of being. (That the "wild" is
"depth" will of course only become intelligible after
the discussion of Merleau-Ponty' s conception of being
as depth which comes later in this chapter.)
According to Merleau-Ponty, Husserl's uncovering of
depth changed Husserl's project from being one aimed at
"possession" of otherness to one aimed at revealing the
surplus of being beyond our objectifications in order to
challenge our possessive comportment towards the world and
open us to a relation that is more genuinely dialogical.
187
"Making explicit" becomes largely a task of revealing
the forgotten "dehiscence" of Being, so well concealed
by objectifying thought. m short "phenomenology 's task
was to reveal the mystery of the world and reason. nil
Of course, phenomenology was not simply to lead us to
an open mouthed awe in the face of being, but this awe
was to be the strange foundation of its more constructive
efforts at self
-understanding, ethics and politics.
Gone is the notion of an "inner man" which we
should strive to return to in our quest for truth. in
the preface of the Phenomenology of PPrrppHnn Merleau-
Ponty repeats the phrase from Augustine's Of True Re] iginn
which closed the Cartesian Meditations - without even
mentioning Husserl's appropriation of the passage - in
order to define what phenomenology is not. "There is no
inner man, man is the world, and only in the world does
he know himself." 12 Humans are thrown into the depths
of being, and the task is not to eradicate this and
recover an original flat self-possessing being in the
depths of the self, but instead to inform and guide our
lives in recognition of and dialogue with being as depth.
It is this latter notion to which we now turn,
beginning with Merleau-Ponty ' s critique of rationalism
and empiricism, followed by his development of his
philosophy of depth.
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Beyond Classical Thought ^ nd Toward riop-n
The starting point for Merleau-Ponty . s development
of his philosophy of being in Phenomenolp^
consists of a careful analysis and critique of rationalist
and empiricist theories of our knowledge of the world.
Rejecting the notion that the two radically contest one
another, Merleau-Ponty argues that in fact both approaches
are situated on "the same terrain." 13 Both posit a com-
pletely determinate, unambiguous objective world as the
ground of their investigations. Empiricist theories
attempt to explain experience in terms of atomistic
"sensations" which are conducted from the entirely
determinate world to our brain by our sensory apparatus.
Our brain then discerns a world of things by connecting
the array of sense-data atoms (which correspond to the
world itself) through "association," which is supposed to
result from their de facto contiguity. The outcome of
course is a perfectly objective experience of a perfectly
objective world.
Rationalist or "intellectualist" theories of
knowledge likewise presuppose the objective world as
the basis of their analyses. However, while empiricism
treats this world as "in itself," rationalism treats
the world as the product of a constituting consciousness
"which eternally possesses the intelligible structure
of all its objects." 14 Subjects are related to this
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world through "attention," which illuminates and eluci-
dates objects like an unconditioned search light, with
the strange power of bringing to consciousness what
consciousness itself constituted and already included.
Although rationalism explicitly rejects the empiricist's
notion of sensation
- arguing that sensations are
imperceptible themselves - and replaces it with
"judgment," in fact, judgment is ultimately dependent
upon sensation at "the boundary of our consciousness"^
as that which it interprets in a logical fashion.
Both empiricism and rationalism relate us to a
world which is completely given as objective (whether
"in itself" or surreptitiously constituted by the self),
the former through a process of causal relations, the
latter by way of consciously constituted relations.
Merleau-Ponty subjects these theories to extended,
thoroughgoing and persuasive criticism which I wish to
selectively summarize only in the briefest of ways. 16
To begin with, Merleau-Ponty finds that neither theory
can account for the way we go about learning of the world
- an important criticism given that this is the stated
goal of both approaches. Empiricism, which admits only
of knowledge "produced" by the world, "cannot see that
we need to know what we are looking for, otherwise we
would not be looking for it," while intellectualism,
which conceives of a world completely constituted by
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consciousness, "fails to 4-v, a+.r see that we need to be ignorant
of what we are looking for or erm»n« ^ •y j-u gually again we should
not be searching." IV At the root of this problem is
that whether as an effect of the world on a passive
consciousness, or as a result of a consciousness which
constitutes the world, both theories can conceive only
° f 9 c°™Pletel Y detPrmin.tn knowledge and a completely
determinate world, and hence are unable to grasp the
"circumscribed ignorance" which both motivates our
relation to the world and necessitates that there by
something to be learned.
This leads us to the heart of Merleau-Ponty
' s criti-
cism. In positing our presence to a world of objects,
each of which is completely determinate "in itself,"
rationalism and empiricism falsify our experience of
the world and indeed make experience itself impossible
(except perhaps in the case of rationalism, that of a
god both totally present to and unmotivated by the world)
.
Examining our experience more carefully (following Gestalt
theory) he finds that there are no objects given purely
in identity with themselves and that the most basic unit
of experience emerges from difference - that between a
figure and a background. Pure identity - the homogeneous
sensation "in itself" - cannot be experienced, rather it
is this difference which gives birth to our perceptions
of the world. This indicates that rather than being a
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composite of given sense atoms, the perceived world comes
into being through a structuring of differences in which a
figure emerges from an indeterminate background - which is
itself prior to and the condition for sensing identifiable
things within the perceptual field. The identity of an
individual thing, for example the yellow pencil on my grey
desk, is perceptible not simply "in itself," but to the
extent that its color, shape, texture stand out from those
of the desk which is its background.
Yet the figure-ground structure of the perceived
world does more than indicate the extreme inadequacies
of sense data atomism. More fundamentally it calls into
question the rationalist and empiricist notions that the
"objective world" is the stuff of experience. For it is
obvious that the figure-ground structure in which the
world always appears does not present us with a completely
given and determinate experience of things, but instead
shows the experienced world to be something which has
a degree of ambiguity and is partially contingent and
variable. If an employee for a logging company is
calculating the board-feet of timber that a forest
will yield, during his transects through the forest
his perceived world is likely to be dominated by tree
trunks of varying quality, diameter and height. Little
else may appear to this person. On the other hand, an
artist strolling through the same forest may become
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's
totally engrossed in the vibrant green of this spring's
new growth
- its resonance with the brilliant sun and
bright blue sky. It is guite possible that the logger*
and the artist's perceptions
- though both emerging from
their contact with the same forest - would be remarkably
discrepant (even though their differences well out of
certain shared experiences at the most basic level - due
to their both being embodied human selves - which hold
out the possibility of a degree of communication and
understanding). More agonizingly perhaps, the logger
and the artist might be different dimensions of a single
person, resulting in frequent and discordant shifts in
her structuring of the perceived world. At any rate,
what is central for Merleau-Ponty is that at the most
basic level, the world we experience, far from being
the determinate objective world of classical thought,
is a world essentially open to diverse "structurings"
- diverse determinations - through which it is
simultaneously revealed and concealed. The world
always retains an inexhaustible reserve of otherness
which exceeds the perceptions that emerge from our
contact with it. This quality of the perceived world
as structured-yet-open is that which both motivates and
makes possible our living experience of the world. Our
new perceptions always emerge from and are motivated by
our past experiences (rather than being determined by them
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or arising fro. nowhere as with classicai epistemology)
and are possible preoisely beoause the past did not offer
us the world in completion.
This essentially ambiguous world which Merleau-Ponty
begins to unveil, no longer rests within the objectivity
of the "in itself." Along with the perceived world's
essential transcendence (its openness and elusive
otherness)
,
Merleau-Ponty discovers an essential
immanence
: an ineliminable relation between self and
world. The phenomenological world is always revealed
as "perceived by" an incarnate self, a being embodied
within it from whence it is witnessed. The appearance
of the world is always bound up with my spatial and
temporal position (and the positions I can possibly
inhabit) in it, as well as my incarnate history in a
social, cultural, economic and political world. This
is already apparent in the example of the logger and
the artist. The intersection of each social incarnate
self and the world gives rise to perceptions which are
always rooted in a particular existence. The self and
the world refer endlessly to one another in a process
of co-creation. If the phenomenal world is always in
part sustained by an incarnate self, this is not for
Merleau-Ponty a return to subjectivism, for the self
is in turn its relationships with a world that is not
entirely of its choosing. The self and world are
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reciprocally intertwined, and as one Merleau-Ponty
scholar has put it, "the edge of [this] dialectic
moves too quickly to be caught at rest.... "18
Thus far we have briefly sketched some of Merleau-
Ponty's philosophical ideas in a most basic manner, what
we begin to see is a world which is far different than
that of classical thought; a world which most funda-
mentally appears not as simply "in itself" but through
our intersection and communion with it. However,
Merleau-Ponty notes that this world - both immanent
and transcendent
- is not the world that we recognize
in our everyday life. in our everyday attitudes we tend
unreflectively to take the world as simply and completely
"there." We generally lose sight of the way it is rooted
in our living relations with it and the extent to which it
maintains itself as partially other than and resistant to
our sense of it. in short, Merleau-Ponty argues that in
our everyday unreflective attitude we usually accept the
world as an objective thing - something closer to the
world of classical thought than the phenomenological
world Merleau-Ponty seeks to bring forth. Nevertheless,
Merleau-Ponty claims that this "objective world" always
rests upon the world of our primary experience which
emerges from our brute intersection with the world.
Humans perpetually lose sight of this, he argues,
because it is the essence of perception to forget
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itself, to lose itself in the things which appear in
the perceived world. indeed its ability to lose itself
is precisely what allows there to be "things" for us.
"Obsessed with being and foraetfm of «-v,y »u r gettul the perspectivism of
my experience, I henceforth treat it as an object....""
However, for all the manipulative capabilities which this
attitude gives rise to - including scientific thought,
which Merleau-Ponty wants not to disregard, but to limit -
he contends that it conceals the fundamental being of the
world upon which it rests. This forgetfulness obfuscates
the nature of both selves and the world, and has dangerous
methodological, ethical and political manifestations which
Merleau-Ponty finds accentuated in various aspects of the
modern world.
In contrast to the "objective" world, Merleau-Ponty
seeks to explore the world as it is given to us in our
primitive experiential contact with being in order to
reformulate our conceptions of self and world, and
conjointly, to develop an ontology that is radically
different from that of classical thought. He seeks to
unveil the world as we experience it prior to our familiar
acceptance of "things" and prior to our theoretical grasp
of it. In other words, he aims at " return [ing] to that
world which precedes knowledge, of which knowledge always
2 0speaks . " This forgoing of our everyday acceptance of
the world is what Merleau-Ponty - following Husserl -
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calls "phenomenological reduction." it is the attempt
to grasp the world as it emerges into being for us, not
in order to reveal it as the correlate of a transcendental
ego as Husserl did, but in order "to reveal the mystery of
the world and of reason" 2 * which is concealed by classical
thought. Merleau-Ponty's philosophical explorations of
the phenomenological world intend to provide us with
understandings of the world which heighten our awareness
of its paradoxical and ambiguous nature and illustrate
that the mystery of the lived world is not its weakness,
but precisely what lets it be "there." Of rationalism
and empiricism, Merleau-Ponty remarks, "they levelled out
experience." 22 m opposition to this flattened world,
Merleau-Ponty seeks to disclose being as depth. Yet
the disclosures of the phenomenological reduction never
coincide with immediate experience, for they themselves
are a form of reflection and as such never present us with
brute experience, but instead, with unreflected experience
as it is understood and worked over by reflection. While
returning to the lived world provides Merleau-Ponty with
a vantage point from which to critique decisively forms
of objectifying knowledge based on identity, neverthe-
less the lived world does not signify a privileged domain
capable of providing the existential phenomenologist
with a complete knowledge. Rather, by pointing to the
lived world Merleau-Ponty gestures to that - all too
197
forgotten
- mysterious region which calls us to a
continual questioning engagement. Living experience,
in its depth, always transcends our reflection upon it
and ushers forth a dialogical relation with being which we
must continuously renew. Hence while the phenomenological
reduction is central to Merleau-Ponty's philosophical
strategy, he cautions from the beginning that the "most
important lesson which the reduction teaches us is the
impossibility of complete reduction."" The wondrousness
of the world rests in part in its ability to exceed even
our attempts to grasp its wonder.
An important dimension of this paradox is that
for Merleau-Ponty, both the experienced world and
philosophical reflection are in a perpetual process
of co-creation:
The phenomenological world is not
the bringing to explicit expression
of a pre-existing being, but the
laying down of being. Philosophy
is not the reflection of a pre-
existing truth, but, like art,
the act of bringing truth into
being. 24
There is no pure and absolutely
unexpressed life in man; the
unreflected [irreflechi] comes
into existence for us only
through reflection. 5
In these passages, we glimpse the circularity which is
a central theme in Merleau-Ponty's ontology and manifests
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itself in almost all of his work
. 0n the one^ refiec _
tion always refers back to a layer of unreflective life
out of which it emerges. On the other hand however,
this unreflective life does not exist for us unlesswe
return to it and bring it forth through reflection. Yet
unreflective life is neither everything (according to
a superficial reading of "the one hand") nor nothing
(according to a superficial reading of "the other
hand"). Instead, it should be conceived of as not
fully determinate existence which is open to a variety
of appropriations and resistant in varying degrees to
all appropriations as well. Objective renderings of
experience are possible because of perception's propensity
to forget itself, but as we have seen, they are untenable
because they are unable upon close examination to eluci-
date a way in which humans could experience the world.
In contrast, Merleau-Ponty creatively expresses this wild
untamed level of experience - "brings it into being" -
in a way that places before our eyes and mind its very
ambiguity and renders our ability to experience it more
comprehensible
.
As noted, philosophical reflection transforms
being in its attempt to express it. Indeed, "without
reflection life would probably dissipate itself in
ignorance of itself or in chaos." 26 Recalling Marx's
eleventh thesis on Feuerbach that "philosophers have
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only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point,
however, is to change it, one should note that for
Merleau-Ponty, the philosophical act of understanding
the world is already a transformation of this world.
This is not in any way to assert that Merleau-Ponty
advocated a praxis of inner life, much of his writing
on politics and religion is aimed at refuting this notion.
Nevertheless, if praxis does not end with philosophy, it
takes an essential first step with it. Emphasizing the
seriousness of the philosophical project, he writes:
We take our fate in our hands, webecome responsible for our history,
through reflection, but equally by'
a
decision on which we stake our life,
and in both cases what is involved is
a violent act which is validated bybeing performed. 8
To conceive of being as depth as Merleau-Ponty does
is to transform being, it is to make being deeper. As we
shall see, though being is depth, to conceive of depth
being and to create an individual and social existence on
the basis of such an understanding is to begin to bring
depth into life in a far "deeper" manner than was the case
prior to our efforts. Being is essentially depth, but it
can be flattened. The circularities involved here can
only be hinted at at the moment, and will have to await
the extensive discussion of depth below for further
elaboration. Before we begin this later task, I wish
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to briefly indicate Merleau-Ponty's understanding of the
stakes involved (this too will be further developed in
the next chapter) by sketching the dangers of flattened
notions of being.
Dangers of Flat R^ing
If one wants to understand why objectifying and
subjectifying thoughts and practices which flatten being
intensify, diversify and proliferate with such ubiguity
in modernity, the works of Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, Weber,
Lukacs, Heidegger, Adorno and Foucault are far more fecund
than those of Merleau-Ponty
. other than occasional echoes
of Hegel, Marx, Lukacs and Weber, and vague statements
like, "certain ideas have a pre-established affinity
with certain politics or interests because each of them
presupposes the same conception of man," 29 we gain little
historical insight into the increasing hegemony of these
thoughts and practices. Indeed, Merleau-Ponty's apparent
belief that perception's propensity to lose sight of
itself is the germ cell of objective thought, while
insightful in some ways, lends itself to hopelessly
uninsightful and ahistorical understandings of contem-
porary discourses and practices. But if he did not
delve deeply into the causes of reified thought, he
was not unaware of the dangers it harbored.
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in a brilliantly blunt footnote in The_Visib^e_and
TheJnviMbl^, Merleau-Ponty writes: "Every atte.pt to
reinstate the illusion of the *thing itself is in fact
an attempt to return to my imperialism and the value of
my thing.'.30 Tq pQsit ^ ^.^ ^ ^
its determinate existence, of which I am witness, as
independent of its relations with me. To sever the
threads which connect us with things and things with
us is to posit a world lacking both immanence and
transcendence (the latter, because our lack of carnal
relations with things extricates us from the world, and
affords us a complete and comprehensive view that is
unavailable to embodied vision)
. This world and these
things are flattened to my view of them insofar as I
deny entirely the perspectival and carnal character of
my vision and lay absolute and exhaustive claims to the
"in itself." However, rather than the "truth" which it
claims to possess, this thinking actually inaugurates
an "imperialism" because it flatly denies both "other"
aspects of the thing and all perceptions others may
have of the thing that are not its own. Hence it is
simultaneously an imperial denial and conquest of
both nature and other people. (It is particularly
imperialistic when another person is the "thing itself"
that is the object of the objectifying gaze.)
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Merleau-Ponty argues that in addition to being the
aurora of the ontological dimension of imperialism, flat
disembodied thought perpetuates and enhances its hold
on things by establishing itself in a distanced and
supposedly free surveying attitude from above. From
the vantage point of a jet plane, "high altitude thought"
("kosmotheoros") perceives a flat world below spread out
before it in entirety. Devoid of otherness, devoid of
its intrinsic claims, devoid of the claims of others, it
awaits manipulation. In further attempting to define the
thing in terms of its thought and the "prior possibility
of thinking it," this objective thought "impose [s] upon
the world in advance the conditions for our control over
3
1
it." in addition, by denying the otherness of the
world, this form of thought denies the violence it
perpetrates and legitimizes the silence it imposes.
It is, I think, this broad understanding of the
social and political tendencies of the predominant modern
philosophies, that drives much of Merleau-Ponty ' s writing,
In any case, this understanding both motivates and is
central to the discussion that follows.
Philosophy of Depth
The centrality of "depth" (profondeur) in the
work of Merleau-Ponty has generally been overlooked or
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underestimated by his interpreters . 32 However, many
of his texts contain discussions of depth and he uses
the word repeatedly in The_JOsib^e_^Th^
in his attempts to distinguish his philosophy from Kant,
Bergson, Sartre, Husserl and others. m the Phen^ology
of Perception, Merleau-Ponty states that depth is "the
most existential of all dimensions . "33 In a working note
in Th
^ Risible and The Invisible
, he says that without
depth, "there would not be a world or Being.
"
3 4
while
these passages taken alone are obviously insufficient to
illustrate the claim that Merleau-Ponty is most profoundly
a philosopher of depth, they do indicate that it is an
important notion for him and one that needs to be care-
fully explored in order to understand his philosophy.
They are especially provocative for the present inquiry
given his explicit rejection on more than one occasion
of a "deep self" or "deep truth." if there would be no
Being without depth, and yet depth is not - nor harbors
- objective truth, we are led to ask: How must we
understand this depth which is so essential to Being
that Being would not Be if not as depth? Let us look
more closely.
Merleau-Ponty 's first discussion of depth occurs in
Phenomenology of Perception , where as usual, he launches
his own analysis from a careful critique of empiricist and
intellectualist approaches. Both theories, he argues, are
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alike "in denying that depth is visible. "35 For classical
thought, which assumes that depth is simply "breadth seen
from the side ," depth cannot be seen because the seer is
in no position to see it. it is either concealed by the
first surface in sight which blocks our vision of all that
is in the depths behind it; or in the case of the distance
between our eyes and the first surface, there is no way
of actually seeing this depth itself, since "this distance
is compressed into a point" in our flat visual field. 36
The depth we are speaking of can only actually be seen if
the observer moves to the side, in which case it becomes
breadth. Classical thought argues that we experience
depth not by seeing it, but rather by intellectually
interpreting it in terms of breadth from facts such as
the apparent size of the object in our visual field and
the angle of convergence between our eyes. Hence the
experience of depth is here understood as a cognitive
activity in which we judge the objective breadth we
would discover between ourselves and things if we were
to see this distance from the side.
Merleau-Ponty finds serious problems in this
objectivist rendering of depth. First, he argues that
these traditional approaches "do not give us any account
of the human experience of the world; they tell us what a
God might think about it." 37 In collapsing depth to an
interpretation of would-be breadth seen from the side,
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they conjure up an experience of the world from the
point of view of a subject who thinks of himself as
simultaneously everywhere - a subject who must alway!
posit himself at right angles to the line between hit
moving gaze and objects it contacts. Such an experience
of the world inheres in no point of view; it arises from
a subject who must occupy an infinite number of points
in space (at least in some fantastic mental sense) in
order to experience depth as identical to breadth wherever
he turns his gaze. Yet Merleau-Ponty notes that this
is clearly not the case, and that the essence of our
experience of depth is precisely that it is the experience
of an incarnate being specifically located in the lived
world. For this being, for human experience, depth is
not equivalent to breadth and height - dimensions which
are laid out in plain view before us. its appearance,
more than the other two dimensions, speaks of its
inherence in a relation between a subject and the
world, rather than appearing simply as a quality of
the world itself. The depth of the world always refers
to a particular perspective which implies a communication
between a self and the world at the origin of spatial
experience, hitherto considered unproblematically as given
"in itself." By collapsing depth into breadth and then
conceiving of a "cerebral alchemy" which facilitates this
conversion, classical thought jumps over this difference
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between depth and the other dimensions and assumes a
thorough knowledge of an entirely uniform objective
space as the basis of our experience. However, this
assumption begs the question, which is precisely to ask
how we come to experience space - and depth itself in
particular
- to begin with. Our experience of depth must
be prior to sophisticated calculations based on a space
which depth itself gives rise to.
In contrast to these abstract approaches which deny
both the specificity of depth and the peculiar relations
between the self and the world which depth indicates,
Merleau-Ponty contends that we must seek to disclose
the way in which depth comes into being for us as depth
without basing our analysis on calculations we supposedly
make according to an entirely objective and explicit
spatial network, the experience of which depth itself
gives rise to. To do justice to this "most existential
dimension," we must explore the existential relations
between the self and the world towards which it gestures
as fundamental, since it is through these relations that
our experience of depth and the world originate. We
must approach the experience of depth - and the relations
through which it arises - through the "phenomenological
reduction" in order to avoid falsely comprehending it
in terms of a world which is simply there "in itself"
and always already experienced as deep. The relations
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between the self and the world cannot be comprehended
"objectively,
"
and it is only through these relations
that the experience of depth and the world of things
springs forth. if we simply assume that which needs
to be understood we will have failed our task miserably.
Prior to the world in which science has "levelled down
the individual perspective" we must rediscover "the
originality of depth." 38 Instead of explaining the
experience of depth by phenomena in the given world,
we must seek the origin - the birth - of our experience
of the world in depth.
Merleau-Ponty takes depth's gesture towards the
relation between the self and the world seriously, and
hence he makes this relation the starting point of his
analysis. The experience of depth is fundamentally "a
possibility of a subject involved in the world." 39 The
subject ceaselessly finds itself thrown into thickets of
being of which it is not the author, and it responds to
this thrownness through a continual effort to get a grip
on this wild and indeterminate world which surrounds it.
Yet the self's partial ability to get a hold on being -
to sense something
, rather than being condemned to thrash
aimlessly forever amidst a world entirely ungraspable,
entirely foreign - is not simply a result of its own will,
but rather emerges from the fact that it belong to a
more primordial and "general existence" from which it
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.eau-
originates as divergence, separation (ecart)
. while thi;
general existence is referred to in the Phenomenon
of Perception
,
40
and often implicitly underlies hi,
discussions even where it is not mentioned, Merl,
Ponty does not submit it to a more careful and developed
analysis until his later discussions of the "flesh."
Without fully developing this notion until later, I wish
to begin with a very brief and simplified discussion of
flesh, since it sheds a certain light on Merleau-Ponty
'
s
earlier experiential discussions of the self-world
relation with respect to depth which will allow us to
explore them while avoiding some of their obscurity.
Among other things, we find in his notion of flesh
the ontological possibility of the "self," the "world" and
the relations between them. Merleau-Ponty calls not only
my carnal existence, but also that of the world flesh in
order to indicate a "kinship" between them which makes
possible the sensible world which emerges through their
communion. Indeed, the communication between the self
and the world is only possible because, in a general
sense, they share the same flesh. Expressing his theory
of embodiment in its more developed form as "flesh among
flesh," Merleau-Ponty writes:
If [the body] touches [things] and
sees them, this is only because,
being of their family, itself visible
and tangible, it uses its own being
as a means to participate in theirs...
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because the body belongs to the
order of the things as the worldis universal flesh. 41
My flesh can be present to that of the world because at
a certain level they are similar stuff. My body lends
itself to the world and the world inscribes my body
because they "belong together" as differentiations of
a common flesh. Without this commonality nothing would
be "there." Just as I can touch my own body by applying
flesh to flesh, so too can I sense the rest of the world
because I am thick like it is; and when I palpate it
with my touch or my gaze it resists me, forming at the
interface a surface of sensibility. Merleau-Ponty uses
the term flesh in part to indicate this commonality,
and in addition to distinguish his philosophy from any
materialistic philosophy which would reduce the "coiling
over" of flesh upon flesh to a relation among mere "things
in themselves." Flesh is - as we shall see - "a general
manner of being," 42 inexhaustible, and not to be subju-
gated to our experiences of it as object.
As humans we thus find ourselves tossed in the jungle
of flesh, and our existence is at a most fundamental
perceptual level a constantly renewed attempt to establish
and maintain a hold on the world. It is not the easy-
going hold of a subject and a world which are rationally
designed for one another. No, Merleau-Ponty ' s "world
ceaselessly assails and beleaguers subjectivity as waves
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wash around a wreck on the shore."" The commonality Qf
the self's flesh and that of the world does not ensure a
harmony, merely the possibility of something rather than
nothing. m the midst of this condition, existence is the
primordial attempt to make being determinate for oneself,
the effort to experience a world with distinctions,
significance, references and potentials - a world with
a degree of familiarity in which we can find and guide
ourselves.
Because my sensual field belongs to the finitude of
an historical bodily being which is submerged deep in the
world, in the most basic sense I cannot be everywhere at
once nor present all at once to everything. Nor even
can I be present simultaneously to everything which most
immediately surrounds me. The finitude of my being which
precludes ubiquitous presence to every-thing, behoves that
my perceptual contact with - my perceptual hold upon - the
world be through something
. Hence my perceptual bond with
the world must be essentially directional, proceeding to
and fro between myself and something in the world. It is
through this directional attempt to grasp the world so as
to further direct my existence within it, that depth comes
into being for us. "Depth is born beneath my gaze when
the latter tries to see something " 44 (Merleau-Ponty '
s
emphasis). At a most basic level, the perception of
anything is (as we have already seen) the accomplishment
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of a depth organization of the perceptual field into
figure and ground. To perceive something, it must "stand
out"
-
a trope which already indicates the essentiality
of depth to perception: the figure must stand out from
the depths of the background. The emergence of a distinct
something implies the submergence of the rest of the world
into the depths of varying degrees of indeterminacy. it
is these perceptual distinctions, Merleau-Ponty contends,
which give birth to the phenomenological world from an
indeterminate sensory field by rendering it in a depth
organization that allows us to grasp the world through
our operative finitude and take up an existence with it.
Yet it should be emphasized that our grasping of
the world is not at all the free act of a constituting
subject. The phenomenological world emerges through
the carnal intercourse between the flesh of my body and
the flesh of the world. Depth emerges as I "try" to
see something, yet "the act of focusing.
. . is equally a
response to a question put by the data [les donnees] and
this response is contained in the question." 45 if as
Merleau-Ponty says, it is impossible "to see the spaces
between the trees as things and the trees themselves as
background, 1,46 this is because the world demands that the
incarnate self perceive it within particular limits. My
body cannot climb the space between the trees just as it
cannot pass through the trees as if they were space. As
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my body moves, it interseo-hc; , , j .
,
u ersects the world in ever new ways;
and its movement is in a relation of circularity with
its perceptual grasp of the world in depth, insofar as
it simultaneously presupposes and ceaselessly forms and
transforms this field. As the world seduces, yields and
resists us in multitudinous ways, our perceptual world is
called forth. The world motivates my attempts to grasp
it. However, even these formulations are abstract moments
of my body's relation to the world - a relation in which
flesh "coils over" upon flesh, that is more primary than
either of the moments. The body and the world it is
submerged in ceaselessly interpenetrate one another
through reciprocal carnal "motivations." The field
of depth emerges through this chasm between them, and
ultimately "it is the field itself which is moving
towards the most perfect possible symmetry, and depth
is merely a moment in arriving at a perceptual faith
in one single thing" 47 (my emphasis)
.
Let us further explore this perceptual field and
the depth organization through which all things emerge.
When Merleau-Ponty refers to "the originality of depth,"
clearly the figure-ground structure of all perception
which brings things forth in our sensual field is part
of what he has in mind. This depth founds a world with
distinctions and texture which allows us to partially
grasp it. Yet what is the essence of things which are
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brought forth in this field? (i use the word „ essence „ as
Merleau-Ponty does, not as a static nature, but thinking
instead of Wesen and ester - active verbal essence. 48
)
Are they flat entities laid out completely before us?
Merleau-Ponty 's response to the latter question is a
definitive "no." Things are "things" not only through
the depth of their distinction from their surroundings,
but because they themselves have depth. Indeed, this
quality is intertwined with their distinction. "Depth
is the means the things have to remain distinct, to remain
things, while not being what I look at at present." 49
Without their own depth, things would be indistinct from
their surroundings and indistinct from me as well since
I would totally possess them; they would not be. Hence,
contemporaneous with the birth of something in my
perceptual field is the rendering of the thing in depth,
and this depth implies the spatiality of the world as
well
.
Merleau-Ponty pursues this genesis of the experience
of depth in his discussion of our perception of a cube
sketched on paper. I see a three-dimensional figure -
rather than nothing or a mere incoherent juxtaposition
of lines - by inhabiting it and animating it with my gaze
in ways which the lines themselves call forth. This depth
perception brings forth a "thing," a "locality," which
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gathers together the lines on the page so thoroughly that
their appearance is governed by their mutual implications
Angles that are acute or obtuse when viewed in terms
of the flat objective juxtaposition of lines, appear
immediately in depth as right angles and the lateral
faces (objectively diamond shaped) appear as "squares
seen askew." Depth is precisely this bringing forth, this
gathering together, this instantaneous crystallization of
a significant perception in which some-thing and a "there"
appears - that is, a being, volume, locality, the multiple
parts of which "belong together" through their reciprocal
implications. Prior to this there is no-thing, and no
"there," only vague indeterminacy. Merleau-Ponty elabo-
rates this point with a discussion of our perception
of a sketched cube, because the sketch is sufficiently
ambiguous to partially disclose the manner in which the
depth rendering brings the field into being and holds sway
over the aspects of the field, endowing angles and shapes
with a significance they acquire through their relations
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with other parts, pulling forth some lines, repelling
others back, separating the figure of the cube from the
background of the page; in short, giving birth to the
"there." However, what Merleau-Ponty says of the sketched
cube applies to all perception (except of course with the
obvious difference that a real three-dimensional cube is
rendered in a depth which has a tactile thickness which
accords with its visibility)
. When I perceive a real
cube, say the sugar cube on the kitchen table, its being
springs forth from the background as a thick angular
thing whose angles, shadows and faces cohere together
in an originating spatial depth. All perceived things
appear as things through this experiential pulling forth
and pushing back which generally occurs instantaneously,
distributing their parts in a depth which sustains their
significance and calls forth the "there."
As we have indicated, this depth is not simply
a quality of things themselves, but inheres in the
perspective of our perceptual field. As my grasp on
the world, the world's grasp on me, the depth in and
through which things appear always expresses the stretch
between them and me. Things appear not only as distinct
from a background, but distinct from myself as well.
Each thing is "being at a distance," 50 and it appears
as a significant thing only by cohering in a depth which
reveals the various distances of its different parts from
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me. Without this implicit stipulation no thing can be;
not even a flat juxtaposition of lines on a flat surface,
for "there are forms and definite planes only if it is
stipulated how far from me their different parts are. "51
This "stipulating" is not that of an objective thought
which would measure the distance, but more fundamentally
the depth which emerges with the perceptual field as soon
as it is perceptually grasped as "there," as soon as there
is anything to measure. m absence of this depth there is
only indeterminacy.
Hence we see not only that our experience of things
originates in depth, but that in giving birth to "being
at a distance," depth renders open the "clearing" we
always find ourselves in the midst of. it is the depth
of the perceptual field which clears being, which holds
the field open, instead of smothering us in the absolute
proximity of an indeterminacy from which we can distin-
guish neither ourselves nor a world. Here we begin to
see the specificity and uniqueness of depth - the reason
Merleau-Ponty calls us to think it. Depth as the essence
of the clearing is not the "third dimension" of the world
which, like the other two dimensions, can be measured.
Rather, Merleau-Ponty speaks of depth as that through
which our experience of the world and the three dimensions
originate .
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Depth thus understood is, rather,the experience of... a global
"locality"
- everything in the
same place at the same time, a
lnTllll*
fr°m WhiGh hei<?ht, widtha d depth are abstracted, of a
volummosity we express in a word
when we say that a thing is there . 52
The "there" emerges in depth as the visual field
"pulls forward," "pushes back," implicates, reveals
and conceals to present the space of the world. A volume
of experience is given birth to within which we always
discover ourselves.
Merleau-Ponty's inquiry into depth calls attention to
the paradoxical nature of the world's presence to us, in
which the depth of each being is grasped on the basis of
distinctions which allow it to "stand out" from an eclipse
that which it is not, while in turn these distinctions
and this envelopment appear on the basis of each being's
depth.
The enigma [of depth] consists in
the fact that I see things, each
one in its place, precisely because
they eclipse one another and that
they are rivals before my sight
precisely because each one is in
its own place. Their exteriority
is known in their envelopment and
their mutual dependence in their
autonomy. 53
Indeed things are only "there" through a sort of self-
eclipse, in which their present surface of visibility
is indebted to and indicative of a latent invisibility
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harbored in the depths of their h^inr,un be ng. Emerging from
the depths of things throuah tho r^-M •^ niiu gn ne coiling over of flesh
on flesh, "the looK does not overcome depth, it goes round
it. "54 The world and the th . ngs wh . ch with^ ^
are this transcendence as depth, this presence of the
inexhaustibl e.
Thus far, our discussion of depth has drawn
substantial support from illustrations that are visual
in nature. However Merleau-Ponty 's contention that the
perceived world originates through a depth rendering
in which things find both their cohesion and their
distinction from other things, applies to the perceived
world as such, not just visual perception. As my fingers
run through the warm sand on a beach, at least for an
instant the rest of the tactile world which surrounds me
is partially eclipsed and driven back by the thick being
of the resistant sand. As I am captivated by Coltrane's
saxophone, it bubbles out of the depths of an irreverently
noisy book store, pressing the chatter, the jingle of
coins falling into a cash register, the squeaky door,
the sliding of books, into the deep reaches of its shadow,
eclipsing them so thoroughly that they are almost driven
from the room. And his wild improvisation is only able to
do this because it is there - a thickness of inexhaustible
sound which both appears through and demands its distinc-
tion. Merleau-Ponty writes repeatedly: "To be conscious
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= to have a figure on a ground - one cannot go back any
further. "55 The clearing of the lived world is always
present in this depth structure in which we do not
experience a uniform objective world, analogous to
Cartesian space for all our senses, but rather a world
that is "coherently deformed" around figures which "stand
out . "
However, if we have established that depth renders
open the clearing of the lived world and that it is the
dimension of transcendence, a crucial question looms large
concerning the relationship between this experience of
things and the flesh of the world. Does our experience
correspond to the world's flesh? Does it express this
flesh? Is it attuned to this flesh? After all, have we
not asserted an ontological collusion between the self
and the world by calling them both flesh?
I wish first to develop Merleau-Ponty ' s response
to these questions by further elaborating his discussion
of our experience of the world; and then, to explore the
"indirect ontology" that grows out of this discussion and
remains incomplete in his final works. In the latter,
he addresses the relation between our experience and the
Being of things.
As we have begun to see, the depth organization of
the perceived world simultaneously reveals and conceals
the beings which appear therein. However, Merleau-Ponty
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also employs metaphors l ike "express" and "transgress"
which are far less neutral and far more illuminating for
the discussion at hand. 56 A close look at ^ experienced
world indicates that each perception of a thing is ex-
tremely partial when compared with the multiplicitous
being of the thing that is further revealed through the
temporal elaboration of experience. More profoundly each
perceptual moment organizes the field of experience in a
manner which in part transgressively deforms the world
that is revealed as our experience accrues (and, as we
shall see, the world is not exhausted in the multiplicity
of perceptions)
.
No other type of perception is available
to us. To have the world partially in our grasp, to have
it in the depth of a perceptual field, is to "express"
it in a manner that brings it into being in ever new ways
which emerge from our intersection with it. But it is
also essentially to render the world partially invisible
- hidden in the backsides, the insides, the horizons of
our perceptual field - and to elevate and subordinate its
qualities and dimensions in ways which transform, bend and
transgress its polyphonous and often cacophonous being.
One particularly apt word Merleau-Ponty uses to
describe originating perception is "jaillir" 57 - to
shoot forth, to gush, to flash. To perceive is to
experience the figure of perception shooting forth in
a flash which captures my attention and blinds me - at
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least for an instant
- from the rest of the world. For
Merleau-Ponty, there is a sense in which all perception
is dramatic. As my gaze is fixed on the point of contact
between my pencil and the page, the motion of writing,
the presence of the page, hovers over and dominates the
room. Most of the world plunges beyond our horizon into
invisibility. if we are usually unaware of this drama,
Merleau-Ponty argues that it is because we tend to lose
ourselves and the profundity of each instant, in the
world which is revealed through continuous experience.
We take this latter world as simply there, yet it always
originates in the perceptual field which gushes like a
spring out of our communion with things.
Summarizing the turbulence and transcendence of
things, Merleau-Ponty writes:
[Visible things] are always behind
what I see of them, as horizons, and
what we call visibility is this very
transcendence. No thing no side of a
thing shows itself except by actively
hiding others, denouncing them in the
act of concealing [masguer] them. To
see is as a matter of principle to
see farther than one sees, to reach
a latent existence. The invisible
is the outline and the depth of the
visible. 58
However, this "masking," this "denunciation" which
is the essence of the visible, is not that of a God which
reigns eternally. Rather the perceived world is "wild
Being " (L'Etre sauvage) J7 and depth vacillates like the
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surface of a raging ocean, as figures emerge and submerge
in the flow of experience. As the face of an other with
whom I am conversing seizes the perceptual field, the
being of third persons, the clock on the wall, the fly
buzzing against the window pane as well as the facial
expressions which my present rendering eclipses, do
not resign themselves to their subordinated background
presence, but rather contest the field's organization.
Things coexist as "rivals" in my perceptual field,
ceaselessly upsetting its balance, imparting perpetual
life to perception rather than subsuming themselves neatly
in a vision that is "once and for all." "Things dispute
for my gaze; and anchored in one of them, I feel in it
the solicitation of the others which makes them coexist
with the first - the demands of a horizon and its claim
to exist." 60 My perceptual world, one dominated by the
animated face of my friend, is "coherently deformed" as
the clock almost leaps off the wall. Now I barely hear
the other, I barely see him; the other struggles over
his loss of hegemony as I realize, "I'm late." And I
am late, but the sudden expression of this truth, like
all truths, cannot but transgress other aspects of being,
like a storm cloud which brings darkness and lightning
to the world deep below. The newly structured world is
itself unstable: I do not leave before I swat a fly.
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However, the world he describes is not one of
incoherence in which the surface transience of experi-
ence is its greatest depth. He does not describe a world
that is predominantly discontinuous - completely made
and remade
- from one instant to the next. Rather, the
depth of our experience of the world which renders things
both
-there" and open to new and different perceptions,
also ensures that there can be a degree of continuity to
our experience
- that it can cohere and elaborate rather
than be ontologically doomed to proceed as a succession of
discontinuous differences. 61 The figure which currently
dominates my perceptual field harbors in the depths of
its background horizons the other things which surround
it and hence implicitly implies them. it is this mutual
implication of other things and other experiences in
the depths of each thing and experience that maintains
a continuity in our experience of the world.
The importance of this basic coherence and continuity
of the clearing cannot be overestimated. It is this which
holds open the possibility that we might develop our per-
ceptual and conceptual relationship to the world rather
than simply abandon ourselves to a nihilistic succession
of "differences." It is this which allows that our
different experiences, no matter how discordant, might
speak in the conversation of our existence and offer us
the possibility of developing a greater understanding
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our
of ourselves, others and things in the world. Without
this basic belonging-together-in-the-same-"there"
of
experience, existence could be nothing but a gauntlet in
which we would never be able to rise to our feet. Depth
vacillates like a raging ocean, but as inhabitants of
this sea we simultaneously experience the marked cohesion
of this massive fluid.
If Merleau-Ponty depicts "a world of teeming
exclusive things which could only be taken in by
means of a temporal cycle in which each gain is at
the same time a loss," 62 this is not to establish the
foundations of a philosophy that affirms all perceptions
as "equally valid." Some perceptions express the world
better and transgress it less harmfully than others.
Those which close us off from different others and close
us to the possibility of different experiences in the
future transgress the depth of the world in a way that
fundamentally violates depth itself. Transgressions -
"coherent deformation" - that bring forth a dialogical
encounter with the world and maintain an openness to
the future are on the other hand - as we shall see - the
essence of depth itself. If I see in the person before
me only the possibility of extracting surplus value, I
am clearly transgressing this person far more and in a
way that is quite different than if I recognize in the
other a being which transcends me with her particular
225
aspirations, pleasures and desires. The world itself
continually makes clearer the relative values of our
perceptions as it "crosses out" those perceptions that
prove to be unsustainable upon further contact. Yet even
perceptions which are sustainable contain an ineliminable
transgressive quality. To render the world into the depth
of the clearing is not just to "deliver" it into the open,
but to "rend"
- in the sense of to tear it open. One of
Merleau-Ponty's most important insights, it seems to me,
is that perception is unavoidably a "violent act." 63
However, the depth of the "there" which always
violates things as it expresses them, is equally that
which maintains the openness of our experience and
provides the possibility of new perceptions which reveal
dimensions hitherto dis-regarded. The backsides, the
backgrounds, the horizons of my perceptual field, absorb
my senses into the thickness of a fertile and protean
soil capable of nurturing new visions which unfasten old
closures. Through the temporal elaboration of experience
I can become aware of differences and otherness to which I
had previously been oblivious. But the will to eliminate
transgression from each and every perception, to be
present all at once to all differences, is unwittingly
the will to express nothing - to let no difference figure
on a ground.
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All of this discussion has thus far taken place
at the level of experience. Yet we are already closer
than we may think to an ontology of "depth Being." if
we have put forth such a lengthy portrayal of Merleau-
Ponty's discussion of experiential depth, it is not
simply because of its intrinsic value - although there
is a great deal of this - but also because it is in
keeping with Merleau-Ponty
' s contention that "one cannot
make a direct ontology. "64 "For how would we speak of
Being, since those beings and shapes of Being, which
open to us the only conceivable access to it, at the
same time hide it from us by their mass "65 Instead,
we must proceed through a careful examination of beings
and experience in order to "advance obliquely" towards
an ontology of this elusive Being. 66 Understood in
this light, Merleau-Ponty
' s work at least from the
Phenomenology of Perception on can be seen in retrospect
as part of his working out of an "indirect ontology"
which supports his final work, but also requires the
final unfinished writing to show that the earlier effort
"is in fact ontology. "67 Presently the task at hand is
to discern the trajectory of his final work in an effort
to illustrate the way in which he gathers together his
earlier insights into an ontological development that
significantly deepens them.
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In a "working note" entitled "the » senses' -
dimensionality
- Being," Merleau-Ponty ponders the
relation between "the sensible" and Being in a way
that is extremely insightful and opens the door to a
discussion of his ontology. He writes:
What is proper to the sensible ... isto be representative of the whole
not by a sign-signification relation,
or by the immanence of the parts
in one another and in the whole,
but because each part is torn up(arrachee) from the whole, comes
with its roots, encroaches upon the
whole, transgresses the frontiers
of the others. 8
This is a passage of great fecundity, for in it Merleau-
Ponty begins to illuminate the relation between "the
sensible" and "the whole" (Being) which it represents,
in a manner that sheds a great deal of light on his
understanding of the active essence of Being itself.
In stating that the sensible is "torn up" from the
whole, he indicates a profound kinship between the
sensible and Being, which is central to his ontology.
The sensible is not a phenomenal fabrication of a noumenal
being which is completely other than what we sense: nor
is it simply a violence we do to things. Instead the
sensible is a "part" of Being, and hence it speaks to us
- if only indirectly through "the voices of silence" -
of Being itself. The task of Merleau-Ponty ' s "indirect
ontology" is to "rediscover this world of silence" which
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speaks through the beings we perceive; to disclose the
Being of beings in such a way as to gain insight into
both our experience of things and their transcendence -
our experience of beings as transcendent.
Our exploration of the "wild Being" of the perceived
world revealed a primordial layer of experience which
is ceaselessly transformed and deformed as it becomes
present in diverse depths. But what is the Being of this
fluctuating yet coherent vision? What sort of nature is
open to such diverse renderings? These are the questions
which Merleau-Ponty's interrogation of "brute" experience
gives rise to, for the latter illustrates not only the
untenability of past ontologies, but the pressing need
for ontological reformulation as well.
We must approach his ontology carefully, for even
the question "What is Being?" can lead us astray if we
take it to gesture towards some sort of "in itself." if
Merleau-Ponty responds to this question - and he does -
it is precisely by changing the meaning of each of the
terms; for "what," "is" and "Being," each harbor a
thickness and inertia stemming from their employment
in traditional philosophy which powerfully implies
ontological conceptions that he explicitly rejects.
To inhabit the question without transforming it is
to be carried along in a blindness that renders the
interrogation which the question mark calls forth
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meaningless from the start. Hence, it is crucial to
note that the governing idea of Merleau-Ponty' s ontology
is that Being "Is not only what it is." 69 Let us explore
this latter assertion more carefully.
In his interrogation of this elusive Being, Merleau-
Ponty uses a cluster of terms; however by far the most
important concept is "flesh." "Flesh is what » lines' the
visibles, ^sustains them, nourishes them.'" 70 Flesh is
that out of which the sensible is "torn up." it is that
which the visible transgressively presents. Yet it is
not itself a "thing." Rather flesh is "a pregnancy of
possibles," 71 "polymorphism," a "latency," "openness" -
most profoundly "depth" and "nowise a layer of flat
entities or the in itself." 72 it is in this notion of
"pregnancy of possibles" that we begin to see the way
in which Being is not only what it is.
Earlier in our discussion we indicated that one
reason Merleau-Ponty calls being flesh is to emphasize
the commonality between the pulp of my body and that of
the world. However Merleau-Ponty deepens this insight
significantly when he argues that the commonality is not
just one of "similar stuff," but "similar style" also.
Merleau-Ponty calls Being "flesh" because my bodily flesh
"is to the greatest extent what every thing is." 73 To
say that Being is flesh, is to say that the Being of
everything somehow resembles that of my flesh. Being
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is called flesh in an effort to evoke a quality - an
essential activity
- which is most proxixnally experienced
in my own flesh and further a quality of which my flesh
is the most profound amplification, what characterizes
my flesh, Merleau-Ponty maintains, is its "reversibility,"
the fact that it is both sentient and sensible. My flesh
is both a being; that perceives and a perceived being. it
is neither exclusively "in itself" nor exclusively "for
itself," but rather - and more primordially - both at
once. It is both a field or clearing and what appears in
the clearing. This flesh "is a relation of the visible
with itself that traverses me and constitutes me as a
seer, this circle which I do not form, which forms me,
this coiling over of the visible upon the visible." 74
My flesh is not an inert mass, but a being which has
itself and other beings in a sensual field - a being
which is not contingently this way, but essentially
so. I cannot detach myself from the visible. I am
this essential activity ("Wesen," "ester") which is
the visible 's relation to itself such that a dimension
is cleared in which it appears. This is the openness,
latency, pregnancy, depth of flesh - not just the flesh
of my immediate body, but (in a way that is very similar
yet very different) the flesh of the world as well.
Yet one will protest that rather than being what
characterizes the similarity between my flesh and the
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world, the quality we have just described is precisely
what distinguishes the two. is not to argue otherwise
to return to a strange philosophical position resembling
early Greek hylozoism? in response to this imaginary
interlocutor Merleau-Ponty explicitly asserts that "this
is not hylozoism.
»
7 5 "The flesh of the world is not self-
sensing (se sentir) as is my flesh - it is sensible and
not sentient." 76 However, in spite of this crucial
distinction Merleau-Ponty nevertheless argues that all
flesh is a mode of reversibility: all flesh both appears
in the clearing and participates in clearing the clearing.
In another working note we find:
My body is to the greatest extent
what everything is: a dimensional
this. It is the universal thing
- But, while the things become
dimensions only insofar as they
are received in a field
r
my body
is this field itself, i.e., a
sensible that is dimensional of
itself " 77 (My emphasis and his.)
Hence, this dimensionality of things - their mode of
reversibility - comes into being only when things are
presented in the sensual field of my body. But this is
not to say that in the last instance the dimensionality
of things is simply a quality which I impart to things
- a quality which does not belong to them as well. If we
recall our earlier discussion, we note that our perception
of things - their appearance within a perceptual field -
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is neither our creation, nor a quality of things in
themselves, but rather that which emerges through the
intercourse between the flesh of my body and that of the
world. This intercourse brinSs_fJ^th_^^
that were only latent possibilities beforehand. (The
thing's appearance does not lie "in itself.") Yet
along with any thing's appearance in the clearing, we
simultaneously elicit another essential possibility of
the thing: its dimensionality. This dimensionality is
a dependent dimensionality, but it belongs as essentially
to anything which appears as its very appearance itself.
Hence the Being of things is to not appear to us
simply as inert beings within a perceptual field, but to
participate in clearing the field as well: to "repre-
sent," to make present (and thereby partly conceal) the
Being of which they are a part. All things we perceive
simultaneously give birth to the field they appear in.
Things and parts of things interact not just as "things,"
but by being "dimensions" through which other beings (and
other parts of themselves) are expressed, brought into
being, presented. Depicting this mode of reversibility
Merleau-Ponty writes: "there is dimensionality of every
fact and facticity of every dimension - This is in virtue
of the x ontological difference.'" 78 it is this ontologi-
cal difference that is the depth of Being.
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Let us explore this a bit more carefully. The
dimensionality of the world is perhaps most simply
revealed in Merleau-Ponty
' s discussion of color in the
working note with which we began our discussion of the
indirect ontology of The VisihTo and Th^ Tn,n^H .
Yellow, he argues, is not merely a sensible color but
"surpasses itself of itself" as soon as it becomes the
color of the illumination, the dominant color of the
field, it ceases to be such or such a color, it has
therefore of itself an ontologies function
, it becomes
apt to represent all things. 79 Yellow is a dimension
in the sense that it is not simply the presence of a
particularity, but a sensible which opens the world as
well: it
...gives itself as a certain being
and as a dimension
,
the expression
of every possible being . As the
illuminating color, yellow presents
the rest of the world, expressing
and transgressing it in the process.
However, dimensionality is not just
a quality of sensible beings which
so clearly radiate throughout the
rest of the world. All sensibles
are dimensional (to varying degrees)
in that they partake in opening
the perceptual field as a whole.
Perception is not first a percep-
tion of things, but a perception
of elements . . .of rays of the world ,
of things which are dimensions. ..
I
slide (glisse) on these "elements"
and here I am in the world. °"
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When I perceive the room around me, it is not present
completely and all at once, but rather present through
various fragments which reveal it to me. it may appear
through my absorption in a Picasso print on the far
wall or through the close proximity of the page I am
absorbed in as I write. m each case the sensible which
is torn out of Being and "figures" in the perceptual field
presents the room as a whole: for example, I see "room
through my absorption in the page." I "glisse" on the
page and enter the world through it - a room which is
highlighted and shadowed, amplified and muted, and in
general appears with a certain significance endowed
largely by the page. If I meet a large man with a
knife on a dark street, he does not just appear before
me as a human being in the visible. His appearance has
an "ontological function," it reveals the world around
me. My openness to Being takes place through this being
I encounter. The world springs forth as Dangerous and
everything around me is revealed as primarily either
an enhancement or an abatement of this Danger. Hence
the "dimensionality of every fact"; a dimensionality
which along with the facticity of the sensible, is
"torn out" of Being and expresses everything which
it presents and everything it claims to be through
encroachment and transgression.
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As I have noted, this
"reversibility" of being
-
the simultaneous facticity and dimensionality of the
sensible
-
is central to Merleau-Ponty' s understanding
of Being as "pregnancy of possibilities," latency, open-
ness and depth. if beings were not this reversibility
one might argue that Being was infinite and never subject
to complete experience, but not that it was a pregnant
openness. Descartes, Leibniz and Spinoza all took this
approach to Being, conceiving of it as a "positive
infinity" which is effectively more than we will ever
be able to know. As infinite, the world is conceived
as a determinate endlessness (Unendlichkeit) of which
we ceaselessly uncover small fragments which leave so
much remaining in the dark. The visible manifests only
the little pellicle of being that it is. The invisible,
the unknown, is conceived as "a positive only absent." 81
Given this understanding of being, there may be endless
cross-sections of each thing, but in each of these
views, everything would stay put in its own proper
place; everything would be present in the stillness
and "in itself" proportionateness of the Renaissance
perspective. Each view - at least when cleansed of
prejudice would express perfectly a fragment of the
infinite. But this is not at all the infinity of
which Merleau-Ponty speaks. His infinity is an
"operative infinity": "the infinity of Offenheit
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[openness] and not Unendlichkeit [endlessness] . "82
It is an infinity that ceaselessly ProliferH-~ not
simply because there are an endless number of cross-
sections we can make of any thing, but because each
sensible, as a dimension, brings forfch into the visible,
the thing and world from which it is torn in a new way
(partially transgressive) and thereby establishes within
each being and among beings, relations which are not
simply those belonging to things "in themselves" (which
at most could be endless) but relations of re
-presentation
which multiply by ceaselessly giving birth to both the
visible and an ever-replenished pregnant reserve in the
depths of the invisible. This reserve is not just a
hidden thing which can be revealed, but a being, which,
when made determinate will itself represent the world
anew
- coherently transforming and deforming the world.
These relations of "clearing" within being make possible
and necessary an expressive-transgressive activity within
Being which is utterly other than the "in itself."
In light of this fact, Merleau-Ponty 's contention
that Being is depth begins to be comprehensible. Depth
cannot ultimately be consigned to the side of a "for
itself" which must render the world in depth in order
to experience it. No pellicle of the visible rests
passively "in itself." Rather the intercourse of our
historical bodily flesh and that of the world brings
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.ons
forth a world in which each part partakes in relati,
of depth with other parts: pulling things forth and
pushing things back in the depth of the clearing. These
relations are not secondary aspects of things but belong
as fundamentally to things as their very appearance.
Facticity and dimensionality are abstract moments of the
reversibility which characterizes the thingness of a thing
-
that is, the depth, the "there is" of things which is
never that of a neutral visible. in its intersection with
our body the sensible presents things, but it does so in a
depth which maintains them at a distance; repels things as
it brings them forth. "Depth is the means the things have
to remain distinct, to remain things, while not being what
I look at at present. It is preeminently the dimension of
the simultaneous. Without it there would not be a world
or Being." 83 We might add, that with it the world that
emerges is "wild Being," a Being with an operative depth
that proliferates everywhere we look and maintains the
ineliminable otherness of things. In marked contrast to
identifying thought, Merleau-Ponty argues that otherness
is the very Being of things and the world. If identifying
thought remains oblivious to the uniqueness of depth, it
is because depth is the dimension in which things remain
other, different (and this is the basis of the possibility
of their non-possessed identity) . This oblivion to depth
is not an accident, it is necessarily intertwined with
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sets of thoughts and practices which are oblivious to the
otherness of things; thoughts and practices which def
the world as being completely suited to possession. m
opposition to this conquered world, Merleau-Ponty posit
"different" world springing forth in inexhaustible depth.
"[T]he look does not overcome depth, it goes round it." 8 *
Yet Merleau-Ponty does not posit a complete and total
otherness in the place of a complete and total identity.
If things remain distinct in depth, so too, they are
presented in depth, though never in the purity of an
expression without transgression. There is a certain
complicity between the historical body and the world,
but one in which expression and transgression, like
Hobbes and fear, are "born twins." it is a complicity
which enables there to be a dialogue between the self
and the world, but one which gives rise to extreme
contestation as well as agreement.
It must be emphasized that all we have said about
the self's relation to the world extends to the self's
relation to its self as well. "I who see have my
own depth." 85 (Indeed, as we have seen, it is in
communion with the reversibility of my own flesh that
things spring forth as reversible themselves.) As an
"exemplar sensible" I am not self-present simply and
all at once, but rather I am continually rendered present
in and as a depth which violates dimensions of my being
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just as it brings others towards creative fruition. I
never coincide with myself in a complete self-presence,
and it is precisely this invisibility and absence - which
characterizes even my most inward experience of myself -
that allows me to open out upon and experience a world
that inheres in its otherness. A flat self-possessing
cogito could never allow a wild mysterious world to seep
into its hermetically sealed experience of certainty.
On the other hand, the deep non-coinciding self is thrown
into the depths of the world. As non-identical it is
confronted with the task of creating itself in contact
with its own and the world's otherness.
Depth: The Dimension of Being-With Others
Thus far we have explored depth as that which most
characterizes beings and the clearing which emerges
through the carnal intercourse between the body and the
world. Depth is the Being of flesh which continuously
coils over upon itself, giving birth to the visible
pregnant with the invisible. Yet if the discourse were
to end at this point, it would perhaps obfuscate depth
more than illuminate it. If the world were to break off
here, we would be far more Cartesian and far less deep
than we imagine. For depth is essentially intercorporeal
:
it springs forth through our contact with others who are
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different. m absence of these others, depth is^ot.
Hence, to speak of the experienced world as deep only or
even primarily in terms of a single self's communion with
the flesh of the world is, once again, to flatten depth.
It is to assume once more the philosophical stance of a
tradition which denies depth most primordially in assuming
that we can speak of a self, a world and their relations
in absence of others. it is to assume that philosophical
questions can and should be approached most fundamentally
by probing the relations between an isolated individual
and the surrounding world. it is to perpetuate that flat
"I" which Virginia woolf sees materializing across the
pages of a proliferating literature written mostly by
men. 86 When Merleau-Ponty writes that those who attempt
to construct phenomena starting from the "solipsist layer"
"ignore the profoundest things Husserl is saying to us," 87
he is speaking as usual not only or perhaps even primarily
of what is important in Husserl 's philosophy, but of that
which is central to his own. For Merleau-Ponty (and his
Husserl) the isolated self, the "solipsist layer," is not
at all primary, but rather a "thought experiment intended
more to reveal than to break the links of the intentional
8 8web." Thus far we have discussed depth without
explicitly addressing others, in an effort to disclose
some of the primordial characteristics of our relationship
with the world. Equally primordial - and without which
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we would not in an important respect experience the world
in depth
- is our relationship with others. It is only
in elaborating the circularity between our discussion
of depth thus far and our relation with others that our
task will assume its true value. m approaching "the
profoundest things- Merleau-Ponty is saying to us, we must
show not only that depth renders possible our experience
of others, but equally that others give birth to a central
dimension of our experience of depth. Only then will „e
kick the habits of the flattened "I" - its flat ontology,
ethics and politics.
We have shed light above on Merleau-Ponty 's comment
that without depth there would not be a world or Being.
He could equally have written that without others who
are different there would be no experience of this
"Etre profond." As we have seen, the world is "there"
as a voluminosity of experience which opens up as it is
rendered in a depth in which things appear as distinct
individuals. However, Merleau-Ponty argues that prior to
"intersubjective life" there is no "there" - no experience
of a world in depth - but only anonymity in which "there
is neither individuation nor distinction. 89 There is only
a confused realm lacking differentiation, transcendence
and depth. The self merges with the world, the world
with the self, and hence neither emerges in its own
right. It is only after the self is distinct for itself
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something as we shall see which emerges simultaneously
with its grasp of others who are different - that the
world emerges in its transcendent depths. Prior to this
there is only a "primordial generality"^ lacking the
depth through which things appear "at a distance." This
is not to say that without others who are different our
senses would cease to open out upon the world. For
example, I would still see the yellow mass that is my
bicycle helmet. Yet I would not see it as a thing
distinct from me and hence it would not exist for me
in the depth which separates it from me and allows it
to be "there" in its own right. As I have argued, depth
and distinction are co-originary
. what is crucial to
note, is that the primordial, distinction with which
the depth of the "there" fully emerges - the primordial
difference which releases beings from "primordial
generality" and into the depth of the clearing - is
that between the self and all that it is not, which
bursts forth as the self confronts different others.
This is an insight of no small importance and calls
for further careful elaboration. In order to understand
more clearly Merleau-Ponty ' s circular comment that "the
fully objective thing is based upon the experience of
others, and the latter upon the experience of the body,
which in a way is a thing itself" 91 we need to address
several issues. First, I will very briefly summarize
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his discussions of what it is about the nature of our
bodily being that opens us to the experience of an
"other." second, I will discuss the importance of the
"difference" between selves as essential to the perception
of both ethers and the self. Finally, I „Ul discuss
the way in which our existence as beings among different
others confers objectivity and depth upon the clearing
to which we belong.
The modern problem of the other stems from Descartes'
formulation of the cogito, in which the fact that "I
think" is taken as the first absolute and most fundamental
ground of my certainty. He argues that all other knowl-
edge is rooted in this transparent fact and has the
status of being the cogito's mental judgment of its
representations. Descartes himself avoids the solipsism
this position lends itself to through his "proof" that
there exists an undeceiving God, one who guarantees that
my most rigorous representations of the world and others
are not merely illusory, but representations of beings
which do exist in fact. However, for those lacking
Descartes' certainty in God, the existence of others
and otherness becomes a Problem. If transparency and
pure self-presence are the ground which assures my
certainty of a being's existence (namely that of my
own res coqitans ) , then how can I possibly be certain
of the existence of another "for itself" - a being
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defined by its absence from me insofar as I can never
coincide with it? How can the other be for me anything
but my representation (and hence not truly an other)?
Our presence to others as such is an unsolvable probl,
for the philosophy of consciousness, and this probl,
is perhaps the greatest testimony of its poverty. Never-
theless it is a pervasive poverty, one which dominated
the intellectual milieu from which Merleau-Ponty emerged
and hence one which he felt compelled to address. 92
However he does not, of course, address the probl
on its own terms. Indeed his approach to the probl
demands a radical transcendence of the philosophy of
the cogito from which it emerges. Merleau-Ponty writes
"[w]hat is interesting is not... to solve the problem of
the other" but rather "a transformation of the problem." 93
The essence of this transformation is to ask not how my
constituting consciousness can come to know of another
constituting consciousness, but rather how my bodily
being experiences another bodily being. The secret
to the latter question, he argues, can be partially
illuminated by re-examining the way in which my body
perceives itself, for the perception of others "presents
us with but an amplification of the same paradox." 94
Unlike the Cartesian cogito which is completely
present to itself at each instant of its thought - able
to perceive itself perceiving - the self-perception of
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Merleau-Ponty's incarnate self is characterized by a
certain absence. As my right hand attempts to touch
the actual touch of my left hand, the latter retreats
into the depths of my being just as my right hand is
about to succeed. My body is never completely present
to itself in the act of perception, because perception
is an "ek-stase" in which the self is thrown outside of
itself and into the world (world in this instance meaning
this visible body of self-perception)
. Perception must
in part lose itself to gain access to the world. in
this perpetual thrownness the self-as-sensing recedes
into the depths of the figure of the self-as-sensed.
My left hand is given as an animate sensing thing, but
one whose sensing my right hand cannot be completely
present to. Hence Merleau-Ponty writes that "the
reflection of the body upon itself always miscarries
at the last moment." 95
This remark goes a long way, for it forces us to
abandon Cartesian self-presence and resituate our sense
of self in the depths of the world to which we belong.
The body's presence to itself has no absolute privilege
over its sense of the rest of the world, for I am given
to myself, as a part of the world and "I who see have
my own depths." 96 Because all that is present including
myself is "there" in a depth which presents an absence
as well, the fact that I am unable to coincide with
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the perceiving being of an other, no more threatens her
existence for me than my lack of coincidence with my own
perceiving being threatens my existence for myself. And
if I know myself as part of the sensible world - as an
animate being presented with a living grip on the world -
then why, when I see other similar animate beings, would
I not recognize them as "others"? Indeed, it is because
I know myself as a "perceiving thing" in the world that
I am able to sense and corporeally understand that there
are "other myselves." Merleau-Ponty writes:
My right hand was present at
the advent of my left hand's
active sense of touch [in depth,
as we have described]
. it is
no different fashion that the
other's body becomes animate
before me when I shake another
man's hand or just look at him. 97
My body is able to recognize an other when it witnesses
the latter livingly engaged with the world, intertwined
with the visible in a manner which bears an undeniable
human style.
But what sparks this sudden recognition of an other
living human being? Though Merleau-Ponty never gives this
question as extended an analysis as one would hope for,
he addresses it briefly in various texts in ways which
are highly illuminating. The central notion that runs
through these discussions is that the other is revealed as
an "other" when I encounter her difference from myself and
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my expectations. Prior to the unexpected, the strange,
the shocking encounter with another, the other^s_such
does not really appear, m The vi.i h1o Tnp. Tm,^„„
Merleau-Ponty writes:
Here is this well-known countenancethis mile, these modulations of voice
whose styles is as familiar to me as
'
myself. Perhaps in many moments of
my life the other is for me reducedto this spectacle, which can be a
charm. But should the voice alter,
should the unwonted appear in the
score of the dialogue, or, on the
contrary, should a response respond
too well to what I thought without
having really said it - and suddenly
there breaks forth the evidence that
yonder also, minute by minute, life
is being lived:
. . . another privatP
world shows through
r through the
fabric of my own and for a moment
I live it. ys (My emphasis.)
It is then, the unusual which kindles our sense of the
other, whether it be a direct difference of content or
style, or an uncanny proximity ("responding too well")
which upsets established proper distances. Merleau-Ponty
makes a similar argument in the chapter on "Dialogue and
the Perception of the Other" in The Prose of the World :
"If the other person is really another , at a certain stage
I must be surprized, disoriented" 99 (my emphasis) . In an
earlier work still, he emphasizes the discrepancy which
gives birth to our experience of the other in stating
that, "the body of the other. .
.
tears itself away from
being one of my phenomena, offers me the task of a true
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communication......100 what is crucial tQ ^^ ^
that we do not fundamentally recognize others in realizing
that they are human beings who are "the same" as we expect
them to be. It is through this sameness that the other
slides into the status of "one of my phenomena" and hence
ceases to be "other" for us. it is precisely in others'
difference (here I include their shocking concordance
with us as well as their more straightforward differences)
that we recognize them as "other" beings who like us
participate in being human. Emphasizing the importance
of difference (here in the straightforward sense) in
giving birth to a mode of coexistence that is distinctly
"there" in depth, Merleau-Ponty speculates that
[one] might even say that
what Heidegger lacks is... an
affirmation of the individual:
he does not mention that struggle
of consciousnesses and that opposi-
tion of freedoms without which
coexistence sinks into anonymity
and everyday banality. 101
With Hegel, Merleau-Ponty contends that the recognition
of self and other emerges simultaneously in the tension
between others who are different. 102
Being with different others pulls us out of anonymity
and hurls us into an intercorporeal world with depth and
distinction. And at the instant that I become aware of
an other perceiving being, so too, for the first time,
I become aware of myself. As I perceive the other,
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»[f]or the first time, the seeing that I am is for me
really visible; for the first time I appear to myself
completely turned inside out under my own eyes." 11"
^S I realize that I "fimiroii <-v.uuci x ngu e" in the perceptual field
of an other, I become distinct for myself as well.
The perception of self and other spring forth together.
Indeed, the notion of my. self only has meaning in
contrast with other selves from which I am distinct.
Hence (following Lacan's analysis of the "mirror
stage") 104 Merleau-Ponty completely leaves the terrain
of the cogito
,
which takes itself as the starting point
of all understanding, and asserts on the contrary that
the cogito emerges only through contact with others who
are different. Thus, though my body is such that it
prepares me to experience the other insofar as its own
self
-presence can only be in depth, its depth should not
be thought of as a "prior reality " upon which the rest
of our experience is based. The body as depth being is
only realized with different others: "The constitution
of others does not come after that of my body; others and
my body are born together from the original ecstasy" 105
- that which occurs when they are thrown together.
As we noted above, this original ecstasy which gives
birth to the self that senses itself, simultaneously gives
birth to both the distinction between self and world, and
the depth of the "there." However, at the same time that
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our experience of others inaugurates the difference which
releases us from "primordial generality," the presence of
their perceptual opening upon the world which we share
brings forth a clearing with a far more textured distinct
"visible" and an "invisible" of which we are far more
aware
- in short a clearing with a far greater depth -
than we could experience in absolute solitude (supposing
that the latter itself was possible). Indeed, the
presence of the perceiving other "confers on my objects
the new dimension of intersubjective being or, in other
words, of objectivity." 106
Merleau-Ponty's elaboration of this insight is
perhaps sharpest in an early section of The Visible.
and The Invisible, which presents us, I think, with
some of his most fascinating writing. Here he describes
the intercorporeal world through an analogy with the
world that springs forth in binocular vision. The visual
images which each eye alone is able to render, deliver us
to a relatively flat realm of "phantasms," lacking both
the distinct presence and the latency which emerges with
the depth world that appears as both eyes focus together.
In the latter instance the different images of each eye
synergistically combine to produce a world which is
"there" in a far more convincing manner. Similarly,
the different perceptions of others combine in communica-
tionxu to bring forth a world which is "there" far more
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profoundly (thinking here of the French "profond" which
also means "deep") than the "private world" presented to
a single self: "communication makes us witness to one
sole world, as the synergy of our eyes suspends them on
one unique thing. "108 ^ ^^ ^
phantasms could not compete with the thing [seen by both
eyes], so also now one could describe the private worlds
as divergence with respect to the world it.sMf "109
As two persons are present to each other in and through
the world that is before them, each of the "private
worlds" which appear in their respective perceptual
fields "is given to its incumbent as a variant of one
common world." 110 while each person becomes present to
this common world through the synergy among others, no
one possesses it completely, for each field is only a
"divergence.
"
The depth through which we come to witness a common
world does not homogenize our different perspectives any
more than the depth which emerges as we train both eyes
upon a thing demands that each eye have an identical
vision. Instead, in both cases, depth emerges as the
being of things which both makes possible divergent views
and is called forth as divergences are brought together
or "suspended" upon one thing. Depth is the dimension
in which differences join in a thing not to be squashed
and extinguished, but to communicate and give birth to
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a sense of the richness and wildness of the world which
far surpasses that which the differences are able to
present in isolation. Depth deepens most profoundly
not when two or more persons realize that they see the
same world in the same way, but in the tension which
arises as they recognize that they see the same world
differently. it is in the attempt to elaborate and
communicate these differences that my private world
must deepen in order to harbor that which belongs to
the things I see while not having been or perhaps not
even being present immediately before me. As I attempt
to recognize the otherness of the other's perceptions
of the world to which we both belong, my world attains
a texture and latency that it did not have before. I
realize that the world I am present to is much more than
I see, far more "there" than my singular vision attests
to.
However, if the monocular-binocular analogy is ex-
tremely revealing in certain respects, we must be careful
not to let it mislead us. The depth which emerges through
the synergy of our two eyes gives birth to a world which
is so convincing that we are almost never aware of our
single eyes as divergent visions. Yet this is not so
thoroughly the case with the intercorporeal world which
emerges among different others. Indeed, here there is a
ceaseless sense of discrepancy which gives birth to the
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world as such, but which is not subsumed so harmpjiio^
within it. Rather, the social world is that which
...envelops the individual,
simultaneously soliciting him
and menacing him... each conscious-
ness both finds and loses itselfin its relationship with other
consciousnesses.
. .the social is
not collecti ve consriousness butintersubjectivity, a living
relationship and tension among
individuals. 11
1
However, once again, this tension should not be thought
of in terms of differences each of which exist completely
in their pure self-same identity and henceforth partake
in the commerce of discussion. Our selves - our divergent
worlds
- are variants of this intersubjective world which
envelops us, and it is as variants that we are different.
We are with others as variants of an "anonymous visibili-
ty" which "inhabits us both"; as different positions in a
conversation of which we are not so much the constituting
agents, but rather beings borne along by this lively
being-in-tension with respect to which we are formed as
we attempt to specify our differences. When Merleau-Ponty
writes that my body and others are born together in an
"original ecstasy" he conceives of our being thrown into
the world itself as an intercorporeal structure :
The other's words, or mine in him,
do not limit themselves to vibrating
like chords the listener's machinery
of acquired significations.... Their
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flow must have the power of throwingme in turn toward a signification thatneither he nor I possessed before. "9
It is perhaps here, in rediscovering the depth of
the clearing which emerges in the intercorporeal world,
that we can most appreciate Merleau-Ponty
' s Husserl and
the meaning of his comment that "Husserl awakens a wild
world and mind." Merleau-Ponty 's encounter with Husserl
reveals a world in depth which is entirely obfuscated
by most western philosophies. it is depth which is born
as the self becomes distinct as it recognizes itself in
its intersection with an other. it is a depth clearing
which is far more "there" (both in terms of presence and
absence) than that which might exist in "isolation." My
dialoqical relation with a different other continually
confers upon the world a distinctness and specificity
which it would never have if I were a being completely
alone. (Non-dialogical relations have quite a different
effect, as we shall see.) As we stare at the sunrise
our conversation brings forth a world with more and more
texture: the greens near the horizon, the rays of light
flashing above the clouds which I had not seen before,
spring out of our dialogue and throw me into a world I
cannot quit. The agreements that are achieved among
different others combine in the world to multiply the
density, complexity and fertility of the figures which
appear before us, as well as our sense of reality. But
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oalso, the things the other sees there which I cannot
quite accomplish in my own vision, reveal the horizons,
the backsides of my own immediate perceptual field. My
field harbors an invisibility in its horizons which makes
it even more "there" than it immediately appears to me.
I am struck by the world's transcendence, its capacity t
outstrip and resist my attempts to grasp it. I am brought
before a depth world that is other, a depth that calls me
into a continual dialogue with the natural world as well
as the world of others.
At this point it is perhaps helpful to summarize and
clarify the understanding of the experience of depth that
has thus far been presented. We began with a discussion
of the birth of the perceptual field in the depth of the
figure-ground structure. Here the field is presented with
a latency, an indeterminacy - a depth which is essential
and cannot be overcome. This depth emerges as soon as
our senses open out upon the world and it is with us
until our perceptual contact with the world ceases.
Paradoxically however, Merleau-Ponty maintains that
the solipsist rendering of our perceptual field into
figure-ground is not sufficient to give birth to a
"world" proper. In fact, prior to "intersubjective
life" there is "neither individuation nor distinction"
in any "real" sense, no "fully objective things," no
"depth" in an important respect that is different yet
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related to that described above. This is as we have
seen, because we do not become "distinct selves" until
we become aware simultaneously of others as perceiving
beings and the fact that we "figure" in their perception.
It is this "distinguishing" through which the world
emerges from its submergence in an anonymity to become
"Etre profond"
- a real "there" with both particularity
and latency. Through this distinction the world "figures"
for me on the background of my body (and vice versa) and
as such appears as depth in the fullest sense. Prior
to this distinction particularity has not been released
from the merging of self and world and latency as such
is not experienceable since it lacks a referent. Thus
Merleau-Ponty seems to argue that while there are figures
and grounds prior to others, at this level we do not
experience the real distinction of what figures in our
field and hence we do not experience things as such.
If this is correct "Etre profond" is born when the
distinction and latency of our perception is "realized"
in the realm of intercorporeality
. Dialogical being
with others continually presents us with the unexpected
polyphony and mystery of the world.
However, let us not sound so optimistic. For
this intercorporeal world which brings forth depth
also menaces the depth of selves as it does so. We
are so often flattened, torn up, obfuscated in our
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lives with others. Yet this assertion ostensibly has
an odd ring within the philosophy we have just elaborated.
Have we not argued that the world is essentially "Etre
profond"? What does it mean to speak of "flattening"
in this context? I will address this question in two
parts, first indicating a couple of places where Merleau-
Ponty seems to indicate an awareness of the danger of
some sort of flattening, and second, by elaborating a
possible phenomenology of flattened being.
That depth itself appears at some level - as
yet unspecified - to have an aspect of contingency
is hinted at in a passage we have already quoted above
where Merleau-Ponty emphasizes the importance of different
others and recalls "that struggle of consciousnesses and
that opposition of freedoms without which coexistence
sinks into anonymity and everyday banality." 113 Were
the agonistic tensions and bizarre proximities of our
lives with others to begin to wither away in some sense,
the depth which is born in this realm would begin to
disappear as well. Coexistence would move away from
the distinction and latency which characterizes the
depth of the "there," towards "anonymity." If our
distinctive individualities were to be increasingly
normalized, rather than illuminating a world of depth,
our intercorporeal existence might increasingly present
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an anonymous flattened view of the world - a view
perpetuated in a continual exchange of flat agreement.
For Merleau-Ponty this is not simply an imagined
danger, but a menace which is steadily at work in
modernity's persistent attempt (in a variety of forms)
to flatten the wildness of Being with objectivist
understandings of humans and the world. These
conceptualizations reduce humans to a set of trans-
parent operations which eradicate the otherness in
others and ourselves and substitute it with a thorough
"intelligibility." Yet it is not simply a "misconception"
that Merleau-Ponty is concerned with, it is an erasure
of Being. Expressing this prospect, he writes that the
danger of increasingly
...set [ting] out to construct man and
history on the basis of a few abstract
indices (as a decadent psychoanalysis
and a decadent culturalism have done
in the United States) is that, "since
man really becomes the manipulandum
he takes himself to be, we enter into
a cultural regimen where there is
neither truth nor falsity concerning
man and history, into a sleep, or
a nightmare, from which there is no
awakening. 114
This is a strongly worded statement and it is
strange to read this philosopher of contingency speak
of what seems like the contingency of radical contingency
itself: a closed regimen "from which there is no awaken-
ing." Perhaps we have before us an exaggerated rhetoric
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designed to shock us into an awareness of a great danger.
Almost everywhere else Merleau-Ponty has argued that the
contingency which threatens us equally prevents the evil
in the present from attaining the status of absolute
finality. Whatever the case may be with regard to the
possibility of an "ultimate flattening" however, what
seems quite clear with respect to the quoted passage
is that Merleau-Ponty sees in modern objectivist
constructions of human being a certain flattening of
being which at least works towards a kind of closure
as it proceeds. By taking ourselves to be - and increas-
ingly becoming
- the "manipulandum" we increasingly close
ourselves to the polyphonous character of our being and
simultaneously close ourselves to the experience of
different others. in short, we become increasingly
severed from the depth of the clearing.
But what could this possibly mean? What might
Merleau-Ponty have in mind when he speaks of an anonymous
coexistence, a nightmare from which there is no awakening?
What could an experience of flat being be like? Merleau-
Ponty does not pursue this question riqorously with
respect to the passages above, so we can only formulate
what he might have said in light of what he writes in
other contexts and in light of his philosophy as we
have explored it thus far.
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The only place Merleau-Ponty attempts a phenomenology
of flat being is in his discussion of hallucinations in
the Phenomeno1 ogy of Perception. While the flatness we
are concerned with will obviously be different from the
individual hallucination in important ways, nevertheless
I think one can argue that objectifying and normalizing
theories and practices flatten being in several ways which
are hauntingly analogous to that of the hallucination.
What distinguishes the hallucinatory thing from
a real thing in the world, is that the former, unlike
the latter, is not a "depth being" (Etre profond). 115
While the thing in the world is present in a depth which
simultaneously prevents us from ever completely possessing
it and allows it to remain distinct, the hallucination
lacks a certain transcendence, and is "an artificial world
answering to the total intention of [the hallucinator's]
being." 116 This lack of depth has several important
manifestations. To begin with, while the real thing
is open to endless and inexhaustible exploration as our
senses move around its depth, and as we rend open our
current perceptions to more detailed examinations, in
contrast, "[the] hallucinatory thing is not. . .packed with
small perceptions which sustain its existence. It is
an implicit and inarticulate significance." 117 It lacks
the "consummate fullness" of the thing in the world which
presents itself with textures, details and other sides
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that are implicit in the horizons of my present percept
though not explicitly before me. m contrast to thi
fullness, which harbors the invisible that both calls
forth and unfolds through the temporal elaboration of
experience, the imaginary thing is "there" as complete
-
a pure correlate of our intentional being that "has
no depth and does not respond to our effort to vary our
points of view. -1" It ^ completely as it is presented
in the hallucination, not as a being with reserves.
Indeed, because its being is absolutely complete and
lacking horizons, it is "played out on a different stage
from that of the perceived world." 119 it is simply
there, superimposed upon the world, but not existing
within it. The hallucinator can find no paths to connect
the hallucination with the rest of his experience and that
of others
- it is wholly outside the intercorporeal realm.
Because of this the hallucination cannot be successfully
challenged by others. The hallucinator has an awareness
that the hallucination does not exist at all for others,
but that does not devalue it in the least:
the food refused by the victim
of hallucination is poisoned only
for him, but to this extent it
is poisoned irrefutably. The
hallucination is not a perception,
but has the value of reality , and
it alone counts for the victim.
The world has lost its expressive
force and the hallucinatory system
has usurped it. 120
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The hallucination is a "running wild" (1'affelement)
of the body's perceptual power to the extent that frag-
ments of the world are unrecognizably distorted, or in
even more extreme instances, the world is lost altogether.
The clearing no longer emerges "through dealings with
harsh, resistant and intractable world which has no
knowledge of us," but rather in the fabrication of an
isolated fictitious setting" 12 ! - a setting which, in
the complete flatness of its presence, is unsusceptible
to interrogation by the self or others, and hermetically
sealed from the expressive force of the world.
In what sense can the anonymity of objectified and
normalized coexistence be compared with the hallucination?
Clearly they are quite different insofar as the halluci-
nation is a private experience, while the anonymity to
which we refer is a collective phenomenon. Furthermore,
the flattening in which we are interested concerns the
perceptual realm - not a "different stage." In spite
of these differences however, I think the perceptual
field associated with objectifying and normalizing
practices acquires a flatness that is markedly similar
to the flat completeness of the hallucination. Clearly
we do not mean that the perceptual field loses the
depth of its figure-ground structure. However, as
our perception becomes increasingly normalized, this
structure becomes increasingly "frozen." The latency
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lses
of the perceptual world which once solicited our sen,
and provided ever-new perceptions of things, is more
and more locked out of the foreground. For example, for
many men, women may only "figure" in the perceptual world
according to normalized objectified indices of femininity
and sexuality. The rest of women's cacophonous being is
frozen in a background which, for all practical purposes
may be inaccessible. Similarly, as nature is reduced
to the status of "object," all those dimensions which
do not fit within this general figure are frozen out of
our experienced world. The multiplicity of selves and
the world is increasingly closed out by normalized
perceptions which intensify as they circulate among
people in institutions, discourses and practices.
We saw that central to Merleau-Ponty
' s understanding
of the depth which emerges in the perceptual field was
being as a "perpetual pregnancy." Yet it is precisely
this which withers as our figures freeze. What is at
the heart of the normalizing gaze is a denial of the
possibility of a background that might be surprising and
disruptive. This gaze parades in a flat completeness
that is parallel to that of a hallucination. As we
approach the world and others through this conceptual
and perceptual schema it becomes for us a being
increasingly lacking transcendence. Yet as we have
seen, transcendence is the essence of the world for
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Merleau-Ponty. Hence we become present to something
that less and less has the character of "world" in
the deepest sense, and more and more begins to acquire
qualities of the hallucination. Beings increasingly
appear as correlates of the subject - in this case
collective
- and in this mode of presence interrogative
relations which might upset this basic misperception
are less likely to arise.
Of course, Merleau-Ponty was not a theorist of "one-
dimensionality." As much as he was aware of the dangers
of flattening in which that which is other than and in
the background of the established visible is "locked out,"
nevertheless, what appears always does in fact appear
with a latency which though effectively locked out is
not nothing. Hence even as the world is flattened it
harbors the possibility - which can be reduced but
not extinguished - of resisting flattening modes of
perception. Furthermore, Merleau-Ponty understood
the world to be full of tensions and contradictions
which counteracted the leveling tendencies he saw at
work in modernity. Thus, while he viewed most western
philosophy since Descartes as operating within flattening
objectivistic assumptions, he was also well aware of
elements in Hegel, Kierkegaard, Marx, Nietzsche and
Freud which resisted this trend. 122 Similarly, within
the human sciences, while he believed that objectivist
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constructions were prevalent, he also saw movements within
these sciences which he thought contained the germ cells
of a radical reformulation. 1" Again
, while he „as^
aware of the violence and injustice of capitalism, it was
not for him a seamless reality: history thus far remains
open.
If we take such pains to illustrate the similarities
between the hallucination and operationalized coexistence,
it is to underscore that what is at stake in taking this
latter path, concerns important aspects of the depth of
the experienced world. If the "unwonted" is in Merleau-
Ponty's view essential to the depth of the clearing, it
is equally important to realize that the objectifying
norm takes aim at this very depth.
What emerges from Merleau-Ponty ' s discussion of Being
as depth and the possibilities of flattening, is, I think,
quite profound. Implicit in this discussion are the first
steps of a path out of modernity's nihilistic inability
to affirm any values. For the fact of the world's depth
- the depth through which things are "there" in the full
sense as visible and invisible with latency - far from
being devoid of value, implies a recognition and reaffir-
mation of the value of different others (who are willing
to make a similar affirmation) and more generally, the
otherness of the world. For the singular self or the
collective subject which denies all difference, the world
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is increasingly flattened and supplanted by a complete
depth-denying presence. The expression pf that
they appear in the openness of the clearing, demands an
affirmative valuation of otherness. This expression
implies transgression; but it is a transgression which
brings forth something into our field of perception with
a latency in which the temporal elaboration of experience
may bring forth previously transgressed elements. The
objectifying gaze brings forth no-thing and makes present
a frozen image beneath which the world - unrecognized -
held in a transgression that denies its own violence and
seeks to eternalize itself.
In pursuing the phenomenological project of
exploring the origin of the world's wondrous presence
to us, Merleau-Ponty discovers that "principle of an
ethics" which he adumbrates at the end of his prospectus
for the College de France. As an ethic of the world
as such, it provides us with an important step in
"revaluating values" and frees us of the nihilism
which necessarily accompanies objectivist understandings
of the world as simply and completely there (i.e., not
there at all)
.
Our bringing forth, listening to and
engaging with the depth of the world is, I believe the
fundamental value for Merleau-Ponty. Empty? Only for
those who, longing for "the complete," are oblivious
to the wild flowering fullness of the world which not
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only lies at the heart of his philosophy, but is too the
deep spring of his celebration - and the source of his
caution and sense of danger. However, the recognition of
different others which is so crucial to this engagement
is at this point quite vague. In the following chapter
we pursue some of the ethical and political implications
of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy in order to elaborate the
sense of this recognition in terms of our coexistence with
others
.
Ethics and Politics of np.pth
Introduction
A great deal of Merleau-Ponty's work directly
addresses ethical and political issues. However,
while he developed penetrating and lucid critiques
of some of the central ethical and political thoughts
and practices of our age, the affirmative directions of
his thought were left very far from being fully developed.
There are powerful and suggestive insights into these
questions in almost every text he wrote, but they call
for further thoughtful elaboration.
It is clear that Merleau-Ponty sought to develop
his theories of perception, expression and his ontology
in part, to provide us with fresh insights into how we
might live together as political and social beings in
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ways that minimize "terror" in both its explicit and
more insidious forms. it is no accident and of no small
importance, that in the prospectus of his work which he
prepared for his candidacy to the College de France, he
closes by noting that a successful elaboration of the
"wonder" of expression "would at the same time give us
the principle of an ethics. "124 Even ^ ^^ ^
saw published, a work on aesthetics and ontology that
might seem far removed from ethics and politics, is in
an important respect, an attempt to reawaken the "brute"
world of the painter as a first step in formulating an
alternative to the nightmare of "operational thinking"
and being which threatens us in modernity. 125
But what exactly is the nature of this nightmare and
what might be the alternative? In this chapter I maintain
that the power of illumination which Merleau-Ponty
'
s
writing lends to an exploration of these questions far
exceeds his explicit attempts to address them directly.
Hence, rather than limiting the present discussion to
the latter, I wish to develop the ethical and political
implications of the philosophy of depth elaborated in the
previous chapter, and to bring into focus and distinction
his more explicit ethical and political insights within
this context. Only in so doing does the richness and
depth of Merleau-Ponty 's work - as well as the necessity
of confronting it - become fully apparent.
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Some historians of ideas will probably say that
what follows is not a faithful remembrance of Merleau-
Ponty; that one should stick to a more literal reading.
But I do not wish - to use his own phrase - to condemn
Merleau-Ponty to the "museum." m what follows, I
take most seriously his view that art, philosophy and
politics thrive not in preserving the past by constructing
identical copies, but through "the duty to start over
again and to give the past, not survival which is the
hypocritical form of forgetfulness, but the efficacy
of renewal or * repetition,
' which is the noble form of
memory." 126 Here I do not wish to record so much as to
continue the philosophical effort which still lives and
breathes on each page - so long as we do not treat them
as artifacts to be dated and located in an entangled web
of dead relations. 127
In this chapter I attempt to draw out the ethical
implications of his understanding of the artist in order
to articulate a theory of the self and its relations
to the surrounding world. Next I consider some of the
social and political arrangements which Merleau-Ponty
believed fostered flattening and hence were untenable.
I then proceed to carefully explore the affirmation of
parliamentary democracy in an effort to gain ethical
and political understandings which extend beyond the
institution of parliament itself. Finally, I argue
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that an affirmation of the self as a work of art is
essential to shifting the function of politics away
from the imperative of ever-enhancing and legitimizing
reified systems of productivity, towards an affirmation
of diversity and dialogue that transcends "the existential
requirements of a particular political order." 128
What sort of lives and social practices would more
successfully recognize and affirm ourselves as different
as well as different others? The most superficial con-
clusion one might draw from the above insight is that
its realization calls for anarchical liberty: let
everyone be absolutely free to express all "difference."
Let each "become different" from one instant to the
next. Yet Merleau-Ponty is "not speaking in favor of
an anarchical liberty," 129 for it simply denies the
reality of - as well as the necessity of - confronting
the violence which springs forth in the interaction
between people who were not designed ahead of time to
spontaneously enter into harmonious relations. It
assumes that human society is naturally a "community
of reasonable minds," whereas, the task of both philoso-
phers and political theorists is to "explain the upsurge
of reason in a world that is not of its making and to
prepare the substructure of living experience without
which reason and liberty are emptied of their content
and wither away." 130 The anarchist solution to the
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problems of freedom and difference is simply to deny
that they really are genuine problems of coexistence.
Hence they assume that coexistence will be problem-free
-
or at least that problems will be reduced to a minimum -
if we just "let it be." Yet there is no reason to assume
that there would be much recognition of otherness at all
in a state of absolute anarchy. We do not have to assume
a Hobbesian "war of all against all" to be suspicious
of the naive teleology in a theory that posits such a
"natural" harmony. Furthermore what "difference" would
there be to recognize in such a state of absolute freedom?
As Merleau-Ponty has argued "[t]here is no freedom in
submission to each shiver of opinion." 131 Such an
existence would most likely cancel its efforts from
one moment to the next; it would be more productive
of nothing, than difference. The development of human
difference that shines forth as visible and demands
recognition, is not "natural," but the product of
careful elaboration of "styles" of individual and
social existence. " Liberty has to be made in a world
not predestined to it" 132 (my emphasis) . We might
say the same thing for the recognition of difference.
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Self as a Work of Art
Merleau-Ponty's self dwells in the depths of an
ambiguous world that "ceaselessly assails and beleaguers
subjectivity as waves wash round a wreck on the shore. "133
Yet if at times we come across some remarkable echoes of
Augustine in his conception of this existence where humans
so often are "not a strength but a weakness in the field
of being, »"4 his conception of nQW we might understand
and craft our lives is nevertheless very different from
Augustine's in some fundamental ways, when Merleau-Ponty
turns away from the objectified world of classical thought
and towards a fresh study of the embodied self, he finds
no "source of intrinsic truth," no "inner man." 135 Rather
he uncovers only a self inextricably intertwined with
the world. We find ourselves thrown into this world,
a society, a body with vulnerabilities and limits - all
of which to a great extent we neither chose nor can deny.
And there is no God to guide us, no nature in which we
find hints of a design or transparent purpose for which
to live. Merleau-Ponty discovers depth, but it harbors
not even the muffled voice of a self-present God. But
nor is this discovery that being is depth nihilistic
and empty. To be sure, we do not discover a completely
articulated theory of ethical values and practices
through the ontological exploration of depth. In fact,
the notion of a completed theory of ethics is antithetical
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to a philosophy of depth. Yet an understanding of the
depth of being offers us a general ethical direction ; it
motions us towards an appreciation of difference, dialogue
and style.
According to Merleau-Ponty
, we are faced with living
our lives and transforming our social world in ways which
articulate and meaningfully bring forth - and in doing
so partially create - these general values that he
finds rooted in our existence. And we must do so in
the turbulent intercourse between the self, others and
the world at large. We creatively bring forth meaning
and value in our lives in "actively being what we are
by chance," 136 in plunging into communication with this
historical world of nature and others which penetrates
us to the cores of our being, and in attempting to explore
and pursue the limits and possibilities it presents as
well as strategies for change that enhance freedom and
the depth of being.
In an effort to further elaborate Merleau-Ponty '
s
understanding of this task and the ethical understanding
of our lives that emerges from his philosophy, I wish to
explore and develop a notion of the self as a work of art,
drawing extensively from Merleau-Ponty 's comments on style
and the nature of artistic expression.
As our body makes its way in the world it "gathers
itself together and begins to see, to understand, and
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to signify.-.137 Through our particular inscription ^
the social and natural world, through our successes and
failures in our attempts to pick a path with our "fragile
body, in a language which has already done so much
speaking, and in a reeling history , "138 we each develop
a "style" of existence, sedimented habitual ways of
perceiving, moving in and conceiving of the world. it
is this style through which the body interacts with the
world, unifies itself - a unity that is never total, not
that of an entity subsumed under a law, and one which is
continually disrupted by new experiences which challenge
it in different ways - and through which others come to
recognize and communicate with us. So fundamental is the
notion of style to Merleau-Ponty
' s understanding of the
body that he argues that the latter should be compared
to a "work of art"139 not because our life ±s the purely
self-conscious elaboration of an absolute subject, but
because each movement and perception is born in the wake
of and colored by the style (primarily preconscious) which
animates it. Viewed from without, each manifestation of
one's style reveals "a way of inhabiting the world, of
handling it... in short, the emblem of a certain relation-
ship to being." 140 We witness this style in another's
movement and perhaps even more profoundly in the paths
left by the painter's brush as she attempts to capture,
express, accentuate and bring to explicit life on a
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canvass, the world that appears in her stylizing
perception. From within, style does not appear as
such, but orients and gives form to the world one
perceives in arranging "certain gaps or fissures,
figures and ground, a top and a bottom, a norm and
a deviation in the inaccessible plenum of things." 141
Style submits things to a "coherent deformation"
which bends the diverse elements of the world towards
a particular signification and establishes in one's
movement and perception - one's work - a certain "system
of equivalences," priorities and privileged elements
with respect to which the world tends to spring forth
before us. Our style should not be thought of primarily
as something that is governed by our consciousness but
rather as that which emerges at the point of contact
between the self and the world through the practices
and relationships into which the self enters. in turn,
the world always appears to us through this style. Style
at the most basic level is "preconceptual generality -
generality of the axis ' which is preobjective and creates
the reality of the world." 142 Intellectual and artistic
consciousness - as we shall see in more detail below -
emerges out of this preconceptual style, but the form is
not merely epiphenomenal , for as it attempts to bring the
preconceptual realm into explicit existence it actively
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transform this real*. Hence they exist in a relationship
of circularity.
Though most of Merleau-Ponty
' s discussions of style
are concerned primarily with art and artists, and he makes
little effort to develop an ethic around the notion of
the self as a work of art, it seems to me that when his
few comments on the embodied self as art are thought in
relation to his more extensive discussions of the artist
and style, some interesting insights into the self and
ethics emerge. If as he suggests, we should think of the
embodied self as a work of art, the sense of this thought
is not merely to indicate that the living essence of the
body is style, for this understanding has prescriptive
dimensions as well. As embodied selves with sedimented
ways of being in the world we are all essentially analo-
gous to works of art, but we do not all live artistically.
It is only when one makes this understanding of the self
as art an integral part of one's existence, when one
becomes self-conscious of one's being as art, and begins
to fashion a life and an ethic around this understanding,
that the self starts to become a work of art in the
fullest of senses. The artistic self seeks not so much
to discover the truth of itself (since "truth" is always
revealed through one's style) - but to create meaning
and elaborate a style of existence in the nexus between
the self, others and the natural world.
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Yet the artistic self is by no means fcQ be ^^
of an absolute prescriptionless freedom for whom all ways
of being are equally valid. Merleau-Ponty
< s discussions
of the artist are not merely descriptive, but contain what
is for him an exemplary notion of the artist and artistic
being more generally. They can be read as thoughts about
an exemplary style in light of which or by way of which
we might develop our various different styles. This
notion of artistic being does not give us meaning in
and of itself, but presents us with broad contours around
which meaning ought to be artistically brought forth.
Let us turn to his discussion of the artist in order to
gain a better understanding of those elaborations of style
with which Merleau-Ponty finds difficulty and those he
holds in high esteem.
Thrown into the depths of the world, "caught up
in the push and shove of being," borne by a time which
relentlessly carries me forth, "I take up a field and
invent myself." 143 But what is the nature of this
inventing? As his criticisms of Sartre illustrate,
it is not that of an originary subject - conceived as
nothingness - who chooses his existence with an absolute
freedom. Rather this "inventing" is that of a self
whose being is bound up with numerous accidents - bodily,
familial, historical - from which one cannot entirely
escape; accidents which color our opening upon the
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world. »m every life, one's birth and one's past
define categories or basic dimensions which do not
impose any particular act but which can be found in
all.'.144 The task Qf ^ art . st ^ ^ ^ f ^ ^
work of art is not to abstractly project these givens
in order to attain some Archimedian point of view that
would witness existence without "distortion" and secure
a pure freedom. Such a rebellion is an existential
impossibility and it is self-defeating insofar as it
denies the particularities of oneself and one's situation
through which the self opens out upon the world. in
contrast, the artist gathers the multiple aspects of
his or her being together in an attempt to explore and
express the possibilities they open. Of course, this
"gathering" itself is not some abstract force, but
always already motivated and infused with that which
it gathers. However, these "givens" do not impose upon
one's existence a determined static meaning but rather,
like the "accidents in Cezanne's life" - his nervous
weaknesses, his troubled eyes - which "present [ed]
themselves to him as what he had to live leaving how
to live it undetermined, 1,145 are the ambiguous text
one has to decipher and elaborate from. Cezanne's fits
and depressions, his "schizoid temperament," instead of
existing only as something which wrenched him and those
around him, additionally acquires, when it speaks through
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his painting, a "metaphysical sense a mv ^r- j *-ax ^nse... way of seeing the
world reduced to the totality of frozen appearances, with
all expressive values suspended. Thus the illness ceases
to be an absurd fact and becomes a general possibility
of human existence." 146 pP7arin„
,
^ .t.e Cezan e's temperament might have
incapacitated him, he might have said nothing. But his
artistic expression of the unusual world that appeared
before his eyes, brought forth and integrated this aspect
into his existence in a way that enabled the peculiarities
of his life to contribute to and shape a voice that
continues to significantly and interestingly engage the
historical world in which it is situated. Similarly
Merleau-Ponty writes:
The reason that Leonardo [da Vinci]
is something more than one of the
innumerable victims of an unhappy
childhood is not that he has one
foot in the great beyond but that
he succeeded in making a means
of interpreting the world out of
everything he lived.
. .he fashioned
his corporeal or life situation
into a language. 147
As embodied selves our existence of necessity must
confront the accidents which we find and which find us.
But as we noted, the artistic self does not allow itself
to be determined by these factors, either through obedi-
ence and simple acceptance or by a course of abstract
denial. Instead it carefully elaborates a style in a
continual effort at expression which "always goes beyond
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what_it_transform by brlnaingj^nt^o^^
changes its meaning"^ (my empnasis)
> Jn & aU
expression, even the most basic perception, has this
latter quality. However, what distinguishes the most
exemplary of artistic selves is that they actively pursue
this creative effort in a manner that recognizes the
nature of artistic expression itself - the tensions and
inextricable relations between tradition and change, past,
present and future, one's accidental characteristics and
what one longs to be, self and other - and seeks to create
within the tensions inherent to it. 149
Let us consider more carefully the nature of this
artistic "elaboration of style." in the relationship
between the self and its perceptual style we discover
a circularity that is fundamental to artistic work.
Merleau-Ponty's discussions of style often accent the
preconceptual level: "perception already stylizes," 150
it fashions the world that appears before us, and it
is out of and with reference to this world, that our
intellectual and artistic consciousness develops. Yet
is this to imply that all of the real work of existence
is already accomplished at the preconceptual level?
Are the artist's thoughts and works merely epiphenomena?
This would be strange given that his discussions seem
to indicate a conscious dimension of art that is important
in its own right and not identical to perceptual style.
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It is clear that in his discussions of the "primacy
of perception," Merleau-Ponty does not seek to "renounce
reflection. "151 As we illustrated in an earlier section,
intellectual consciousness plays an extremely important
role in his philosophy. indeed, "without reflection
life would probably dissipate into ignorance of itself
or in chaos. "152 ^ ^^ ^^ ^ ^^.^
should be "ignorant of its origins," for its activity is
always vaguely portended - though not determined - in the
perceptual field that emerges in the intersection of the
body and the world. "That convergence of visible and
intellectual vectors of the painting towards the same
signification, X, is already sketched out in the painter's
perception. "153 However, the sketches one finds at the
perceptual level harbor only broad motives - beginnings
with indeterminate outcomes - for artistic and intellec-
tual expression. The stuff of artistic utterance does
not lie completed in the perceptual realm, needing only
to be recovered like a pearl at the bottom of a deep
murky sea, but rather must be submitted to yet another
stylization - another giving of form - in order to be
brought forth. This supplemental stylization at the
level of artistic expression is "the x coherent
deformation' by which [the artist] concentrates the
still scattered meaning of his perception and makes
it exist expressly. "I 54 Hence the artist interacts
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relatively with the world that appears before her,
motivated by it, thrown by it, but also at the same
time bending, orienting and deforming it in the attempt
to bring it into explicit existence for herself and
others. in order for the body to get a perceptual
grip on the world, it must participate in the "coherent
deformation- of the plenitude of its surroundings, the
establishment of depth, priorities, figures and grounds.
In order to get a grasp on this perceptual world itself
- "making it manageable for the artist and accessible
to others" 155
- she must submit it to a similar transfig-
uration. Thus as the artist attempts to bring forth the
perceptual realm, she also re-creates it and contributes
to its making: "there is no pure absolutely unexpressed
life in man; the unreflected [irreflechi] comes into
existence for us only through reflection." 156 The
artist develops within this ceaseless circularity.
As long as the artist remains an artist, for her,
her work is always in progress and never completed. For
each expression of our encounter with the world brings
forth out of the depths which one can never overcome,
only a fragment of what there was to be said. To be
sure, this is often an important fragment that really
"says something," but the silences which surround it,
the transgressed elements driven from or subordinated
within the work, speak of a tremendous plenitude of
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otherness which calls her to go farther, to continue
the dialogue between the self and the world that is the
life of the artist. indeed, the world that faces the
artist every day is not so much that which has already
been caught in a phrase or on a canvass, but rather a
"questioning" that wells out of the depths which exceed
what she has thus far been able to give voice to. 157
This view of the artist stands in marked contrast
to some other conceptions of the artist's project.
In Renaissance and Classical theories of painting for
example, the artist's task is excessively reduced to
rendering the world present through the exact tech-
niques of perspective. Within this framework, things
are submitted to a strict ordering which denies "the
solicitation of the others" that are assigned to the
background and, falsifies depth in totally silencing
the invisible of the visible - "the demands of a horizon
and its claim to exist." 158 Here reality is presented
"in the mode of the completed or of eternity," and rather
than "wild being," we experience a crystallized, tamed
world where "everything takes on an air of propriety and
discretion." 159 Yet this in itself is not the foremost
problem, for Merleau-Ponty does not deny that perspective
can sometimes be utilized to contribute to expressing
aspects of the world we experience (though he clearly
thinks painters like Cezanne and Van Gogh are far more
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interesting and successful in portraying the lived world)
.
His main concern is that many theoreticians of perspective
not only froze the world in the picture, but attempted to
freeze the historical world outside as well, by claiming
that their "method" was the absolute truth of painting:
a truth which monopolizes the historical foreground and
assigns all "others" to the obscurity of the background
in a way which is strikingly in accord with its artistic
activity. Perhaps it is the thoroughness of the denial
of contingency on the canvass that motivates the attempt
to conclude history? At any rate, Merleau-Ponty
'
s
explicit statements are more cautious: "These techniques
were false only insofar as they pretended to bring an
end to painting's quest and history, to found once and
for all an exact and infallible art of painting." 160
In contrast, Merleau-Ponty 's artist is never
finished. And this openness to the future is inherent-
ly an openness to the past and others as well. in an
effort to creatively express that which presents itself
so elusively and in such a scattered fashion, that
which has been washed over and hidden by the currents
of history, in order to engage that question which shines
out of the things in the world before her, the artist is
thrown into a dialogue with the voices of the past and
others
.
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In searching "beneath the imposed order of
humanity"^! in an attenpt ^ ^
of appearances which is the cradle of things, "162
Cezanne no more abstractly denies tradition than he
does his troubled eyes or his emotional makeup. Rather
he engages this tradition, listening to and examining
its insights into the world in an effort to bend it
towards new shapes and meanings which better expres*
his existence and the appearance of the world to h:
an existence and appearance which themselves are formed
in part in the crucible of this uneasy conversation
with tradition. When Cezanne is in Paris, Merleau-Ponty
writes, he visits the Louvre every day. But he goes
there as an artist, "in the joy of dialogue" and not
with a "spurious reverence." 1" He appropriates aspects
of geometry, geography, impressionism, not in order to
mimic, but to bring forth a world which goes far beyond
what any of these traditions recognized. The exemplary
artist engages the efforts of those who have come before
her as well as her contemporaries not as dead facts, but
as voices and actions which live on in various ways in
one's own work and from which one cannot detach oneself;
voices and actions which throw the self towards certain
significations and away from others, voices with which
we must wrestle since we are nothing but particular
divergences in this historical conversation and struggle
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with others. To actively develop a style and actively
partake in the historical dialogue requires a thorough
knowledge of the history which penetrates us through
and through. The past opens us to some possibilities
for expression, but also subjugates us and blinds
to others, and it is in our dialogue with it that
attempt to further elaborate these possibilities but
also to explore that which is denied. it is a quest
i
of discerning which limits enhance the depth of ourselve
and the world and which act primarily to flatten.
Our existence as art is in large part the practice
of bringing into mutual confrontation what has been
said and done by others and the particular density of
our own being - our difference - which has grown out of
this social milieu yet exceeds it. "What we have to say"
- both literally, in terms of immediate expression and
figuratively, thinking of the self as a work of art as
a statement - "is only the excess of what we live over
what has already been said." 164 it is the things and
dimensions of things we are or can see and embrace
which seem important, empowering and have not been
seen, embraced or existed in the foreground before,
that our style attempts to express. It is by rearranging
the elements of our milieu, changing figures and grounds,
placing things in "compositions which change their
meaning," utilizing aspects of our history in new
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ways, abandoning others, juxtaposing terms that have
been kept apart, highlighting tensions and contradicti,
that have been concealed, that we transfigure the past so
that it may come to better express elements of our being -
Pleasures, powers, relationships, thoughts, desires - it
has previously not given expression to. Hence the artist
"continues while going beyond, conserves while destroying,
interprets through deviation." 165
Yet the transfiguring of this engagement between
the self and its milieu is not so one-sided, for the
self is transfigured in the process as well. in its
attempt to "say something" it comes to understand and
create itself to an important extent in light of the
other voices with which it is in dialogue. it expresses
itself and takes form in a language - the terms of a
tradition of understandings and practices - which it
shares with others and the past, and in so doing not
only bends this language towards new significations,
but also is "coherently deformed" itself. These words
which others speak and have spoken - their works, their
strivings, their gestures - "do not limit themselves
to vibrating like chords the listeners' machinery of
acquired signification Their flow must have the
power of throwing me in turn towards a signification
that neither [they] nor I possessed before." 166 Indeed,
the artist is so intertwined in and so constituted by
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this dialogue that he is never able to say precisely
"what comes from him and what comes from things, what
the new work adds to the old ones, or what it has taken
from others and what is its own." 167
The history in which the artist
participates.
. .is the perpetual
conversation woven together by
all speech, all valid works and
actions, each, according to itsplace and circumstance, contesting
and confirming the other, each
one re-creating all the others. 168
We elaborate ourselves - our style - in this agonistic
interaction and hence this is where the exemplary artist
explicitly seeks to dwell: in continual dialogue with
that which precedes and surrounds her.
Yet let us be clear about this conversation which
is the artist's being. The artist's interest, concern
and engagement with others is not that of an "I'm O.K.
you're O.K." "validation" of everything surrounding her.
No, it is much wilder, tougher, fiestier than this. The
artist listens carefully to, learns from and is thrown
by other voices. Indeed, Merleau-Ponty writes of an
"obligation to understand situations other than my own
and to create a path between my life and that of others,
that is, to express myself." 169 But her response is that
of creative engagement, not flattery and polite accord.
The exemplary artist pulls together the world that appears
before her, the works and statements of others, in an
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effort to add a voice to the world which sheds important
insights hitherto unrecognized upon the world in which
we live
-
its depth and mystery, its pleasures, tragedies,
subjugations, sufferings. when successful, her work
"throws our image of the world out of focus, distends
it, draws it towards fuller meaning. -"0 In tnis
Merleau-Ponty writes that the artistic existence Moulds
others much more often than follows them," is concerned
"with others become such that he is able to live with
them." 171 a society and politics constituted around an
ethic of the self as a work of art would see selves in
relations of what we might call "respectful tension" with
one another: respectful in recognition that "the other
whom I respect gets his life from me as I get my life
from him"; 172 tension, because this life we impart to
one another emerges when we intermingle, "each from the
depths of its difference." 173
Merleau-Ponty is not elaborating a philosophy of
difference simply for the sake of difference, detached
from any sense of identity. We do not become different
blindly and "for the hell of it." Nor do we coherently
deform others' views of the world just to do so. As
we saw above, we contest and confirm one another in
this dialogue that draws us beyond ourselves. Where
we are in accord with what has been or is being said
by others, we affirm and elaborate this. Where we
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sense what is missing or subjugated in their statement
we encroach upon them in an effort to push them toward
what appears to us to be a fuller expression of things.
There is a profound sense of going beyond in his work,
but it is not a going beyond grounded only in itself.
Rather it is the depth of being that calls for - among
other things
- transfiguration. it is the inexhaustible
reserve of otherness which continually calls the self
towards further engagement and equally it is the hidden
undersides and unexpected dangers that relentlessly haunt
our lives which demand that we "go farther," that our
efforts continue. The interaction of difference and the
effort to formulate new ways of thinking and acting are
vital to Merleau-Ponty's understanding of being as depth
and artistic existence, but they are intimately bound
up with
- though not subordinated to - an affirmation of
the importance of identity. As we have seen, it is only
through carefully elaborating a style that one is able
to engage the world in a most significant way. Without
style, that is in part the product of conscious elabora-
tion, our being scatters from one moment to the next.
One could say that pure difference is as flattening
and productive of nothing as is pure identity. Merleau-
Ponty offers us a philosophy that affirms identity and
difference in their promiscuity , both necessary to bring
forth and engage the depth of the world.
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His own philosophy was itself an effort well aware
of its unfinished nature, of the agonistic tensions
between the philosopher and his milieu - but this goes
equally for the interaction among others more generally -
he writes "we have yet to learn the proper uses of this
encroachment.-.174 It seems to ffle ^ & ^ ^
this direction lies in this discussion of the self as a
work of art. As we have seen, the self as a work of art
in the exemplary sense is self-conscious of its being
as art and is engaged in an artistic relationship with
itself. Yet this is not an artistic relation guided only
by an abstract notion of "creativity,., but rather one
whose creativity is guided by Merleau-Ponty
' s insight
into the essentiality of different others and the natural
world to both the self and artistic activity.
It seems to me that some important things follow
from this understanding. Perhaps most basic, is that
this artistic relation to the self - far different from
the self-absorption so popular these days - is always
significantly involved with others and the world. As
Merleau-Ponty emphasizes at the end of the Phenomenol ogY
of Perception
,
people are but "a network of relationships,
and these alone matter" to them. 175 To craft the self
is to attempt to fashion, interrelate and separate, and
to some extent choose these relationships in a way that
creates the self into a provocative statement, not (to
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import Foucault's analytics) a normalized being that 1
according to the truths thrust upon it by objectifying
and subjectifying discourses and practices. But given
her understanding of the self, the self as a work of art
must always exceed simply having an artistic relation to
the self and encompass an artistic relation to the world
as well. indeed, the former without the latter can be
little more than contentless form - an utterly false
consciousness that denies its own embodiment.
Another insight that follows from this intertwining
of self, other and art, is that alongside the care for
the self that characterizes the artistic existence is a
°are f°r the other and the natural world. This is not
one last attempt to salvage a thought that reduces the
value of the other to its being- for-the-self - in this
case the artistic self which needs different others
for its own development. Such a conceptual collapse
is entirely at odds with Merleau-Ponty
' s philosophy of
depth. Rather the care of which we speak - like the
depth which ultimately calls for it - emerges from the
interworld, at the interstice of our differences, in the
fact that we "get our lives from each other." it seems
to me that while everything does not reduce itself to
this fact, it is no exaggeration to say that everything
is infused with it, and that a significant dimension of
artistic existence consists in exploring and seeking to
ives
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enhance the vitality of others *-u •Y and this mterworld between
us
.
As we have seen, this entails a respect for others
but Merleau-Ponty understands this in terms of an often
encroaching engagement, not a "spurious reverence."
If Merleau-Ponty speaks of "moulding others," he does
not have in mind the constitution of a simple universal
identity or sameness. Such a world of others is for the
artist a desert offering little sustenance for creative
life. The artist attempts to draw people towards certain
ways of perceiving, thinking and being, and away from
others; the politician seeks to mould a national identity.
But central to these ways and identities which Merleau-
Ponty ' S artist
- Merleau-Ponty as an artist - pushes
towards and embraces is a sense of an artistic approach
to existence, a recognition of the importance of different
others and a reawakening of our mysterious bodily inter-
twining with the world - in other words, identities that
bring forth and enhance the textures and depth of our
activity in the world. Yet let us not underplay the
importance of identity here, for this ethic only has
historical meaning to the extent that, as a society,
we affirm and nurture it in our thoughts and practices.
It seems to me that society's identification with this
ethic is as crucial to bringing forth the depth of
the world and the artist's existence as are the
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differences that depth and art entail. it is this
very broad understanding of identity and difference
towards which the artist attempts to move people.
(Again, the point is not to reduce the artistic project
to this effort, but to say nevertheless that this is
an essential aspect of the self as a work of art as
conceived of here.)
However, what is involved of course is far more
than simply the realm of understanding. Our lives are
directly shaped on the everyday level by the institutions
and practices in which we partake. Hence the effort
towards a more artistic approach to life demands a very
significant transformation of those institutions which
objectify and subjectify around notions of truth which
do far more to enhance an often senseless endless,
disproportionately distributed productivity and control,
than to enhance the quality of our lives. These
priorities and practices as well as the larger systemic
political and economic institutions with which they
are interconnected must be changed if the self as a
work of art is ever to be more than an idea in the
minds of a few philosophers. "The problem is to find
institutions which implant this practice of freedom
in our customs." 176
With this problem in mind, I turn to Merleau-Ponty 's
political writings in order to sketch the beginnings of a
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"Pontics of aepth... First t win explore Merleau.ponty , s
analysis flattening social and political institutions
then explore his analysis of democratic politics in Ught
of the discussion thus far.
Politics of n^pi-h
We have already seen that Merleau-Ponty rejects
anarchism, arguing that it is an untenable solution
because it simply ignores the problems presented by
the human condition. An equally superficial understanding
of the politics of depth would be that capitalism, as
that system which supposedly thrives on the competitive
struggle between "free" individuals is the perfect social
mechanism for bringing forth the difference and depth
of others and the world. However Merleau-Ponty rejects
capitalism as well, for under the guise of liberty,
law and individuality, he sees hierarchy, exploitation,
unemployment, war and imperialism. Far from simply
leading to a mutual recognition of both the common
humanity and the otherness of others, people approach
one another within the "free market" as objects reduced
to use-value. Class divisions do not give birth to an
affirmation of others' differences, but rather to an
obliteration of most people's difference, as society
takes forms that fashion people around the goal of
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enhancing an endless productivity which is dispropor.
tionately allocated and even more disproportionately
controlled, m contrast to the Western humanis» of
capitalist societies, which he believed to be an
insidious ideological denial of capitalists violence,
he advocated a
..humanism in *w- rri ~ -j nn which
acknowledges in every man a powermore precious than his productive
capacity, not in virtue of being
an organism endowed with such and
such a talent, but as a being capable
?? self-determination and situatinghimself 1n thP world. (My emphasis
except for "humanism in extension.")
Even in his later political writing, in which he became
very critical of communist revolutionary theory and
practice, he still emphasized that "by this we in no
way imply acceptance of the eternal laws of the capitalist
order or any respect for this order." 178
If not anarchy, if not capitalism, then what? For
a number of years, particularly in the middle and late
1940 's, Merleau-Ponty thought that Marxism offered not
only the best critique of bourgeois society, but a tenable
alternative direction as well. He believed with Marx
that there was a possibility that the proletariat was
a "class of men who, because they are expropriated in
present society from their country, their labor, and their
very life, are capable of recognizing one another aside
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from all differences ^r , and thus founding humanity . « 179
However, though it is clear uthat he supported socialist
production really governed hvY g by the workers and a breakdown
of established hierarchies, the modes of organization
that might best bring this about are not carefully
elaborated. While he attempted to develop a reading
of events within the Soviet Union which was sensitive
to the way the contingency of history made itself felt
in a single revolutionary country surrounded by hostile
bourgeois states, he did not see an embodiment of the
Marxian dream in Soviet reality. it did not appear to
him that they were moving toward a greater recognition
of humans by humans or proletarian power, "0 though he
left open the question of their future development.
Hence his affirmation of Marxism does not take us
as far as we would like towards a more developed under-
standing of the political and ethical implications of
his philosophical formulations. Nevertheless it is
worthwhile to emphasize that his Marxism was not one
that was aimed at eliminating differences, but rather
one that sought to create a world where a greater
recognition of differences might exist. When he writes
of the proletariat's "recognizing one another aside
from all differences," this is of course, not at all to
say that we should do away with all of our differences.
Capitalism on the whole levels people's differences
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(furthermore, the differences it creates are largely
flattening)
,
and paradoxically this might facilitate
a recognition of commonality. Yet it is not ^
recognition of a common homogeneous identity shared
by an, but rather a recognition of a human
capacity for
"self-determination" and the ability of
each to "situate himself in the world" which Merleau-Ponty
values. m short, to "recognize one another aside from
all differences" is to recognize that other's differences
are not gua difference, the negation of their humanity -
understood in terms of objectified norms or productive
capacity
- but rather expressions of humanity as the
capacity for a degree of self-determination. This is
at the same time a denial of differences whose very
being is closed to otherness and based on a fundamental
obliteration of other people's difference (e.g., a
capitalist who recognizes workers primarily as commodities
that enhance his wealth)
. if the exploitation of the
proletariat was to foster a common recognition, it was
most fundamentally a recognition that no one is free
alone; that a greater level of self-determination is
intrinsically intertwined with a greater mutual affirma-
tion of others' freedom, their otherness. On Marxism
and difference Merleau-Ponty writes:
To be a Marxist is not to renounce
all differences , to give up one's
identity as a Frenchman, a native
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of Tours or Paris, or to for*™
.into the worlQ^tiHiritis indeed to becol^aTt^f theuniversal, but without ceasingto be what we are.
. . . This willonly happen through... a meetingat the crossroads of actual
proletarians, such as they existin the different countries, andnot through an ascetic inter-
nationalism wherein each of them
for being a Msrvicf ™
However, Merleau-Ponty
' s belief that Marxism might
lead to a greater recognition of the capacity for self-
determination and difference did not last long. As he
became aware in the early 19 50's of the Soviet camps, the
persistence of extreme hierarchy, authoritarianism in the
workplace and the persistent unwillingness of the Soviet
communist party to allow a real opposition, his comments
on the Soviet Union acquired an increasingly critical
tone. His changing evaluation of the U.S.S.R. culminated
in a reassessment and rejection of what he argued were
some of the theoretical foundations of Marxism as well.
Merleau-Ponty 's critique of Marxism focused on the
manner in which the latter squashed the space within
which a significant opposition could exist. He argued
that both its understanding of the relation between
the proletariat and the party, and its understanding
of the historical significance of this relation, led
it to deny the importance and legitimacy of any dialogical
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recognition of others who externally ^
_
indeed, to view aU external opposition as a threat to the
development of truth in history that must he eliminated.
Merleau-Ponty maintains that at the center of
Marxist theory is the idea that the proietariat is the
universal class which alone reali^ ^alizes the universality
and seif-consciousness that philosophers have previously
only imagined. The proletariat is to transcend all
particularity, and Marx argued that with its development
history has "finally put world-historical, empirically
universal individuals in place of local ones. "182
Finally history has produced the universal subject.
Marx and Lenin were of course well aware that this
universal subject is only a "limit case," that in
fact the proletariat is divided in a multiplicity of
factions, differing levels of development and various
stages of self
-consciousness,
"it is because of this
that there is a need for a Party which clarifies the
proletariat to itself, for a party of iron, as Lenin
* 18 3said." m attempting to express the historical
meaning of the proletariat, the party is to take the
lead. However, it is never to get more than "one step
ahead," for the proletarians "bring the seal of truth to
the politics of the Party" 184 and the party must maintain
itself in a dialectical tension in which it "establishes
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itself as the expression of the working class by making
itself accepted by the working class. "185
Yet Merleau-Ponty argues that this tension is doomed
to collapse into dictatorship largely due to Marxisms
conceptualization of the proletariat. For Marxism as we
have noted, the proletariat is the universal in history.
Yet it is not a complete realization of its universality
but rather a universality-in-development which is in a
continual process of self-criticism and self-transcendence
(^taufhto)
. Merleau-Ponty maintains that Marxism
"concentrates all the negativity and all the meaning of
history^in an existing historical formation, the working
class.'.186 m so doingf in conceiving Qf a class ^
is totally self-critical, it lays the conceptual ground
for denying the legitimacy of all those who do not speak
and act as true representatives of this exclusively
genuine negativity. As universal negativity, the
working class "would no longer need to be contested
from the outside. "187 Indeed, from this standpoint
"all that is other is an enemy
,
nlBB merely an attempt
to thwart the true universal. This, of course, leads
to the exclusion of not only those who make no claim to
speak exclusively for the working class, but also those
members of the working class who understand their present
conditions and desirable alternatives differently than
those in the Party who "truly" comprehend the "real"
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universality of this class. By conceiving of the
working class as "universal in its truth" (even if
it is not entirely self-conscious of its universality,
Marxism leaves no space for the articulation of a
multiplicity of divergent perspectives, interests and
strategies within the working class - differences which
it admits do in fact exist and differences which might
require endless tensions and mediations. Rather,
"universality" paves the way for a reduction of this
Multiplicity to its singular truth at any given moment
and since this reduction is not accomplished
"naturally"
within the working class itself (history does not give
birth to a revolutionary proletariat in the optimistic
fashion predicted by early Marx and early Lukacs)
, it
is brought about and "clarified" by a "party of iron."
Through the elimination of certain tendencies and the
accentuation of others the proletariat is led by the
party towards its true unified meaning, while there
is supposed to be a continual dialectical interchange
between the party and the proletariat, Marxism's
conception of the latter is so singular that it cannot
tolerate the plurality of negativities which is the
very essence of dialogue, and hence it abolishes the
very space for the dialogical exchange that is to be
the life blood and maximum guarantee of the revolution's
legitimacy. This leads to a very truncated dialectic -
303
or more accurately, a dialectic that is terminated in the
party which represents the genuine negative and has no
need for - nor can tolerah^ . .te
- an opposition. The negative
is driven out of existence as the party, in gaining power
becomes a positive entity which resists all criticism.
Perhaps at least at the theoretical level, what
lies at the heart of Merleau-Ponty
' s changed evaluation
of certain important aspects of Marxism is the difference
between his interpretation and what he finally believed to
be the Marxist interpretation of the passage we discussed
above on the proletariat "recognizing one another aside
from all differences and thus founding humanity." For
Merleau-Ponty, this meant recognizing the capacity of each
to situate him or herself in the world; to not simply be
a thing determined by the world, but, as a depth being,
to transcend determinations, to proliferate the power of
the negative in one's being in the world. The recognition
that Merleau-Ponty had in mind, was not one that flattened
the depth and negativities of each into a universal nega-
tivity, but rather one that sought to affirm multiple loci
of negativity and to build a shared social and political
movement through "a meeting at the crossroads" which would
articulate common interests that might enhance rather
than erode the possibilities for different expressions
of being. Such a notion was certainly not aimed at
eliminating contestation. For some time he thought
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this idea was Marxist, but his disillusion^ with the
historical develops of communism and the theoretical
reassessment this led to, eventually brought nim to a
very different conclusion. Inplicit in his^
is a critique of the Marxist understanding of "recognition
aside from all differences" ao u«-s„xr as being part of a theoretical
framework that concentrated negativity into a class -
and the party that represented it - while simultaneously
denying multiplicitous expressions of its existence,
in conceiving of recognition aside^rom all differences,
Marxism fails to establish the importance of difference
' at
the center of its understanding. instead, at the center
were flattened notions of the proletariat, negativity and
the party
- all of which worked towards the obliteration
of contestation among different others, and indeed, toward
the perception of "other as enemy." Rather than a theory
which sought a greater affirmation of depth, Merleau-Ponty
found significant elements of Marxism to be conducive to a
situation where "the open depths cln^ themse.l vp," 189 (my
emphasis)
.
A thorough evaluation of this criticism of Marxism
would involve a theoretical and historical endeavor
that far exceeds the scope of the work at hand. I wish
to digress briefly in a partial defense of Merleau-Ponty '
s
position only in order to show in the sketchiest of
ways that its value remains, in spite of some of the
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criticisms that have been levied against it. Merleau-
Ponty has been criticized for placing the proletariat-
party relation at the center of Marxism in a manner
that misses the centrality of many contemporary Western
neo-Marxist attempts to shift the primary level of
analysis and focal point of change from state power to
the structuration of everyday life. 190 It is said that
his criticism of Marxism misses what is most important
about Marxism. it seems to me that as a defense of a
certain type of Marxism interpreted along these lines,
there is some truth to these criticisms. However,
Merleau-Ponty's critique of Marxism was not intended
as a wholesale dismissal of Marxism, and certainly it
was not meant as a rejection of all Marxism of everyday
life. Rather it was a critique of the philosophical and
political theoretical foundations of the historically most
important communist developments of the twentieth century
- foundations which Merleau-Ponty thought were rooted in
Marx himself. At this level, I think, Adventure* of th.
Dialectic remains a work of extremely valuable insight.
Furthermore, insofar as any viable movement for change
must confront the political realm as part of its strategy
- we cannot wish this away - it is an important work for
Marxism of everyday life as well. it has been argued that
Adventures of the Dialectic is insufficiently historical;
that the collapse Merleau- Ponty describes which occurs
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when "the open depths close themselves," cannot be
accounted for at such an abstract level. "1 clearly
a textured historical account would have greatly enhanced
his project. But again, this criticism largely misses
the point. His discussion is not so much an effort to
show what "caused" the particular development of twentieth
century communism, but more an attempt to illustrate the
theoretical underpinnings and problems that contributed
to this development. Of course, the dialectic between
texts and interpretations is very important to this task
and this dialectic must be explored in an historical
context in order to better show why certain readings of
texts flourish and others do not at particular historical
moments
- a greater historical dimension would have
profoundly enriched Merleau-Ponty
' s work. Yet Merleau-
Ponty argues quite persuasively that there is much in
the texts of Marx, Lukacs and Lenin that contributed
to the theoretical and practical developments of Soviet
communism. At this level his work remains very important
- even if an historical account of other circumstances
contributing to these developments would have made it
more so.
But where does all of this leave us concerning our
inquiry into the ethical and political understandings
and practices which might lead to a greater mutual
recognition of depth and difference? Merleau-Ponty'
s
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germ cell formulation of an ali-Pm.fternative in Adventure
of the Dialectic only goes so far ini yu b t in answering thi
question. Indeed, reflecting o„ ua
,
riectm on his proposal he writes:
"This is not *a solution' and we know it full well. "192
He is right about this, yet if considered closely and
in conjunction with other elements of his philosophy
it gestures further than many have realized - including,
perhaps, Merleau-Ponty himself.
Of utmost importance in his defense against the
closure he saw occurring in the communist left was
his support of democratic parliamentary action, "for
Parliament is the only known institution that guarantees
a minimum of opposition and truth.""3 (This argument
applies specifically to parliament, which is based on
proportional representation with a minimal percentage of
the overall vote enabling a party to gain representation.
It applies to a far lesser extent - if at all - to our
congressional system in which the "winner takes all."
This latter system operates to exclude minority voices
and to minimize their chances for efficacious expression.
It severely limits - one might say cripples, judging
from this country - political discourse.) in contrast
to a communist politics which focused all negation into
a single class - ultimately comprehended as a unity -
Merleau-Ponty argued that:
We expect progress only from
a conscious action which will
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confront itself with the judg-ment of an opposition. LikeWeber's heroic liberalism, itlets even what contests it enterits universe, and is justifiedin its own eyes only when it
understands its opposition.
*
94
The foundation of any attempt to improve things must be
a recognition that no one has a monopoly on the negative
-
that there are different others with whom we must be
dialogically and critically engaged. Parliament goes
further in holding open this recognition than a "vanguard
party." (m the most extreme situations (e.g., "starva-
tion") Merleau-Ponty admits that the latter may be the
best available alternative.)
Yet Merleau-Ponty 's support of parliament is not
naively optimistic nor does it overlook the ambiguities
and undersides of parliamentary action. in an essay
published nearly a decade earlier, Merleau-Ponty
underscored the problems with this institution. "[W]e
know full well the means which the powerful have at
their disposal - precisely under the aegis of freedom
of the press - to stir up currents of opinion and
manifestations which paralyze a parliamentary majority" -
assuming it is possible to obtain one. 195 He also warned
against
...comparing political democracy, in
which everyone is called upon to give
his opinion on abstract problems and,
above all, where a whole series of
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influences... come between the voterand legislative decisions, with actualworkers control on a daily ?evel?^
a
Furthermore, he was extremely skeptical about the possi-
bility that an institution dominated by the hegemonic
economic interests could bring about significant change
At the time of this early essay, Merleau-Ponty maintained
that a greater hope lay in a leadership like the one
described by Lenin which "presupposes a dialogue and
exchange" with the people. «7 As we have seerif he
later argued that this position is based on conceptions
which work to undermine its best intentions. However,
in affirming the importance of parliament he did not
forget nor retract his earlier criticisms of this
institution but rather urged the non-communist left
to work against these practices which undermined its
proper functioning. He thought that they could do a
lot to counter "parliamentary mystification," which
consists in avoiding real problems or posing them too
late or in ways which obfuscate far more than clarify.
Beyond the problems which result from abuses which might
be remedied however, Merleau-Ponty further recognized
"the limitations of parliamentary and democratic action
...which result from the institution." 198 Though he
does not specify these limitations in Adventures of
the Dialectic, he was probably in part referring to
his earlier observations on the inherent distance
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parliamentary government puts between people and many
of the decisions which affect their lives, the fact
that it is not a "daily. forn of political activity ^
»ost people, the way in which it opens the possibility
of eloquent deceit. These problems might be reduced
but never eliminated as long as national parliamentary
politics plays a significant role in political life.
Nevertheless, he urges us to accept them as the necessary
underside of a political institution that on the whole
holds open the possibility for both effective governing
by large groups of people according to a majority and
recognizing different others, ambiguity and contestation
more than any other of which we know - an institution that
might contribute to maintaining and enhancing the depth of
our coexistence.
Hence we see the manner in which parliament is, for
Merleau-Ponty, what we might call an "apparatus" which,
with its arrangements that help guarantee the possibility
of contestation from day to day, might help keep history
open and demand a greater recognition among people. As
an "apparatus," parliament holds open a door through which
people can enter and partake in the heated dialogical
struggles over real life which actively contribute to our
present and future and, as contestational acts, literally
hold the social world open.
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All this is of the utmost importance. Yet I suggest
that in addition to parliament being an "apparatus" that
helps ensure the possibility of agonistic activity whi
contributes to bringing forth the world in depth, Merl
Ponty's thought provides us with another way in which to
understand the institution of parliament that is quite
valuable as well; and it opens up fertile possibilities
for thinking about human institutions and practices
more generally. Here we must go beyond his explicit
discussions of parliament in order to bring to the
foreground some of the theoretical insights which
probably shaped his view of it - and at any rate
shape the argument that follows.
At about the same time Merleau-Ponty was writing
Adventures of the DialPctir
, he also taught a course on
"Institution in Personal and Public History" at College
de France, in which he explored the notion of "institu-
tion" as a way of avoiding the problems which arise
when philosophies of consciousness take the constituting
subject and its object, the world, as the starting point
of their investigations. Of particular interest to our
current discussion of parliament is his conception of
"institution." Most succinctly:
What we understand by the concept
of institution are those events
in experience which endow it with
durable dimensions in relation
to which a whole series of other
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or a history
- or again thoseevents which sediment in me ameaning, not just as survivals
or residues, but as the invitationto a sequel, the necessity of afuture. 199 (My emphasis.)
This passage receives little further illumination
that is helpful for us in the sketchy summary published
in Themes from the Lectures. However if we recall his
discussion of dimensionality in The Visihi.^^
invisible, it begins to acquire a greater degree of
conceptual texture. There he argued that all things
are not simply objects within a perceptual field,
but also dimensions
: meaning that they participate
in clearing the perceptual field - in opening us to
it and therefore presenting it - as well as appearing
in the clearing. Yet while there is a dimensionality
to all facts, not all facts are equally dimensional.
Some facts or events may participate in the opening of
the perceptual field only for an instant and then be
swallowed up by a movement of the world in which they
become utterly insignificant. Other things however,
things referred to above as institutions and elsewhere
as emblems - acquire such a significance that the
disclosure of Being may take place through them
throughout an entire lifetime. Merleau-Ponty
describes this situation in a working note where
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he pursues an ontological reinterpretation of Freud
in which he argues that "any entity [e.g., feces] can
be accentuated as an emblem of Being. "200 In other
words this entity or event can become
"representative
of Being"
- a being that is fixated in such a way that
the "investment of the openness to Being.
.
.henceforth
takes place ^romhtti^Er^.^oi In such a manner
an event, say of intense subordination or abandonment
by someone deeply loved, may disclose all of our
experiences henceforth in the light, or "atmosphere,"
of an inferiority complex or an inability to love. 202
In these instances the investment of the openness
of Being in a thing is understood by Merleau-Ponty in
a negative manner as a fixed opening which closes us to
the multiplicity of the world by collapsing experience
towards a single dimension which ceaselessly reactivates
itself. Similarly in the case of social institutions
such as racism, sexism, authoritarian structures of power,
sexual norms, etc., our field of perception is fixed in
ways which flatten it. The depth of beings withers in
these cases and the dialogue between the self and the
world is narrowly constituted or effectively terminated.
Yet not all emblems are predominantly negative. Indeed,
Merleau-Ponty elaborates his notion of the institution
in a far more neutral manner. Institutions are events
which establish relatively stable dimensions that create
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ems
an atmosphere and illumination within which future event
acquire meaning. Some institutions can fortify and en-
hance the depth and openness of the world by being embl
which illuminate precisely these ontological qualities.
It is in this sense of "institution" - in addition to
the sense of apparatus discussed above - that parliament
acquires a particular meaning within the context of
Merleau-Ponty's philosophy.
Parliament, as a central institution in society
which is connected to all citizens, can be an emblem
which
- at least in the best cases, elaborated more
fully below
- endows experience with a meaning which
is not so much that of a particular being-event, but
rather more that of the depth, openness and resistance
of the world; an emblem which is representative of
Being not in collapsing it to a single dimension but
by investing the clearing in a way that accentuates
our experience of the most fundamental character of
the clearing itself: depth. Said again in a slightly
different way, parliament is an institution which
in part discloses the openness and resistance of the
"there" or "worldness" in the senses we discussed in
the last chapter. In this case the meaning which attains
durability and stability as it becomes a dimension is
precisely that of the depth of people and the world,
the incredible texturedness and transcendence of things
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fully present. As an emblem
, parliament contributes
to a disclosure of the world that generates a consensus
around this ontological character of the world and the
importance of recognizing different others. This is no
small deed, for Merleau-Ponty <s worK - as well as that
of others
-
has shown us the multiplicity of institutions
ethics, thoughts and practices whose effect is to flatten
radically reduce and close being. In the best instances/
the institution of parliament can be an emblem which
counters these institutions of closure.
insofar as the institution of parliament insists
that we confront oppositions, it affirms that the world
is depth and always exceeds the definitions given it by
one person or group. This is not to say that the best
understandings and courses of action are necessarily
compromises between several different positions, that
is, moderate positions. m many instances this is not
the case and at any rate there is no reason to assume it
is. And parliament makes no such assumption; it simply
asserts that because the world transcends us, each must
maintain an openness to the world and different others
who may reveal dimensions of the world that we might
never have seen nor imagined alone. In asserting the
transcendence of the world and demanding that we face
oppositions, parliament also signifies the fundamental
error of those who refuse dialogue in favor of a world
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that is completely contained within the hounds of the
self's perceptions and conceptions. m addition to
revealing that the being of the world is^
~~t also reveals the circularly related importance of
the interaction among different others in bringing forth
the depth and fullness of the world into the clearing.
It is through this interaction that we are continually
confronted with aspects of the world, events, and
proposals which remind us and enhance our awareness
of the surplus of being that escapes our knowing.
It is through these relations that some aspects of
things are enhanced, multiplied, given greater texture,
while others are crossed out and still others held in
uncertain tensions
- all of this rending and rendering
the world "there" in an open fullness which is quite
antithetical to the frozen figures of objectifying
normalizing practices.
Of course, none of this is unproblematic. We might
view all genuine contestation, primarily as a feature
of "transitional ages" to be transcended for the most
part when we reach a consensus on all important issues
in some unspecified future. 203 m this case, rather
than revealing the depth of the world, parliamentary
contestation would merely reveal the deficiencies of
our age. Or, we might understand parliament only in
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pragmatic terms as the best overall means of arriving
at reasonable legislation to guide a nation.
Merleau-Ponty obviously rejects the former posit
for reasons that should be clear from the first chapter.
While he is sympathetic to the pragmatic argument, it i
not exhaustive of his position, in which parliament i
important as an institution emblematic of depth as well.
Of course, the extent to which it is emblematic of depth
depends, in part, upon the interpretations it receives.
Hence the argument we are presenting is not simply a
description of things, but part of an effort to bolster
an interpretation which enhances the extent to which
parliament really is emblematic of openness and depth.
In this sense the interpretation positively contributes
to the realization of what it describes.
However, if the understanding of parliament-as-emblem
is to move distinctly beyond being a mystification and
legitimization of the present, if it is to contribute
to the deepening and opening of the world, it is necessary
that it not only accentuate certain hopeful dimensions
of our present, but that it alert us to circumstances
in our world which threaten its further realization as
well. If parliament is to function as an institution
of depth in a manner that goes beyond mere reification
and abstraction, then it must also be operative and
meaningful as an apparatus, and this depends not simply
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upon parliament, but upon other social historical factors
as well. If parliament is to be an authentic emblem of
depth, it must be an institution that i*^ facilitates
the expression of multiple voices. To the extent that
it claims to do this while doing something quite differ-
ent, it in part becomes a bad myth and takes its place
in a regime of "truth" and power that is linked more to
subjugation than freedom. Parliament cannot live up to
its ideal of ensuring the possibility of fair contestatio
as long as it is situated within a society where wealth
and many forms of power are extremely inequitably
distributed and yet play a very important role in what
issues are addressed, the limits of debate, who speaks
and who does not, who has access to certain information
and who does not, the way the mass media covers issues
that help generate opinions, etc. it cannot live up
to its ideal of being a meaningful forum as long as the
executive branch controls major foreign policy issues
behind its back; as long as most of the really important
economic decisions which affect hundreds of millions of
lives in far-reaching ways are made behind the closed
doors of multi-national corporation boardrooms. It
ceases to be meaningful when, as Lowi has described,
decision-making becomes entirely fragmented inside
"iron triangles" made up of people on congressional
committees, bureaucrats and powerful interest groups
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ses
with little concern fnr ~o the consequences of their actions
beyond their narrowly calculated balance sheet. it cea
to be meaningful when
- as with the U.S. "winner take all
system of elections
- minority voices are utterly shut
out of congress. it ceases to be meaningful when - for
all these reasons and many more - most people stop voting
and far fewer still are actively engaged in political
activity. m our current state of mass disaffection and
political disempowerment in the U.S., it is not clear how
much an emblem of depth parliament really is or can be.
But the parliamentary emblem is not non-existent,
nor is it simply ideological. it also already functions
as a lever of criticism and bolsters demands for change
towards a better world. The existing democratic ethos
should not be underestimated. it stands as an ideal
worthy of support, one that involves far reaching
reforms and major transformations in important areas
of our society. The realization of parliamentary
ideals goes hand in hand with other changes that open
our social world to participation by and empowerment
of people over events which shape their lives; so too
it involves creating greater space for different voices
and ways of being to develop - as an emblem, parliament
enhances the durability of the depth which emerges in
this process.
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in one of his last directly political essays
Merleau-Ponty alerts us to another issue concerning
parliament which serves as an important caveat to the
discussion thus far. In reflecting on parliamentary
politics in France in the late 1950's, his criticism
concerns not so much a lack of openness, but the lack
of anything much at all. He writes sarcastically:
But what do checks and balances
mean when there is no longer any
action to check and balance?.,
today it is necessary, in continu-ing the criticism, to reorganizepower. Many stupid things are
said against "personal power" or
•strong power": it is a genuine
strength and personality whichthose in power during the Fourth
Republic lacked. 205
It seems to me that this passage provides us with
both a political and an ontological clarification that
is extremely important. While the world as depth is open
to different renderings, it does not equal - it cannot
be reduced to
- "openness." Openness is not what is
"there," rather what is "there" has a depth and is open.
Like checks and balances without any action, openness
alone is nothing. it is simply a recent form of that
persistent dream harbored in Western metaphysics of
being present - open - to the world everywhere and all
at once. It is the latest form of nihilism. Furthermore,
the effort to define the world as openness alone is yet
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another
.tte.pt to posit a world totally open to Qur
attests to transfigure ana possess it: totally without
resistanoe. If Merleau-Ponty has taught us anything,
it is that on the contrary, we always open onto the
«orld through the speoificity, difference and limits
of our historical bodily being, and likewise that
others and things are "there" in a specificity which
in addition to being open, resists - is not open to -
many renderings, and demands that we encounter them.
Our openness to difference is not enhanced through
annihilating the specificity and difference of our own
embodiment in order to simply "be open to difference."
Rather it is by cultivating ourselves in a dialogue with
the world and others that acknowledges and affirms the
specificity, particularity and difference of our own
being that we open towards other. Our openness to the
polyphony and cacophony of the world is enhanced as we
become something "th^re" with distinction - a distinction
which both invites and is capable of participating in,
a profoundly dialogical existence with other distinct
beings.
Hence parliament is not simply an emblem of open-
ness, but of the depth of the world through which things
are both there and r>pPn yet it can be this only to
the extent that actions, initiatives and programs are
developed through this forum - to the extent that
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something is there. To the evtPnf 4.n x e t that no programs
could be formulated in this arena, it would signify
™ore a lack of any =oMO„ world than a world of depth
Merleau-Ponty had in mind a vigorous politics, one which
would strive in a powerful way to lead towards greater
freedom and justice. The new "heroic liberalise he
advocated in his later works was not a variation of
the self-effacing, fence-sitting-by-nature, hear-all-
sides-in-absence-of-any-position liberalism that we are
all too familiar with. Rather it was to be an "initiative
which gathers support.
.. organizes its own pedagogy, and
demonstrates as it develops. "205 It was fcQ ^
shape the political world according to a vision of the
common good while remaining in agonistic tension and
dialogue with those who contest this vision. Both
there and open, it was to hear other voices - even be
"thrown" by them. But its openness was to facilitate
its development as a dynamic "living political power," 206
forcefully shaping itself and the political world in
dialogue, rather than using openness and dialogue as
an excuse not to be present with distinction (more often
than not, forfeiting power to hegemonic elements and
structural tendencies of the status guo) . Both to be
an emblem of depth and to be an apparatus not only
for ensuring the possibility of contestation, but also
for creating social, economic and political conditions
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more conducive to the bsinn „<=cn e g of and creative interaction
among different others, it is necessary that parliament
actually draw enough differences together to generate
action. contestation is an extremely important part
of Merleau-Ponty's understanding of parliament, but its
importance stems from its place within the context of
his philosophy of depth being. Contestation for the saxe
of contestation alone, could destroy mutual recognition,
communication and, in stifling all initiatives, could
bring about the failure of parliament as an emblem of
depth and its failure as an institution capable of
generating a politics of freedom. Contestation is an
important element in bringing forth the social world
that affirms depth, but the latter is the ultimate value
for Merleau-Ponty and it is not reducible to contestation
alone.
Merleau-Ponty thought that for a short period of time
the Mendez-France government was able to approximate some
of these ideas. However, he realized that the effort to
bring about a significant and sustained improvement in our
political culture would involve much more than politics
alone. it would require important changes throughout
society. "The problem is to find institutions which
implant this practice of freedom into our customs." 207
Clearly he was thinking here of institutions in their
capacity to elicit and organize certain dialogical
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forms of activity, and in their emblematic aspect as
well, though he does net specify what sorts of institu-
tions might enhance the freedom of which he speaks.
Almost everything in Merleau-Ponty's philosophy ges-
tures towards changes in the institutions and practices
of everyday life which would enhance people's capacity to
effectively shape their existences, widespread worker's
control of production is clearly indicated. 208 Though he
dees not develop a theory that emphasizes the importance
of local and regional control of major dimensions of
economic, social and political life, such decentralization
seems essential to "implanting the practice of freedom."
Colossal institutions inhibit active participation because
their sheer scale makes one's efforts seem overwhelmingly
insignificant. Vet our current local institutions are
often too irrelevant to solicit significant popular
involvement. Significantly empowered local democratic
institutions would likely go a long way towards con-
fronting this problem.
Yet institutions alone are insufficient. If we led
into this section on the politics of depth by stressing
the importance of developing institutions that would
enhance the possibilities of the artistic ethos, it is
equally important in closing to stress the circularity
of this relationship. The politics of depth requires that
those inhabiting parliament - and democratic institutions
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-re generally - guide themselves ±n^ Qf ^
ethos. That is, decisions should he aimed at creating the
preconditions and space for human heings to creatively and
analogically shape their existences. In absence of this
ethos, democratic politics easily becomes a more insidious
pretext for a flattening politics.
We do not need to imagine the latter, for it shadows
much of our contemporary world. We are driven in moder-
nity by an ethos that identifies the "better life" with
an endlessly increasing productivity. Growth, calculated
in material terms, is seen as the solution for nearly
everything. Yet, as we learn from Foucault, endlessly
increasing productivity demands that more and more of
the self be drawn into the productive apparatus - that
the goal of productivity proliferate throughout more and
more of the social world - and even if this can be done
in ways that are not as normalizing per unit of output
as those methods currently hegemonic, the pressures to
increase will demand further absorption of the self,
further normalization and an eclipse of the space
necessary to lead a creative existence. As long as
we are governed by this god, it is very difficult to
conceive of a flourishing politics of depth, even in
a democratic (broadly conceived) society. Hence it
is clear that we must tame the growth imperative and
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»ove in the direction of a relatively steady state of
economics
.
Yet this transformation requires a new ethos which
both opposes mindless growth and provides an alternative
sense of what is valuable. i believe the self as a work
of art is precisely such an ethos and that Merleau-Ponty
had this ethos in mind when he wrote of » a h^anisJL_in
extension, which acknowledges in every man a power more
precious than his productive capacity... a being capable
of self-determination and of situating himself in the
world." 209 as we develop and inhabit democratic institu-
tions we ought to make decisions in light of this ethos,
for it beacons us towards an affirmation of difference
and dialogue that is most appropriate to the world as
depth. Just as democratic institutions are a precondition
for the widespread proliferation of the artistic ethos,
a lively and open democratic politics requires the sense
of openness and distinction contained in the artistic
ethos, for without it debate flattens to the question
of productivity - and the depth of being flattens in the
productive apparatus. Instead of open forums we will
continue to have forums that are narrowly constituted
forums at war with that which does not fit - forums that
will be in great danger if their discourse exceeds that
required by the goal of productivity.
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Together, the democratic ethcs and the self as a „ork
f art set the stage for a grand human style, one which
embraces indivisibly all the order and all the disorder
f the world." 210
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
Possibi l it-jps and Dangegg
Whoever does not want to fear, lethim probe his inmost self, do not
vourJ?^
11 th\surfa^; go down intoy urself; reach into the farthest
corner of your heart. Examine itthen with care: see there, whether
a poisoned vein of wasting love
of the world still does not pulse
whether you are not moved by some'physical desires, and are not cauqhtin some law of the senses; whetheryou are never elated with emptyboasting, never depressed by some
vain anxiety: then only can youdare to announce that you are pure
and crystal clear, when you have
sifted everything in the deepest
recesses of your inner being. 1
I have argued that Augustine's turn towards an
inward seeking hermeneutical deep self should be situated
in the context of his understanding of the Roman Pagan
self. Inhabiting the center of a conceited ontology
the pagan self, in Augustine's view, was an imperialist,
driven at every level to flatten others and the world
to their being-for-the-self. In so doing the space for
that which was not the self collapsed in a conflagration
kindled and kept ablaze by the flaming gaze of vanity.
By directing the self towards its depths in confession
Augustine sought to deflate this vanity and reinflate
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exist free of the self as unique significations Qf ^
Vet it is too simple to view the confessing-self
and the self of ontological conceit as two types which
Augustine sees merely in external opposition, while this
latter dimension is extremely important and indicates what
is at stake for Augustine, we must not lose sight of the
fact
- Augustine did not lose sight of the fact - that
the struggle between the two selves is also one which is
continually waged within the Christian self. indeed the
confessing-self is in large degree defined^ its inward
struggle with its "other." The confessing-self is not so
much defined by Truth and Goodness in and of themselves,
but by the way in which one struggles on the side of these
qualities to overcome the conceit, evil, impurity within.
For Augustine, our fallen bodies and souls contain an
endless multiplicity of lusts which harbor ontological
conceits that continually threaten to collapse the space
in which others can appear in their glory as truly other
- as God signifying. On earth, this struggle that is
confession can never end.
This is of no small importance, for this active
struggle defines the qualitative aspect of depth.
Perhaps we should call the confessing-self a being
of deepening in order to draw attention to depth as
activity - in order to draw attention to the effects
330
s we
of depth which we must consider more carefully a
attempt to think about Augustine in the context of
Foucault's work.
For Augustine of course, the self that turns its
gaze inward strives to discover, examine and decipher
itself in light of God's truths, weeding out flattening
conceits, purifying itself - in short
,
molding ^
movements of its soul to God's will. As we have seen,
the confessing-self relentlessly unifies itself around
this task and God's truths. Augustine's faith in God
and scripture is unflinching and hence questions about
the Christian morality to which one conforms never arise.
To erase conceit is to discover God within and become
receptive to the unique voices with which surrounding
beings cry out: "He made us." To convert to an exis-
tence that siqnifies God and to see in all things His
Word, is not to sacrifice one's being or the being
of things to God, but to actively affirm that which
imparts being to all things. And this affirmation of
the transcendental signified does not, in Augustine's
view, entail a flattening or levelling of selves or
things, for God's light on earth is polyphonous, each
being manifesting it in a different way. Of course,
living according to God's light entails that the soul
adhere to his injunctions and prohibitions, but these
pull us precisely away from a flattened world and toward
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a truer experience. It is creation as . multiplicitous
celebration of Hi*. In God's light| the effects of
confession can appear only as beneficial.
However, in an age where Christian metaphysics (and
metaphysics in general) is losing its privileged position
as the universal Truth - in an age where for many, God
is dead, Augustine's confessing-self now appears in a
different light. The effects of confession as a mode
of being must open themselves to questions that were
concealed as long as being itself was thought to be
designed by God.
For those who reject metaphysics, there is a
distinctly monological quality to the confessing-self
.
Augustine's polyphony becomes, for Nietzsche, monotony.
In an important sense, from a post-metaphysical perspec-
tive there is only one significant voice in Augustine's
relentless self-examination, and when he writes, "Help
me so that I may see the truth about myself," his wish
is ultimately to hear one voice in that cacophonous
interior he calls the "great deep." From this vantage
point, the quest for depth is a quest to rout out the
last traces of other voices in his experience of the
world, to surround them and penetrate them through
and through to their deepest depths until they cease
to speak, until they cease to be, until "you are pure
and crystal clear." Of course this purity was an
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unattainable endpoint on earth (Augustine died
.-cryi,
constantly and deeply" as he read penance, but as the
confessing-self deepened, it approached ever closer
to monological being: a being no longer distracted by
Pleasures, desires, thoughts or sensations which did
not harbor the voice of the one True God.
This Nietzschean reading of early Christianity
overstates the extent of the latter's reduction and
elimination of other-ne^e: T +- nner ss. it underplays (for strategic
reasons I am not concerned with at the moment) the
space which Christianity opens for appreciating others
as diverse expressions of God. Nevertheless, it contains
an important insight that survives its own exaggeration.
The space for being which is created by Christianity is
- regardless of its merits relative to decadent Rome -
thoroughly constituted by the one True Voice, and this
voice seems in many respects both wrong and narrowly
defined, in light of post-metaphysical perspectives.
If there are many manifestations of the voice of
Augustine's God, they all fall within a tightly
limited range, characterized by harmonious concord
and the unchallengeability of Christian morality and
scripture. Discord indicates error and error is to be
eradicated. In this sense it seems to me that there
is a great deal of truth in the claim that Augustine's
mode of subjectivity is largely monological. Augustine's
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confessinq-self dprinhov^g it ec p ers, re-members and unifies itself
according to God's truth in an effort to extirpate ail
voices that might be discordant with His voice, within
the self God's voice meets the voice of the other as it
confronts impure desires and pleasures. But that this
meeting bears little resemblance to dialogue is indicated
by the "nothing" to which all that is not in al in agreement
with God is assigned. The confessing-self is more
accurately characterized as a site of inner confrontation
than one of inner conversation (albeit often discordant)
,
for the encounter in depth between God's light and that
which is_not, is marked by the aim of absolute hegemony
of God's voice. Within the multiple manifestations of
God's light, there is a dialogue in which the various
dimensions of God co-mingle to give birth to deeper
truth. Yet with respect to that which lies beyond His
Word, there is only a monological polemic - a ceaseless
attempt to silence the Other, and no possibility of a
dialogue in which God is illuminated in the critical
light of his Other. The absurd ring to this last
statement is indicative of the depth of its truth.
At the heart of the confessing-self one can discern
an ontological conceit of a different kind than the one
Augustine so perceptively criticized. In this conceit,
human selves are not the implicit ground of Being, rather
God is the ground that establishes and secures the Truth,
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Good and Being of all beings. Yet we are the highest
elements of his creation and He made us capable of experi-
encing and knowing Truth and Goodness to a very high
degree
-
even if there is an incredible extent to which
-ch of Truth renins concealed and must be continually
deciphered. indeed, God has made us beings such that
we harbor His truth *ithi^ and He is enough
for our fate so that we can find truth and save ourselves
if we truly will to do so. "Return within yourself,"
Augustine writes, "m the inward man dwells truth."
insofar as we should "obey the voice of unchangeable
truth speaking silently within the soul"2 one perhaps
can detect a certain humility, but it is a humility
based upon a conceited ontology that maintains there
is such a voice within us to obey. And it is precisely
the centrality of this voice and this obedience that
gives birth to the monological character of the
confessing-self. in short the humility of obedience
wells out of a conceited ontology and returns to
conceit when it repudiates even the possibility of
that which is utterly other than His voice within
(in the sense that the latter, no matter how demanding,
is "nothingness")
.
Augustine's confessing-self is an ambiguous
phenomena. For he argues quite convincingly that what
I have identified as its specific conceit and monologue
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-
its relentless inward journey - provides
. space
for appreciating others and things that was rapidly
disappearing for the pagan self in late antiquity
Within what Foucault calls the modern episteme however
the conceit which lingers on from two thousand years
of Christianity is implicated in a rapidly narrowing
closure. Foucault makes the case that we are still
thoroughly attached to the belief in a Truth which can
be discovered and obeyed. yet with the recession of God
from our world, man himself becomes the uncertain ground
°f this truth
- uncertain for he inhabits a world, drained
of its telos, which continually threatens to cut him off
from truth. Driven by both his desire for truth and the
centrality of his uncertainty, man in modernity endlessly
seeks to objectify and normalize the social and natural
world around him - to make the other the Same. (At a
more concrete level, this is driven by socio-economic
and political imperatives for profit and productivity.)
One could argue that there is a sense in which
modernity unites two ontological conceits which bear
an interesting resemblance to those that emerge from
our discussion of Augustine's work - both the belief
in a largely discoverable universal truth and the belief
that man is the ground of the truth of things. This
combination - and the fact that "man" cannot in fact
discover a truth that is able to sustain claims to
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universality for very long - provides the
the "norm,., with a mutability that allows it to
shift as it is employed in various power strategies.
(Sex
- that which must be carefully regulated,
psychoanalytically deciphered and that which must
be freed
- in advertisements all across the nation.)
Put somewhat differently the combination relativizes
truth to the latest demands of man's productive
apparatuses and circumstances.
Yet this restless proliferation of norms and the
instability of truth is only one outcome of the interplay
between the two conceits. Another frequent consequence
of this uneasy marriage of modernity which Foucault is
less concerned with, is separation and the destruction
of one of the members, namely universal truth. Sometimes
the atomistic self is unable to tolerate even the claims
to universality which help establish his hegemony, what
is left then is man as his own ground - or rather men, in
the absence of universals which united them. This leads
to atomistic struggles, and the most severe reduction of
those who cohabit the social world to beings-for-the-self
.
Augustine described this process with remarkable acuity in
general terms. Hegel and Marx are two who have analyzed
this dynamic extensively in its particular modern form.
Thus far, humans without metaphysical truths have most
often been self-aggrandizing humans, unlimited by past
337
morals. Their qnriai -,~4- •luei : soc l action - iarn nn ^iil cki g all grounds - has
in the worst cases been "justified" by the senseless and
horrifying £on»s of fasoistio aesthetic decisionism which
Habermas, Richard Wolin and raany others are rightfully
haunted by.
Both of these outcomes - the restless searches
for truth and various forms of nihilism - egoism - are
among the defining features of our age. And both play
an important role in the regular functioning of power.
As the former surveys, regulates and coerces people
around norms that enhance productivity, the latter
frequently deflects criticism and thwarts a sense of
responsibility for and commitment to anything which
lies beyond the self. The former obliterates and
codifies differences while the latter fosters an
oblivious indifference. Foucault, it can be argued,
has not paid enough attention to the salience and
dangers of the latter in his critical writing. That
"man" may be "erased like a face drawn in sand at the
edge of the sea" is dangerous and frightening as well
as potentially attractive and provocative.
Augustine, writing in an extremely different age, had
a profound sense of the dangers of the ontological conceit
that recognizes nothing beyond the self, and we would do
well to listen to his warnings carefully - even if his
alternative contains its own problems and is untenable
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for us. as we stand near the edge of a world without
universal truths, we cannot wish away or take lightly
the problems that tormented him. Beyond metaphysics
there are a variety of paths. if we dance too Ughtly
over the edge we may again discover the horrific, instead
of the possibility of our freedom. Some recent theoretical
trends seem insufficiently aware of this (e.g., this often
seems to be the case with Deleuze and Lyotard. 3
)
Yet is it possible to provide both an awareness
of those dangers and an alternative to them without
Augustine's metaphysics? Can we separate Augustine's
critical insight from his morality? Better still, is
there a position from which we can both recognize the
importance of Augustine's critique of ontological conceit
and recognize the limits and insufficiencies of Augustine
as well? A position from which we can take and fortify
what is best in Augustine's morality - a concern with
flattening and a move towards a greater appreciation of
difference than the decadent version of Roman Paganism -
while avoiding the monological character and arbitrary
limitations of this morality?
I have argued that Foucault's work contains an
ethical alternative to the search for metaphysical
truths which avoids nihilism, egoism and indifference
(in spite of the fact that he rarely focuses upon these
problems in his critical writing) . His artistic ethos
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should be distinguished from the decisionism with which
some would like to associate him. Because Foucault's
understanding of artistic activity is inextricably
connected to a great appreciation of dialogical
encounters with others who are different, his
artistic ethos is closely linked to creating the
self, social, economic and political practices in
forms which would allow and indeed engender such
experiences. This involves fashioning the self
and social world in ways which increase the space
for different others and affirm the value of our
differences. Far from leaving Foucault without
any positive directions, his position provides
a most important voice in the discussion of what
values should govern personal and societal change.
Foucault 's ontology and ethics work counter to both
conceits and provide us with a particular humility which
is not that of humble obedience to metaphysical truths,
but instead, respectful regard for the importance of the
dialogical situation with those who are different and
differences within the self in the creation of ourselves.
He offers us the outlines of a notion of the self as a
work of art which would not generate a monological process
within the self aimed at establishing the One Truth in
depth, but rather fashion the self in part through a
careful internal conversation which would consider many
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dimensions of the spif • x.el and its multiplicitous experiences.
And lff as we noted above< August . ne , s hum . uty weii8
out of a certain conceit, „. might say that Foucault , s
ethic is characterized by a peculiar audacity rooted in
an ontological humility. Not being th>^ ^^
truth, nor being self sufficient, Poucault suggests that
we dwell at the edge o, our being, carefully questioning
who we are in an historical social ontology of ourselves
aimed in part at determining where a transgressive
crafting of our existences might enhance the possibilities
of our freedom and better our lives, within Poucault <s
ethos distinction is both appropriate to the self (there
is no ontological providence which predisposes us to
the "norm") and important if we are to be valuable
interlocutors for others in their own attempts to
artistically shape their lives and the shared social
milieu.
This dimension of Foucault's thought has been
missed by most of his interpreters, and it seems that
there are a few important reasons for this. Foucault
made little effort to make his ethics explicit until
his later writings and even there he is quite subtle
about the matter. For strategic reasons, he carefully
avoided writing from a position that could be construed
to rest on another "truth claim." In his "final inter-
view" in Raritan. he again made clear that he opposed
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the idea of a single morality to be applicable to
everyone.* He was not terribly ^^
who wished to dismiss him as a nihiUst and hence
not guard against passing phrases which could fae
thusly. Yet Foucault was „ot a nih . ust ethicai
stance which was central to his work is precisely an
attempt to stake out an existential strategy between
universal morality and nihilism. It is not a strategy
that has been well received in a world where many are
still yearning to discover metaphysical solutions to
our problems. And it is a strategy whose merits are
barely audible in a world where dialogue and difference
are rigorously marginalized.
The differences between Foucault and Augustine
are quite easy to discern. Those between my readings
of Foucault and Merleau-Ponty on the other hand are more
difficult to grasp. Indeed, I draw them closer together
than would probably make either of them very comfortable. 5
The Merleau-Ponty I describe bears little similarity
with the philosopher-yearning for an originary subject 6
or trying to reduce the world of difference with a
phenomenological body7 - to which Foucault occasionally
makes cryptic references, in fact, I think in many
respects - far from being at odds with each other -
notions of an artistic ethos which can be discerned
in each thinker actually provide an interesting
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and textured theory when they are brought together
Nevertheless there are differences between the two
thinkers and they are important and illuminating.
I will explore these differences as they are manifest
in three areas: first, through a brief analysis of
the rhetoric of "depth" in Merleau-Ponty and Foucault's
frequent attacks on this word; second, through a
discussion of the differences which remain at the
ontological level between the two thinkers; and finally,
by exploring loose affiliations which might be drawn
between the former differences and differences in
the political tendencies of the two philosophers.
Foucault, as we have seen, consistently avoids the
rhetoric of "depth." He is extremely conscious of its
deployment within Christian metaphysics and within the
numerous attempts in our age to resuscitate a metaphysical
understanding of the world. To touch the word is for
him, to risk triggering all sorts of resonations which
might insidiously reinscribe his discourse back into
those which he opposes as sham: confession, Truth,
teleological unities which cohere naturally around
the depths of their singular centers, codified-normalized
subjects, discoverable essences - the secret whispers
of God. Depth is too inextricably tied in with this
constellation of things to be of any use in either
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criticizing this constellation or worUn, towards
different discourses and practices.
Of course, Merleau-Ponty also aims his philosophy
in part against notions that there are pre-existing
truths that we need only reflect or discover and
prefabricated unities that are predestined to come
into existence. But for him, "depth" is both an
important term and a vital metaphor, m large part>
Merleau-Ponty employs "depth" in a manner that is
not concerned with whatever echoes "depth" may import
from its use within Christian metaphysics. He employs
it for its spatial significance, in order, as I have
recounted, to return us to dense living space, space
wildly intertwined with time. Depth is the dimension
that pushes us most forcefully towards a reconsideration
of our being in the world, a re-consideration of the
birth of our experience of space itself ("originality
of depth"), while utilizing the spatial connotations
of "depth" he simultaneously and guite consistently
attempts to coherently transform the word, reinscribing
it as a central figure in a philosophy which reverberates
with words like "polymorphism," "latency," "transgress,"
"wild," "invisible." At some point along the way spatial
depth comes to signify a living thickness - both sensible
and sensing - "overlapping" and "transgressing" itself,
a dimension born simultaneously in our intercorporeal
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mingling with others
, . dimension ^ which
distinct and other as opposed to the dimension in which
things are objectively contain * ,i ntained, displayed and possessed
in entirety.
Yet Merleau-Ponty does more with the word than
utilize and coherently deform its spatial intimations.
He engages certain resonances "depth" has acquired in
Christianity as well. Echoing Augustine, Merleau-Ponty
writes that "depth is the dimension of the hidden."
Reawakening our sense of the hidden, of the invisible
that lines and is an integral aspect of the sensible
world, is a central theme for Merleau-Ponty and "depth"
plays a vital role in the unraveling of this theme.
Of course, what is hidden is not "deep Truth"; rather
it is "hidden-ness" itself that Merleau-Ponty wishes
to bring before us in an effort to reveal an ontology
which recognizes the "obstacles" and "resistance" that
belong to things - a protean world with ineliminable
pregnant reserves. Beyond mere hidden-ness however,
"depth" colors the hidden as wondrous and it motions
us in the direction of a particular attitude toward
the hidden - that of "wonder." And accompanying this
wonder is a certain reverence - a profound awed respect
for Being and flesh. ("Profound" means depth and also
profound.) Albeit this reverence is not for "His voice,"
Merleau-Ponty employs a word steeped in two thousand
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years of Christianity, a word saturated with reverence
as he calls us toward different relations with the world.
in spite of his important departures from metaphysics
-
m the broad sense in which it is commonly employed
today, not the sense in which he sometimes worked with
it8
-
Merleau-Ponty employs the rhetoric of depth, in
part to salvage a sense of mystery and awe that Christi-
anity contained far more of than we typically find in
the secular regions of the modern world. For Merleau-
Ponty
-
with Weber,
"depoeticization" and "disenchantment.,
is central to the problems of modernity, a new and better
ontology and ethics would have to in part evoke poetic -
even reverent
- attitudes. Foucault on the other hand is
more suspicious. He conscientiously avoids such things
in his writing
- even as he describes for us as well as
anyone ever has, the methods which depoeticize our bodies
and disrespect our differences. Reverence seems in his
view to have been too dangerous, too likely to rekindle
teleological conceptions, universal truths, secret
strategies for subjugation, sugary disguises for violence.
In his later work on Kant and enlightenment there are
traces in his rhetoric of something like reverence - we
find words like "belonging" and "respect" - but even here
he is sparing. Indeed, perhaps my development of these
themes in his thought pushes Foucault "further than he
wished to go himself."
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This rhetorical difference between these two
theorists is, I think, entwined with differences at
the ontological level. In an effort to highlight^
differences, let us carefully consider the following
passages.
The first passage, by Foucault, is inescapably self-
explicit:
...we must not imagine that the worldturns towards us a legible face which
we would have only to decipher; the
world is not the accomplice of ourknowledge; there is no prediscursive
providence which disposes the worldin our favour. We must conceive
discourse as a violence which wedo to things, or in any case as apractice which we impose upon them. 9
The second passage, by Merleau-Ponty is more
difficult:
The phenomenological world is not
the bringing to explicit expression
of a pre-existing being, but the
laying down of being. Philosophy
is not the reflection of a pre-
existing truth, but, like art,
the act of bringing truth into
being. One may well ask how
this creation is possible , and
if it does not recapture in things
a pre-existing Reason. The answer
is that the only pre-existent Logos
is the world itself, and that the
philosophy which brings it into
visible existence does not begin
by being possible ; it is actual
or real like the world of which
it is a part, and no explanatory
hypothesis is clearer than the act
whereby we take up this unfinished
347
conceit ??.f& f°rt to Wt. and
We must read carefully here, for if we do not we may
come to the mistaken conclusion that on the very funda-
mental issue of "the world," Foucault and Merleau-Ponty
stand as complete antagonists: The former denies that
the world is Logos, let alone legible, while the latter
discovers in the world a "pre-existent Logos." Those
in search of transcendental breath are allured to
these words. A comforting rhetoric that settles us
back into our chairs after all that blather about
violence, illegibility, indecipherability
, imposition
and lack of favours. So comforting in fact that
"pre-existent Logos" may be the only words one
remembers or thinks about on this entire page.
Yet this would be unfortunate, for Merleau-Ponty 's
line of thought runs in a very different direction than
that which is indicated by this phrase when isolated.
Consider first the "world" which is this pre-existent
logos. He refers, of course, to the "phenomenological
world," the perceptual field or clearing, which we always
inhabit, which, as he writes in the first sentence of
the quoted passage, is itself not an "expression of
a pre-existing being, but the laying down of being"
that emerges - in his later terminology - through the
intertwining of our flesh and that of things. So this
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world does not pre-exist ^ but is laid down
our existence. (And let us not forget as I noted earlier
that for Merleau-Ponty,
"perception is a violent act.")
The phenomenological world is only pre-existent with
respect to philosophy and philosophical activity does
not mirror the Logos of this world - the correlations,
discrepancies, consistencies, continuities, distinctions
which are revealed at the intersections of my various
experiences and those between myself and others - but
"brings it into being" as philosophy attempts to complete
an unfinished world. Philosophers
...do not rediscover an already
given rationality, they "establish
themselves" and establish it, by
an act of initiative which has no
guarantee in being, its justification
resting entirely on the effective
power it centers on us of taking
our history upon ourselves. 11
As with perception, the philosophical reflection which
further gives form to the world does not simply express
possibilities of this world, it also transgresses others,
and as Merleau-Ponty writes in the closing sentence of
this paragraph: it "is a violent act which is validated
by being performed." 12 We should think of the "unfinished
world" as a very incomplete sculpture which requires that
we chisel, grind, sand and polish away some potentialities
in order to accomplish others. And finally, nothing
begins by being "possible," but through the perceptual,
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conceptual or practical activity „hich transcends the
given and lets
-possibility" appear in its wake.
Yet the rhetoric remains. Just as Foucault
banishes "depth" from his discourse, one cannot
imagine him touching
"pre-existent Logos" - even
in a somewhat defensive paragraph like Merleau-Ponty
'
s
-
with a ten foot pen. There simply is no space within
Foucault <s ontology for this type of trope. For the
latter, discourse is a violence we do to things. it
is of course violent for Merleau-Ponty also, but it
is not simply, violence. Central to Merleau-Ponty's
understanding of our embodied perceptual and conceptual
relation to ourselves and the world is the notion that
in the best cases, things that were "unfinished" and
"incomplete" can be "brought into being" and "expressed"
in our intercourse with them, m spite of (he would
say because of ) his awareness of "encroachment,"
"transgression," "concealment," he can still write
that the best speech "frees the meaning captive in
a thing. He can write of the "miracle of related
experiences." 14 There is a certain complicity between
our body and the world for Merleau-Ponty. in the
overlapping of flesh upon flesh the world solicits
our gaze and our gaze responds. Solicitation and
response are fraught with an ineliminable dimension
of discord and violence, but there is the possibility,
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and so.eti.es the occurrence, of a certain circumscribed
justice here as well. Merleau-Ponty
's rhetoric - and
the ontology which reciprocally calls this rhetoric
forth and is illuminated by it . instills anm^
of the turbulence in our existence, but simultaneously
it never allows us to forget the experience of miracles
profundity and poetry.
..It is a view which l ike the most
fragile object of perception - a soap bubble, or a wave -
or like the most simple dialogue, embraces indivisibly
all the order and disorder of the world." 15
The profundity of our experience is not the expres-
sion of a "deep truth" which would be our guarantee,
justification and measure. it is brought into being
in a dialogue between human lives and an inchoate
surrounding world, in which we do not discover a
reason we could obey - even as we experience miracles -
but rather "become responsible for our history."
It seems to me that Merleau-Ponty 's rhetoric and
ontology in which expression and transgression are
intertwined is existentially and experientially much
more appropriate than Foucault's nearly exclusive emphasis
on violence and obstacle. One cannot read a book like
Barry Lopez's Arctic Dreams, with its sensitive portrayal
of the people, animals and plants of the arctic, the
ice, the sun, and not be struck by the fact that in
this discourse there is a certain justice, an expression
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of things in which truths and poetry intermingle. It
is a text that calls attention to the limits and potential
violence of its own and various other perspectives - but
it is not a perspective it makes any sense to summarize
as a "violence done to things." And there is the civil
rights movement, the anti-war movement, the socialist
movement linked with Eugene Debs. None of these can be
summarized adequately as violence and I doubt Foucault
would disagree. However, I still have difficulty
imagining how I could "prove" the superiority of Merleau-
Ponty's approach or even what a "proof" might look like
at this level given their philosophies.
The status of their philosophical agreements - their
points of overlap
- seems a bit easier to define. Both
agree that there is an ineliminable degree of otherness,
difference, recalcitrance, pregnancy to all things we
experience. Everything that we sense, conceptualize
and act upon harbors a surplus beyond that which we
acknowledge
- a surplus that is continually given birth
to, spills beyond and is transgressed by the identities
we formulate in an effort to capture things in their
entirety. The sense of this view does not rest on some
sort of "correspondence" between it and some thing in
the world that it signifies which would guarantee its
truth. Rather, its sense rests upon our sense of the
perpetual failure of concepts, categories, significations,
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norms to totally grasp things. Two tactics which Foucauit
repeatedly utiles for provoking this sense of bankruptcy
is to call our attention to that which is obliterated
or mutilated by our categories and practices (those
who do not work fast enough, those who do not obey,
hermaphrodites, those who masturbate, etc.) and to
expose the way in which they actively and forcefully
impose themselves upon the world. of course, this does
not prove the (at least partial) inadequacy of totalizing
concepts and norms per se, but only that of those norms
and concepts which he debunks (or those related)
. By
showing us repeated efforts and repeated failures however,
Foucauit seeks to prod us into questioning the sense
of this history of Truth-without-excess more generally.
Still, his counter to this history - the notion that
otherness and at least a degree of violence are in-
escapable aspects of existence which we must dialogically
confront in our choices - can claim to be no more than
a working assumption.
Merleau-Ponty also proceeds in part by bringing to
our attention that which is unacknowledged in hegemonic
conceptions (e.g., in his criticisms of liberalism and
Marxism)
.
However, because he also addresses questions
of perception and ontology in ways that are more rigorous,
sustained and, in some senses, more basic, it seems to me
that he more successfully "secures" the points upon which
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he and Foucault agree. „e focuses much Qf
upon the inadequacies of obj ectivist/ ident i fy ing thought
fierce, showing persuasively that it cannot account for
our most basic perceptual experiences - or .ore si.ply,
experience itself.
„e has convincingly demonstrated
that some notions of pvrpcc k^t,r excess
- background, depth, the
invisible
- are necessary if we are to begin to formulate
an understanding of our existence in which experience
is at all possible. He has shown us - at a far more
general level than Foucault - that every revealing
implies concealment, every expression, transgression.
But that perception, discourse and action are
"violent acts"? Here their footing is more difficult
and any attempt to summarily characterize the relation
of the visible to the invisible, the spoken to that
which remains unsaid seems highly questionable. For
it is possible to think of perceptions, conceptions and
practices where that which is eclipsed is so relatively
insignificant or the eclipse so temporary that "violence"
hardly seems to capture what is going on. Indeed as I
have argued to use "violence" in some cases - we can each
conjure our favorite examples - seems to begin to drain
an important word of much of its significance. Hence,
it seems to me that if we wish to stick to what we can
know about the underside of what happens whenever anything
appears we must be satisfied with a word like "eclipse 1
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which may take the form of an utter disgrace, or on the
of sunlight for a few minutes.
But I do not think that either Foucault or Merleau-
Ponty chose their metaphors simply in an attempt to shed
literal light on perception or ontology. Beyond what they
both know about "eclipsing,., their rhetorical choices are
tightly bound up with questions of ethics and politics.
Through his employment of certain metaphors to describe
our fundamental relation to the world (in the broadest
sense: self, others, things) each theorist attempts to
draw us towards what he perceives to be most important
yet most lacking in modernity. For Foucault, who had one
of the most acute eyes for subjugation in this century,
this entails a sense that "everything is dangerous."
Succinctly: "l think that the ethico-political choice
we have to make every day is to determine which is the
main danger." 16 The rhetoric of discord which colors his
ontology is aimed at instilling this lesson so we never
forget it.
Merleau-Ponty also thinks that objectification
and the "terror" associated with it - both overt and
insidious - defines the modern age to a great extent.
In an age where denial is a chief mechanism by which
violence is rendered less visible and perpetuated, he
employs ontological metaphors which summon us to recognize
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the degree of violence in every perception. in an age
where violence is disguised, with Foucault, he gestures
us towards a hyper-sensitivity to the encroachment
intrinsic in existence. Yet this insight shares the
stage with another. For this age of objectification
which denies its violence is at the same time one
of "depoeticization and disenchantment," a time in
which both our categories and our experiences of their
failure are draining away our sense of the openness
of the future and the possibility of creating a world
with more justice and grandeur. Merleau-Ponty worries
about a "bad existentialism, which exhausts itself
in the description of the collision between reason
and the contradictions of experience and terminates
in a consciousness of defeat." 17 His perceptual and
ontological metaphors of "depth," "expression," "miracle,"
"overlapping," are attempts to repoeticize our experience
at a most basic level - attempts to color our existence
with the profundity of possibility.
Viewed at this level, I think that Merleau-Ponty '
s
rhetoric and ontology are more suited than Foucault 's
to the dialogical artistic ethos which I believe they
both share at a general level. A sense of danger and
discord alone is not sufficient - for most people at
most times - to provoke and call forth great creative
deeds. Great acts usually require a sense of positive
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possibility as well. Insofar as tne WQrld Merleau.ponty
evokes is one which is a "pregnancy of possibles-" -
not simply transgression,
"possibles" which allow and
call for better expressions of existence, it elicits
our creative engagement in a way that Foucault's world
does not. it calls us to the task of constructing as
well as deconstructing. of course, Foucault himself
calls us to create our existences, but the world he
describes at the ontological level harbors little of
the inspiration of possibility which would help sustain
this ethos
- an ethos that requires an enormous degree
of fortitude. m short, I think the tenability of this
ethos rests on a sense of the possibility of a certain
degree of complicity in our relations with others and
the natural world, while recognizing that this complicity
always involves an element of transgression.
There are important political implications in the
present distinction as well. The centrality of discord
and danger in Foucault's perception of the world is
entwined with a focus on "local" strategies designed
to thwart the exercise of power at specific sites.
This is partly due to the fact that this perception
has given rise to a heightened understanding of the
importance of these sites in the subjugation of selves.
Yet it is also because this perception has given rise
to a skepticism that leads one to shy away from attempts
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to construct plausible alternatives. In absence of such
alternatives, resistance tends to be consumed in local
struggles against current modes of power.
That Foucault's rhetoric and ontology largely
discourage the attempt to formulate alternatives is
extremely significant, for such alternatives would
involve an articulation of different social values,
visions and concrete directions which might catalyze
significant coalition building with other people
struggling against other sites of power. m addition,
the formulation of alternative practices would tend to
raise more "global" issues as well, as people attempted
to consider the broader circumstances which would be
required in order to realize their goals. These global
issues could provide an additional focus for creating
solidarity.
None of this is necessarily excluded by the ethic
which governs Foucault's work. In fact, I think these
things are called for at the level of his ethics as
I developed them in Chapter Four. But his ontology
and rhetoric tend to inhibit their development. While
his ethics provides an extremely valuable position from
which to begin to formulate positive alternatives to
the contemporary practices he has criticized, Foucault
very rarely actually took these steps. One will say that
this was a strategic choice, that Foucault was simply more
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concerned with playing the „ fool „ and ,.problemat . , . ng „
than with offering us concrete solutions. In part this
is true
- he has said so himself" - and he was able fcQ
raise important questions from this msi«™ <i_m pos tion in ways that
others had not done. Yet we should not endow Foucault
with an agency that he and others have persuasively
debunked. Foucault partly chose his rhetoric and
ontological formulations, but at the same time his
language and fundamental experiences of the world
guided and limited his choices. They dissuaded him
from formulating concrete alternatives even as an
ethos emerged in his writings which provides an original
and fascinating perspective from which to begin this
task. if we are to grasp and creatively develop the
most profound dimensions of Foucault's thought in the
direction of a more adequate political theory it seems
to me that we would do well to shift towards ontological
formulations and rhetorical configurations that are closer
to those of Merleau-Ponty as I have developed his thought
in this text. (Having said this is not to deny that there
is no society imaginable that would not benefit from the
presence of "fools." it is simply to assert that this
benefit hinges in part on those who take up their insights
in ways that are not "fool-ish.")
Merleau-Ponty - as inadequate and unoriginal as his
thoughts on politics often are - continually calls us to
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foliate alternatives to the given visions and practices
of violence and subjugation. His vision of a "third way -
was aimed not only at criticizing and avoiding the hege-
mony of the two super-powers, but also at working out
a path towards a more dialogical and just world. if we
are able to inform this impulse (and the ontology that
supports it) with Foucault's insights into the workings
and dangers of power in modernity, and develop it in
light of the dialogical artistic ethos which emerges
in the writings of both - there are great possibilities.
A Brief GlancP at Two Fignros in the Surrounding
Landscape of Politi cal and Social Thpnry
The dialogical artistic ethos which has been
developed here through the works of Foucault and
Merleau-Ponty provides a vantage point from which to
criticize certain contemporary practices and formulate
alternatives which avoid two dangerous tendencies in
contemporary theory. The first, as exemplified by the
world of Habermas, consists in attempting to ground
critique in quasi-transcendentals derived from an
analysis of an "ideal speech situation" which would
ensure the possibility of a non-coercively arrived at
rational consensus. Leaving aside the questions of
interpretation which arise in the Habermas-Godamer
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debate and elsewhere, the central problem with respect
to the argument I have been developing here is that
in Habermas' scheme differences are only recognized
as legitimate if they fall within the limits defined
by the preconditions deemed necessary for achieving a
"rational consensus." Differences are only acknowledged
to the extent that they can be formulated in a manner
that would guarantee the possibility of an eventual
identity. Yet this a priori privileging of identity,
unity, consensus and Reason above all else is precisely
one of the issues which Foucault contests. m light of
this crucial discrepancy, Dreyfus and Rabinow are probably
justified in asserting that Habermas' position precludes
any real dialogue with Foucault. 20 Habermas' stance seems
to foreclose the possibility of problematizing dimensions
of our modernity which we have good reason to question.
Furthermore, in the context of the achievement of a
transparent rationality there appears to be no space
for "non-rational" differences let alone a positive
valuation of differences. As we have seen, such a
stance is extremely problematic in light of the
philosophies of Foucault and Merleau-Ponty
.
With this in mind Foucault writes, "perhaps one
must not be for consensuality
, but one must be against
nonconsensuality." 21 The principle of nonconsensual ity
here implies a coercive non-dialogical form of power
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that approaches the other through force or discipline.
It is unacceptable for Foucault, because it implies
that we "throw away" the possibility of understand!,
our differences or reaching agreements dialogically
.
Yet there is no genuine dialogical engagement between
different others when their voices are limited at
the start within the confines of a regulative reason
which would a priori guarantee consensus. Hence while
rejecting nonconsensual ity Foucault simultaneously opposed
consensus as a regulative principle, and in fact finds
the most fecund situations to be those where significant
differences intermingle.
There are important limits (which must be empirically
defined) to difference within the artistic ethos. Those
differences that are inherently nonconsensual and non-
dialogical, those whose primary effect is to obliterate
the difference of the world around them, are not
acceptable where they have a significant social impact.
Yet these limits well out of a dialogical appreciation
of and respect for others' differences (a respect and
appreciation which does not preclude extremely discordant
conversations)
,
rather than the preconditions for possible
homogenization.
At the same time that the artistic ethos avoids
the Habermasian quagmire however, it is equally distant
from the "post-modern" alternative we find developed
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in the work of Jean-Francois Lyotard. Reacting against
the dangerous implications of totalizing thought, Lyotard
suggests that we abandon
"legitimating metanarratives"
and affirm the heterogeneity of diverse language games.
For Lyotard, this implies that these games will be (in
Sam Weber's words)
"non-communicating and incommeasur-
able";22 multiplicitous discourses and practices will
flourish without regard to the "totalitarian" demands
for some sort of exterior accountability or concern.
Of course, Lyotard is not entirely blind to the fact
that as embodied in the same social world our discursive
practices encroach upon one another. But his position,
which is one of indifference and non-sense towards that
which lies beyond each particular "game," and in the
inter-world between "games" is unable to address this
problem. Hence Hobbes rumbles in the final passage
of Just Gaming as Lyotard backs into a corner where
he finds lurking "the great prescriber himself." 23
In contrast to this very dangerous morass - whose
worship of incommeasurability and non-communicating
indifference towards that which is Other (or, in
a different "game") leads us back to the absolute
sovereign - the artistic ethos developed here fosters
a communication between games, selves, practices which
transcends the limits of each and calls for the diverse
developments of each to acknowledge and respect the
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aialogical inter-world of differences to which they
belong. The question of the possible forms that this
acknowledgement and respect might take ultiMately brings
us back to the issue of establishing limits. what u
clear within this ethos is that these limits will have
to be determined through an ongoing discussion which
seeks to elaborate an "ontology of the present." only
through such an ontology
- the type initiated by Kant
and continued in Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, Weber, Adorno,
Merleau-Ponty, Foucault, Heidegger and others - can we
genuinely attempt to discern and weigh the advantages and
disadvantages of our practices and hence make decisions
that are as thoughtful as possible. And only through
social, economic and political structures that affirm
multiple and diverse voices can such an ontology attain
a maximum guarantee against dogmatism.
If this text has thus far quite persistently remained
at the level of ontology and ethics, if I have avoided
throwing out many anchors which might "ground" and "bring
down to earth" what is admittedly an abstract journey,
this is in no way to avoid either the necessity or the
desirability of working out the implications of what has
been said for our everyday practices. Yet while theory
and practice, ethics and politics, exist in a relationship
of circularity which partially constitutes the nature of
each, I am extremely wary of those who demand that the
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circle be drawn too tightly. The circumscription implied
too often leads to both bad theory and bad practice. If
I have exploited for the moment a margin of autonomy for
theory, it has been to allow the latter the possibility
of developing in a manner that might shed a different
light upon the practices and commitments out of which
it sprang.
But there is another issue as well. if theory
runs the danger of being excessively constrained when
it is tied too tightly, frequently, or carelessly into
the everyday, the latter suffers as well. The way we
live is too textured and important to be shaped and
governed by quick leaps out of theory, too complicated
for there to be much justice in glib theoretical
references affirming this practice, denying that one.
As Foucault illustrated and articulated on numerous
occasions, the task of creating our lives is an activity
requiring profoundly historical analysis. Discerning
the practical implications of theory requires the same.
Leaping over historical analysis blunts the possible
contributions of theory making it of little value to
the world, and stifles the possibility that the world
might speak to and transform theory. The very possibility
of a dialogue between theory and practice requires more
care than I am capable of in passing remarks and examples.
What is required at this point - in addition to further
365
wor* on the ethic at an abstract^ . ^ ^
proceeds with the values and insights which surface in
the ethos begun by Merleau-Ponty and Foucault.
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